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Abstract
In an age in which humanity produces increasingly more data, information security
is of critical importance. Risk, ambiguity and uncertainty are inherent features of
information security, as potential threats can be known, imperfectly known or unknown.
Information security professionals have to assess risk and consequently decide on protec-
tive and corrective measures for treating this risk. We investigate whether professionals
make such decisions optimally, in an objective way.
In order to do so, we conduct online experiments and surveys measuring perception
and attitudes of security professionals towards risk. Participants are asked to state
their willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid a series of losses-only lotteries, make choices
between such lotteries and state their preferences over risk treatment actions. We
examine professionals’ behaviour in these lotteries as well as in security scenarios and
conclude that security professionals do not minimise expected losses and cannot be
considered as rational decision-makers.
We also contrast professionals’ behaviour to that of a sample of university students and
show that their preferences are measurably different in several respects. Both samples
are found to be susceptible to inconsistencies between WTP and choice decisions. Risk
attitude of participants is found to depend on the probability level of potential losses.
We devise a mechanism to elicit professionals’ preferences between security and oper-
ability and find that the nature of their employment influences these preferences. Our
findings suggest that security professionals are risk and ambiguity averse and are sus-
ceptible to framing effects when assessing and treating risk. Distinct preferences over
risk treatment actions are also detected.
We interview renowned experts from the industry and academia about the implica-
tions of these findings. We conclude that these factors, being usually overlooked in risk
assessment and treatment methodologies, need to be taken into consideration for the
development of objective and unbiased risk management. Finally, we discuss implica-
tions and recommend approaches for de-biasing decision-making.
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1.1 Motivation
The topic of this thesis is the examination of behavioural traits that individual pro-
fessionals and practitioners exhibit when they make decisions in the inherently risky
and uncertain field of information security. The issues of particular interest are how
information security professionals perceive risk, how they act in order to minimise or
avoid risk, and whether behavioural biases adversely affect professionals’ decisions.
Decision- and policy-makers are engaged in a constant effort to limit losses due to
information security breaches. New regulations, policies, technical and operational
measures are implemented in an attempt to minimise the exposure of organisations
and governments to cyber threats. Spending on protective measures and mechanisms
for information security is a big issue for most organisations. Specifying the optimal
level of information security investment is not an easy task for security professionals.
Reports show that defensive information security measures are increasingly adopted
by businesses; nevertheless, the cost of security breaches either remains at high levels
[110] or has been growing [4, 100]. However, insufficient expenditure on information
security is considered as one of the main obstacles that security professionals face [4].
Optimising security investment level is crucial, but hard to achieve, and requires a
balance between overspending and insecurity.1
It might be expected that the existing plethora of best practices and standards for
1When it comes to cybersecurity survey data interpretation should be careful, as contacted and
responding populations can lead to unrepresentative samples [61]. Also, surveying rare events is by
default problematic.
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managing information security systems would allow for investment decisions to be ob-
jectively evaluated and justified. However, there is a lot of space for subjectivity and
judgement in today’s information security environment. A generalised example that
sketches the decisions an information security professional faces is the following. An
information security professional needs to protect national or organisational assets of
specific value against various threats. Therefore, she has to decide the amount of pro-
tective investment that is required to be spent in order to avoid unwanted losses caused
by security breaches or failures. The professional possesses historical data on the fre-
quency of various threats materialising, but data provides only an estimation of threat
probabilities. So, it is up to her to decide and propose the exact investment level for
minimising expected losses. In order to make an informed decision, she conducts an
assessment on the vulnerability of the assets under protection. She needs to decide
whether additional security controls are needed based on the expected value of loss.
She might consider accepting the risk and not invest or she might propose investing
in security measures for reducing the identified vulnerability. Alternatively, she can
choose to implement measures for containing the potential damage in case it occurs,
instead of making the asset less vulnerable. Finally, she can buy insurance in order to
transfer part of the identified risk.
Using historical data as predictors on security events can be considered as the most
objective and reliable approach for making informed decisions on the level of invest-
ment in information security. Such an approach allows for estimating the probability of
threats and their potential impacts. The probabilities of specific events, along with the
loss that an organisation might suffer, determine the expected losses associated with
various threats. For the purpose of providing evidence that can fortify organisations
more effectively, notification of cyber breaches is enforced by laws and regulations, such
as the California Security Breach Information Act [38] or the EU General Data Protec-
tion Regulation [49]. However, such historical data is usually incomplete and decisions
have to be made in fundamentally different contexts with dissimilar requirements. So,
relying only on existing data for educated investment decisions is likely to produce
sub-optimal decisions. Information security professionals have to face the ambiguity
and uncertainty that missing or incomplete information bears and make decisions on
security investment by using their preferred methodologies.
There is a number of approaches followed by professionals. For example, cost-benefit
analysis [72] as well as risk-management resource-allocation techniques [79] constitute
widely accepted approaches to the problem of investment levels. There are variety
of models used by professionals including: Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of
Return (IRR), Return on Investment (ROI) and Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
[19, 57, 73, 101, 124]. NPV is a metric which sums up investment gains per time period
and subtracts the cost of investment from these gains. The metric includes a discount
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rate factor per time period, which describes the decreasing trend of investment gains
per time period. IRR is the specific discount rate which makes NPV equal to zero.
ROI is another measure which evaluates the efficiency of an investment; basicall,y it is
the difference between the gains from an investment minus the investment cost, divided
by this investment cost. ROSI is essentially the application of ROI in the domain of
security; namely, instead of gains it uses monetary loss reduction which is estimated
by the reduction in the annual loss expectancy by a threat achieved by investing in
a security measure. Importantly, all these metrics use expected gains or expected
reduction of losses.
But, since there is no dominant model for decision-making in security [123], profes-
sionals are encouraged to choose their own appropriate risk analysis and assessment
methods [34, 81] to match the needs of their organisations.
However, all methodologies which try to assess risk in a quantitative fashion are subject
to three significant limitations [57]:
1. Many approximations are involved in the process, e.g. due to ambiguity and
unknown risks;
2. As a consequence, these approximations can be biased by the decision-maker’s
perception of risk, and;
3. Involved calculations conducted by the decision-maker can be easily manipulated.
2
Subjectivity of risk perception and the lack of a predominant bounding economic model
for deciding and justifying security investment, imply that the decision-maker’s prefer-
ences and risk attitude, may have important effects on decisions.
Individual risk perception refers to people’s judgement and evaluation of a hazard. Risk
attitude is the individual’s intention to evaluate and act on a risky situation [127] and
can be defined as “a chosen response to uncertainty that matters, driven by percep-
tion” [77]. Perception of risk and attitude towards risk are concepts that have been
extensively studied in the field of behavioural economics [40, 91, 105] revealing various
biases and heuristics, i.e. simple rules, that individuals use when making decisions.
Coming back to the aforementioned example, we can highlight various points that allow
for subjective approaches. For example, the professional’s attitude towards risk can be
differentiated depending on the probability of a threat materialising, and also on the
2For example if the expected annual frequency of occurrence of a threat is estimated to be, say, ten,
it can be easily deflated to eight or exaggerated to twelve, for serving the decision-maker’s personal
agenda. Such a manipulation would also bear changes in costs.
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expected damage to be incurred. When a threat bears potential catastrophic outcomes,
the attention of the professional might be disproportionately focused on the worst-case
outcome, and hence she might be willing to spend more in order to be on the safe
side, even if the probability of such an event is negligible. In other cases, she might
diminish the urgency of quite probable threats or consider small losses inevitable. The
professional might have preferences over the available actions, even if the expected value
of the alternative choices is the same, a fact that would imply the existence of different
preference criteria. Another factor the professional has to take into consideration and
which can potentially affect her decision is the balance between the level of protection
and operational efficiency. The professional can view protection of the assets as a
necessary cost subtracted form the budget, or she can view it as an investment with
business return or other benefits. The classification of protection as either gains or
losses may affect her willingness to invest.
The final investment decision that the professional makes is potentially influenced by
these factors, including her individual attitude to risk. Importantly, the decided level
of investment has to be communicated and justified to other parties in the govern-
mental or organisational structure; these parties may lack the expertise necessary to
understand her suggestions. Such a possibility might cause the security professional
to either exaggerate or deflate her initial proposals in order to make them seem jus-
tifiable. Thus, a variety of potentially influential factors, the amount and quality of
available information and individual perception, all potentially affect decisions. Con-
sequently, information security professionals have to rely on their judgement and thus,
their preferences and biases are ultimately inserted in the decision-making process.
Expected utility theory is the standard normative approach to decision making which
states that for decisions which are made frequently, a rational decision maker should
maximise expected gains. We use this approach, as it is aligned with the widespread
industry practice [57]. Maximisation of expected profits, or, quite often in the context
of information security, minimisation of expected losses constitute strategic goals for
organisations. These goals can be achieved, amongst other actions, by objectifying
security investment decisions. In this research we take an experimental approach in
order to examine risk perception, risk attitude and security-related preferences of active
information security professionals. In particular, we investigate whether the inherent
subjectivity in information security decision-making causes systematic violations of ex-
pected value maximisation and produces behavioural biases which make professionals’
decisions suboptimal. We also examine whether risk behaviour of professionals differs
from the behaviour of a student sample, due to context parameters or professionals’
exposure to risk. We present related literature in Section 2.1.4, however, to the best of
our knowledge, this kind of research has not been studied to an adequate extent. The
strengths and limitations of the research approach are discussed in Section 2.2.
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1.2 Overview of Methodology
For the purposes of this study we conduct a series of experiments and surveys. A sam-
ple of active real-life information security practitioners and professionals is drawn from
current and former students of the master’s degree in Information Security from Royal
Holloway, University of London (RHUL). These professionals have significant experi-
ence across a variety of roles in the industry, as described in detail in the experiments of
Chapters 3 and 4 (see Sections 3.2.2 and 4.2.2). Another sample of volunteer students
is drawn from individuals registered in the database of the Laboratory for Decision
Making and Economic Research at RHUL.
We ask participants to state their willingness to pay in order to avoid lotteries which
have negative-only outcomes. Except for abstract lotteries, we use security-scenario
lotteries in order to simulate the context of information security. This way, we measure
the attitude of subjects towards risk. A variety of lotteries with different levels of
probabilities and outcomes is used. Some lotteries have fixed probabilities and outcomes
and others involve ranges of probabilities or ranges of outcomes or both. This allows
us to examine behaviour towards ambiguity. We devise lottery-comparison tasks in
order to elicit risk preferences of participants. We present the same problems in a
variety of ways and we separate subjects into differently-framed condition groups for
exploring potential framing effects. It should be mentioned that in this research, the
approach followed is the traditional assumption that the preferences of decision-makers
are revealed through their choices.
Survey results are used in combination with experiment findings. Except for demo-
graphic information, the surveys involve problems presented as information security
scenarios, in order to examine decisions in context. Participants also reply to ques-
tions regarding risk perception in general and in relation to their professional roles.
Priorities, decision criteria and role-dependent risk preferences are also reported by the
sample of professionals.
Subjects are informed about the anonymised processing of data, which is used only for
the purposes of the study, before they consent in taking part in the experiments. They
are also informed about the maximum amount of payment that they might receive3.
It is explained to participants that they will be paid based on their performance. The
amount of payment is randomly generated by a computer function which simulates one
of the lotteries that participants choose during the experiments. Payment is sent to
participants in the form of an Amazon gift certificate, via the Amazon website of their
preference.
3For example, participants are informed that they can earn up to 13 and 10 USD in the experiments
of Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
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Whenever possible, we use non-parametric statistical tests, because they involve fewer
assumptions than parametric tests. All experiment tasks are designed and tested
against order effects. In order to exclude order effects from the experiments we conduct
the following steps. First, we randomise the order of questions so that participants, for
example, are not presented with the same types of lotteries in the same sequence. We
also randomise all treatment groups in which participants are assigned to. Secondly, we
examine whether there are significant differences in risk behaviour amongst the random
groups. No order effects are detected in the research.
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2. In this chapter we describe the increasing importance of decision-making
in information security. Fundamental notions of information security risk management
are presented, along with potential biases related to the security environment. We also
provide the theory and the models used in experimental and behavioural economics for
the elicitation of systematic patterns in individual risk behaviour.
Chapter 3. This chapter explores risk attitude of information security professionals
under risk and ambiguity by the use of an experiment and a survey. We also test
other hypotheses in this experiment, namely worst-case aversion and other evaluation
ambiguity aversion. A sample of students is additionally used in the experiment in
order to contrast behaviour of professionals.
We ask participants about the amount of money they are willing to pay in order to avoid
unfavourable lotteries. This way we elicit their attitude towards risk across various lev-
els of probabilities and negative outcomes. Other tasks require that participants choose
between two lotteries. We do not trace enough evidence to support other-evaluation
ambiguity aversion or worst-case aversion. However, we detect systematic violations of
expected utility theory. Risk behaviour of professionals is found significantly different
from that of students in various ways. Professionals are better than students at min-
imising expected losses, but they are equally, and occasionally worse, than students in
being susceptible to preference reversals when presented with the same problems framed
in different ways. These findings imply that professionals’ involvement with risk might
objectify their decisions to a certain extent, however some biases are manifested equally
amongst professionals and students. Perception of probabilities is also estimated as be-
ing more distorted by professionals than by the student sample. Professionals are also
found significantly averse towards ambiguity. The former finding might indicate pro-
fessionals’ limitations in making objective decisions and the latter their inclination to
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accurately specify risks. Lastly, we devise a mechanism in order to measure prioritisa-
tion of professionals over the system attributes of security and operability. The elicited
preferences are shown to depend on professionals’ job positions. Both professionals and
students are found to systematically deviate from expected value maximisation.
Chapter 4. In this chapter we describe an experiment that investigates preferences
of information security professionals related to the risk management process. In par-
ticular, we examine preferences of professionals over risk treatment actions and their
behaviour under different framing conditions.
Professionals are again asked about their willingness to pay (WTP) in order to avoid
a series of negative-outcome lotteries or modify the stakes of lotteries into being more
favourable. We elicit characteristic preferences for specific types of lottery modifica-
tions. Additionally, professionals are asked to make investment decisions in hypotheti-
cal information security scenarios. Professionals systematically prefer to reduce losses
rather than the probabilities associated with these losses in these scenario-lotteries.
Three treatment groups are created randomly, presenting participants with risky choices
framed as gains, losses or individually separated losses. Professionals reveal a distinct
behaviour for eliminating losses: they are more risk-averse in the gains-group than in
the losses-group and more risk-averse when losses are reduced from individual bud-
gets than when they are subtracted from a single budget. However, the possibility of
eliminating risk completely does not change professionals’ risk behaviour relatively to
modifying risk.
Chapter 5. This chapter presents the potential implications of research findings,
along with a survey regarding professionals’ risk-related perceptions. We interview
three renowned information security experts and evaluate the potential impact of the
research findings in real-world security environments. We discuss recommendations for
de-biasing suboptimal security investment decisions.
Chapter 6. Finally, we present the conclusion of the thesis.
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2.1 Information Security
2.1.1 The Importance of Information Security
Our age has been characterised as the “Information Age”. The products and by-
products of our daily activities produce a vast amount of digital data. All this data can
be viewed from the perspective of an individual’s daily activities. We connect to the
Internet, exchange messages, upload photos and videos, use GPS devices, are captured
by cameras, record our daily jogging exercise and our phones, watches, televisions and
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even our cars are connected to networks. It has been estimated that since 2010, human-
ity has been producing more data per day than from the beginning of time until the
year 2003 [136]. At the same time, we want our communications to remain private, our
personal data stored on our computers, tablets and mobile phones to be unreachable by
strangers, and our blood test results to be shared only with medical personnel. We also
expect that traffic lights operate reliably, electricity and water supplies are available
at all times, and that we are able to use our technology and devices whenever we find
it convenient. We do not want someone posting messages on social media using our
name, nor have our credit card details stolen while we shop online.
On the other hand, there is a corporate perspective of information security, which
is under examination in this research. Organisations in every business sector have
a goal to meet their business objectives. The opportunities that businesses have to
take or create, inherently include information security (or cybersecurity) risks. In
this sense, information security risk management plays a crucial role for organisations,
because it protects valuable assets, it secures communications, it maintains information
trustworthy, it keeps services available to clients and provides a variety of security
services. Thus, the well-being and progress of all kinds of organisations relies, to some
extent, on managing information security risks. But, the primary goal of businesses
is to maximise their expected profits and, at the same time, minimise their expected
losses. An organisation’s investment in information security measures ultimately needs
to serve this purpose.
2.1.2 The Information Security Profession
Professionals involved in information security face difficult decisions. They have to
select appropriate measures relating to security technology, security services, awareness
training programs, forensic services and regulatory compliance amongst other issues.
Allocating and justifying the optimal amount of investment for each measure is not
an easy task. The reasons are mainly the uncertainty that pertains potential losses
associated with security breaches and the ambiguous nature of the associated threats
and vulnerabilities. Decisions made by security professionals are crucial; monetary
losses caused by security breaches can have a devastating impact on the continuity,
recovery, the brand value and reputation of the business, and ultimately, on the very
existence of an organisation [123, 124]. On the other hand, demonstrating a low number
of security breaches can provide the organisation with a commercial advantage over its
competitors [8].
Excluding reputation which can, for example, reveal the security posture of an organ-
isation, security can be often viewed as a gamble that professionals have to take. In
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this gamble, the organisation either suffers a loss or, in the best-case scenario, loses
nothing. In this sense, security controls are tools for loss minimisation, and a “security
gamble” yields only non-positive outcomes. This fact diversifies the information secu-
rity investment context from the usual economic framing of choice outcomes as gains
or losses.
The term “investment” in information security was introduced in previous sections
but, it is important to note, that organisational culture still largely treats security
as an overhead and not as an investment [120]. This view constitutes an obstacle in
professionals’ attempts to justify investment in security measures.
For the purpose of this research we categorise information security professionals into
four main roles:
 Senior executives, e.g., Chief Executive Offiers (CEOs), Chief Information Offi-
cers (CIOs), Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs), Chief Security Officers
(CSOs), etc.
 Managers, e.g., Project Managers, IT Directors, Security Managers, etc.
 IT & Security professionals, e.g., Security Officers, System Administrators, Infor-
mation Analysts, etc.
 Compliance, Risk and Privacy professionals, e.g., Consultants, Auditors, etc.
The role of security professionals, except for choosing appropriate protective mecha-
nisms, involves prioritising and balancing attributes of the system under protection.
For example, one of these characteristics is the notion of trade-off between security and
operability (e.g. operational time) in a security environment. Considered through this
prism, the decision-maker has yet another dimension to the problem to consider before
investing.
Another factor which might influence the decision process is the position of the decision-
maker in an organisation. For example, top-down approaches to risk management
initiated from higher management and shareholders have entirely different results to
bottom-up approaches, which are pushed “upwards” from information security person-
nel to management. There are some interesting findings regarding the correlation of
professional roles with preferences of professionals, as will be presented in the following
chapters (see Chapter 3). These issues are dynamic and constantly evolving. Reports
show a shift from traditional decision-making conducted by security and IT managers
towards a framework that involves senior management as well as financial and opera-
tional managers in the decision process [76]. Thus, information security professionals
are not necessarily the only contributors to the information security risk management
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process of an organisation, nor have they the final word on investment decisions. How-
ever, their opinion is highly influential.
Investment in security mechanisms is decided through the risk management process,
as is explained in more detail in Section 2.1.2.1. At the heart of risk management lies
risk assessment and its countless approaches. In order for a quantitative assessment
of risk to be conducted, threats have to be identified, existing vulnerabilities need to
be evaluated, probabilities have to be assigned to each potential threat manifestation,
and corresponding losses need to be estimated. A more detailed description of threats,
vulnerabilities and risk is presented in Section 2.1.2.2. In Section 2.1.3 we describe
a number of information-security-related economic and behavioural hypotheses which
are examined in this study.
2.1.2.1 The Risk Management Process
We provide the definitions and approach of the International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) regarding the risk management process in information security. ISO
is probably the most widely accepted, independent, non-governmental membership or-
ganisation and largest developer of international standards. The ISO/IEC 27000 series
of standards is dedicated to information security and is published collaboratively by
ISO and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). These standards have
been embraced by the information security industry [83], and certification against cer-
tain standards in the series has been made mandatory by a number of governments
worldwide.
Risk management is defined in ISO Guide 73 [80] as the “coordinated activities to
direct and control an organization with regard to risk”. The overall process of risk
management is defined as“a systematic application of management policies, procedures
and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, establishing the context
and identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk”. The
set of activities that comprise the risk management process can be broadly categorised
as either risk assessment or risk treatment. Risk assessment, consists of:
1. Risk identification: where threats and vulnerabilities are found, identified, and
described.
2. Risk analysis: where the nature and level of risk is estimated.
3. Risk evaluation: where the risks are evaluated against the organisation’s risk
criteria.
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All three phases of risk assessment require information security professionals’ judge-
ment.
Risk treatment follows risk assessment and consists of “what to do with the risks at
hand”, e.g. implementing controls in order to reduce, retain, avoid, or share risks
depending on expected costs and benefits [81]. Risk treatment is the final risk decision
that needs to be taken or proposed by security professionals.
The four risk treatment actions are defined in the following way. Risk reduction or
modification refers to the action of reducing the probability of loss, or the loss itself.
The action of retaining risk, is the choice by which the decision-maker accepts the
identified risk as it is. Risk avoidance is usually the business decision by which the
scope of the organisation changes, and therefore there is no exposure to certain threats.
Finally, risk transfer refers to the action in which risk is shared with some other party,
usually by purchasing insurance.
It is widely accepted that “judgement” is not only unavoidable, but also necessary for
managing risk successfully. There are two clear, albeit very general, suggestions in ISO
27005 [81] for efficient risk treatment:
 Judgement should be exercised in certain cases for the justification of decisions,
and;
 Perception of risk by affected parties should be taken into account.
However, individual expert judgement cannot be easily “put into moulds” and worry-
ingly has been shown to be far from optimal in many areas of expertise [60, 68], mostly
because experts reveal subjective preferences, choice inconsistencies and cognitive lim-
itations [141].
One further factor that needs careful consideration is how to find the “most appropriate
ways to communicate risk” to involved parties [81]. However, just as there is no unified
approach to measuring perceived risk, neither is there a well-defined methodology for
risk communication. Importantly, the risk management approach and the individual
behavioural traits might shape the preferences of professionals, making their choices
sub-optimal. To our knowledge, behavioural issues associated with the decision points
of the risk management process have not been extensively studied, especially, from the
perspective of individual choices of information security professionals.
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2.1.2.2 Threats, vulnerabilities and losses
In order to perform quantitative risk assessment, information security professionals have
to estimate the following variables, which depend on the given system under protection
and the needs of the organisation. The following definitions are taken from ISO 27002
[82]:
 Threat is a potential cause of an incident that may result in harm to a system or
organisation.
 Security vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or group of assets that can be
exploited by one or more threats.
 Risk is the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or
groups of assets and thereby cause harm to the organisation.
 Impact is the result of an information security incident, caused by a threat, which
affects assets.
Each potential information security threat i is assumed to have a corresponding proba-
bility of occurence, i.e. a probability of manifestation, ti. For each threat, the informa-
tion system or organisation under protection has an associated probability of breach
(vulnerability), vi. The estimated impact (i.e. the outcome or loss) that the organisa-
tion suffers when a breach is materialised, is symbolised with xi, for various outcomes;
this is related to the value of the asset under protection. One approach is to assume
that the total value of the asset will be lost in the event that a threat materialises [8].
 Asset is anything that has value to an organisation, its business operations and
its continuity [82]. 1
Threats are external, meaning they exist independently of any actions of the decision-
maker, thus, their probabilities cannot be altered. By contrast, vulnerabilities are inter-
nal, meaning that their associated probabilities can be reduced by security investment
decisions. In some cases, information security professionals do not target vulnerability
probabilities vi with their investment decisions, but instead aim to contain the potential
impacts xi.
The probability that a vulnerability is exploited allowing a threat to be realised, i.e.
the risk, is pi = ti × vi. The various probabilities of risk pi correspond to outcomes
xi. The expected value of the impact of an information security incident then is:
1This definition is deliberately vague. Notably, an asset can be information, a physical item or
software.
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Expected Outcome = ti × vi × xi. In some cases, for the purposes of simplicity or
abstraction, risk probabilities pi can be used directly, allowing for the omission of ti
and vi.
2.1.3 Behaviour and Decisions in Information Security
In this section we present a number of decisions that information security professionals
have to make and the associated behavioural traits that they might exhibit.
Risk Aversion
The first trait that can be examined in the behaviour of information security profession-
als is attitude towards risk. That is, whether professionals are risk-averse, risk-neutral
or risk-seeking when they face threats and potential losses. In this research we ex-
amine risk attitude by comparing professionals’ willingness to pay in order to avoid
unfavourable lotteries with the expected value of these lotteries. There might exist
a number of factors that could cause decision-makers to deviate from expected value
maximisation. For example, their risk behaviour might depend on the level of the
threat probability and / or the magnitude of losses. Professionals might have a certain
risk behaviour which is shaped by their involvement with information security. Such a
behaviour might be different from the behaviour of the general population, due to the
frequent exposure of professionals to risk.
Findings related to professionals’ risk attitude are presented in Section 4.3.4; a com-
parison with the behaviour of a student sample is described in Section 3.3.1.
Ambiguity Aversion
Given that real-world decisions are ultimately at least ambiguous, a substantial amount
of theoretical and empirical work has been focused on the observed phenomenon of the
so-called ambiguity avoidance or ambiguity aversion. Very loosely, ambiguity aversion
can be defined as the attitude of preferring specific probabilities over ranges of proba-
bilities, i.e. preferring risky lotteries over ambiguous lotteries. Another definition for
ambiguity is the lack of knowledge regarding various scenarios [48]. This is the most
common situation in information security, where it is almost impossible to estimate the
exact probabilities of threats and vulnerabilities.
There are a variety of psychological sources of ambiguity aversion which have been
studied in the quest of explaining observed avoidance in decisions [50]. For example,
self-evaluation and other-evaluation is a pair of hypotheses in which decision-makers
anticipate future evaluations. Such an anticipation can either refer to decision-makers’
own future evaluation about past choices, in a similar way to regret-aversion [102]. Or,
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alternatively, decision-makers might weight their choices by anticipating the evaluation
of others, e.g. of peers and colleagues. Such a setting is common in organisations and
information security environments.
Other-evaluation Ambiguity Aversion
The information security setting of the other-evaluation ambiguity aversion hypoth-
esis can be a cooperation between a security professional and a senior manager. In
an oversimplified version of the setting, the security professional proposes a security
investment and the senior manager accepts or declines the proposal.
This setting places security professionals in a defensive position where they need to
prove their competence by the soundness of their choices, as it is expected from them
to make sound decisions for protecting the organisation’s assets. This is a distinct
characteristic of the security professional role. So, according to the other-evaluation
hypothesis, decision-makers are ambiguity averse because they choose the most, a pos-
teriori, justifiable option. For example, if a choice were between two risky lotteries
it would be justified to choose the less risky lottery, in which case increased “riski-
ness” can be expressed by the mean preserving spread of a lottery [130]. In particular,
if decision-makers prefer a lottery over its mean preserving spreads, then they are
ambiguity-averse. Moreover, the measure for such aversive behaviour can be explicitly
specified by the risk premium that the decision-makers are willing to pay, for not tak-
ing the gamble. If the dilemma were between a risky and an ambiguous lottery, then
the most justifiable choice would be to choose the risky lottery. Accordingly, if the
decision-maker were to decide between two ambiguous lotteries, then the less ambigu-
ous one could be more easily justified to other parties. In this sense, other-evaluation
leads to ambiguity aversion. It is reasonable to assume that this attitude should be
manifested in information-security decision-making environments, although, as far as
we are concerned, this aspect has not been studied. The other-evaluation ambiguity
aversion hypothesis has been empirically reproduced and sustained as a purported psy-
chological source of ambiguity [50].
Other approaches suggest that ambiguity is a second step in the decision process in
which the less ambiguous option is chosen if all other alternatives are equally preferred
(forced choice) [50, 126].
We present experimental findings that strongly support ambiguity aversion (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1, but we find no evidence of other-evaluation ambiguity aversion (see Sec-
tion 3.3.3). Possible implications of these results are discussed in Section 5.5.
Action and Inaction
Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion in other contexts have been shown to lead to
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the omission-bias [125], i.e. a reluctance of the decision-maker to act. Explanations
of this bias include the perception that damaging omissions are preferred to damaging
actions [142]. Another explanation is the belief that inaction does not cause outcomes.
Security professionals have to justify their choices, but even before that they have to
justify their position. It is doubtful that omission under risk and ambiguity could
be justified as an information security strategy. This might well be the case even if
inaction is the most beneficial option, because it is harder to justify. It is therefore
expected that decision-makers behave in an “anti-omission” (commission) manner, in
order to justify their role and position. At the end of the day, it is considered “better”
to take measures for something that will never happen, than having omitted to take
action for a security breach that did manifest. However, such a choice is not necessarily
the one that minimises losses. For example, the option of buying insurance and thus
transferring risk to another party, even if beneficial, could be less preferable as an
option to professionals. Statistically significant findings of our second experiment may
indicate the existence of such behaviour (see Section 4.3.1).
Gains and Losses
A common perception regarding the information security context is that outcomes
belong in the domain of losses. That is, the best outcome is usually considered to
be a zero loss and there can be no gain. This is a characteristic that differentiates
decision-making in security from decision-making in other environments, e.g. a financial
context, where losses are mirrored by gains. We test whether such a perception of
security has an effect on professionals’ risk attitude by contrasting this view with an
approach to information security as an activity with potential return on investment
(see Section 4.3.3).
Focusing on outcomes
A bias towards the outcome of a decision, in which the decision-maker distinctively
ignores the decision process has been reported. Subjects that manifest this bias, a
posteriori overweight the quality of thinking and the competence of the decision-maker
whenever the result-outcome of the decision turns out to be beneficial, or when the
alternative that was not chosen would have been damaging. Such a bias is present even
if experimental subjects believe that evaluation of choices should not only depend on
the outcomes, but also on the process [22].
Another dimension on the focusing-on-outcomes phenomenon is the possibility that
professionals overestimate the importance of impact and, at the same time, underweight
the probabilities of threats and vulnerabilities which produce these outcomes. This
behaviour might be related to the information security dilemma between proactive and
reactive measures [144, 23]. That is, attention can be targeted towards reducing the
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vulnerabilities of the system under protection or, since it is impossible to eliminate risk
completely, to minimising the extent of damage, in the event that a security breach
occurs. The former case is the traditional approach to security and aims to reduce the
probability of risk, whereas the latter is concerned with minimising the losses associated
with risk. Although for real-world security implementations it is recommended that
both these approaches are taken, it is possible that security professionals have their
own subjective disposition. Slovic [140] proposes the existence of an experiential, as
well as an analytical, form of thinking involved in decisions (proportion dominance)
which causes a preference for reduction of probability of loss instead of loss itself. Our
research findings relating to these questions are presented in Section 4.3.2 and are also
discussed in interviews with security experts in Section 5.4.
Worst-case thinking
The hostile nature hypothesis refers to considering a non-random way by which uncer-
tain events occur [158]. In this hypothesis, less favourable outcomes are perceived as
more likely to happen than beneficial ones. Similarly to the hypothesis of hostile nature
there is worst-case thinking as an aspect of information security decision-making. This
type of thinking implies that decision-makers focus on the “worst possible outcome and
then act as if it were a certainty” [135]. Decision-makers imagine more vividly the less
probable events with potentially more catastrophic outcomes and magnify the proba-
bility of such low-expected occurrence events. This could be related to a number of
decision-making heuristics such as representativeness and availability. Representative-
ness refers to “the degree to which an event (i) is similar in essential characteristics to
its parent population, and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is
generated” [89]. This heuristic might cause an event to be perceived as more likely by
the decision-maker, because it is more representative. Availability is the heuristic by
which we bring the “most available” comparable example in our minds in order to judge
some information. The heuristic gives more weight to recent and vivid information, at
the expense of older information which did not have the same impact on the decision-
maker’s memory [69, 149]. For example, after a specific security breach is publicised,
most security professionals overreact by overestimating the probability of this incident
manifesting.
On the other hand, worst-case thinking is a sort of “validation of ignorance”, in the
sense that individuals are reluctant to focus on what they know, but exaggerate the
importance of speculation. This means that information that decision-makers have
access to is not fully used or, even worse, is underestimated for the sake of missing
information. In other words, there is a tendency to focus on uncertain events, with
immeasurable, but in any case small, probability of occurrence. Therefore, this type of
thinking implies an overweighting of low-probability events. There seems to be some
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psychological source (or sources) which enlarges the probabilities of seldom occurring
events and attracts the attention and mental focus of security decision-makers. Focus-
ing on such events, along with the underweighting of more common events, could be
viewed as an attitude towards uncertainty, or an attitude generated by uncertainty, if
disproportionately focused attention were to be positively correlated with the degree
of uncertainty that the decision bears.
The approach that is chosen in this research in order to examine worst-case thinking
is salience theory [32]. Salience theory states that it is outcomes which are sufficiently
diversified from the rest that disproportionately draw the attention of the decision-
maker. In a context that bears large losses, a catastrophic outcome can be perceived as
“salient” by the decision-maker. High-impact publicised security breaches can be over-
weighted in professionals’ perception, leading to over-investment in particular measures
and jeopardising optimality of security investment.
Salience theory is presented in detail in Section 2.2.1.3 and experiment findings relating
to this type of bias are described in Section 3.3.2 .
Data on Past Security Events
In the information security environment, one could claim that there is always some sort
of information available to aid the decision-maker. As has been already mentioned,
information might be available from historical data, personal experience or information
security surveys. Based on the reasoning of Florencio and Herley [61] surveys that
report security breaches can be misleading and are not trustworthy. The main argument
is that even if the contacted population were a representative sample of the whole
population, the final respondents choose to participate in the surveys for their own
specific reasons, which makes the sample biased and diminishes the reliability of results.
Reliability of such data is increased with disclosure laws which enforce breach notifi-
cation, such as the California Security Breach Information Act [38] or the EU General
Data Protection Regulation [49]. But, even if such data on past security events is re-
liable, information of this kind can act as an anchor for the decision-maker. That is,
available information can become a potentially unjustified reference point (the“anchor”)
for subsequent decisions. This reference point can be shaped by the aforementioned
availability of information, meaning that security incidents which make headlines are
more likely to make a strong impression on professionals’ minds.
Security VS Operability
As mentioned in the previous section, information security professionals need to decide
on the prioritisation of system attributes, depending on the context of implementation.
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One of these decisions is the point of balance between security and operability. Placing
more security controls might always be desirable from a security perspective, but such
an action usually implies reduced operability. Speed of operations, operational costs
and user convenience are factors which need to be evaluated by professionals against
the security benefits of implementing specific security measures.
We devise a mechanism in order to examine professionals’ preferences between security
and operability (operational time). Findings are presented in Section 3.3.4.
Professional Role
Another factor which might influence risk-related decisions of professionals is their pro-
fessional role. Risk can be perceived differently by senior executives of an organisation
than is perceived by Information Technology (IT) personnel or consultants. Individu-
als who have the ultimate responsibility and make the final decisions for protecting an
asset (risk owners) can react to potential threats in a manner systematically different
from that of professionals who make suggestions for protecting this asset. Prioritisation
of decision criteria in order to mitigate or avoid risk can also be perceived differently,
depending on the professional position of the decision-maker. The level of influence of
the various professionals involved, and the degree of consensus needed for deciding on
security investment, differs between organisations. However, it is important to be able
to distinguish potentially misaligned risk perceptions.
We report the influence of professional roles on preferences and risk perception in
Sections 3.3.4 and 5.3.
Preferences over Risk Treatment Actions
Decision-makers in information security can also have preferences regarding how to treat
risk. Risk treatment is the decision regarding “how to deal with the identified risk”.
Risk can be avoided, transferred, modified or accepted, as described in Section 2.1.2.1.
It could be the case that decision-makers are biased towards some of these actions at
the expense of others, even if the expected outcome of the alternatives is the same. We
present evidence of such a bias in Section 4.3.1.
Framing
Framing is a phenomenon which transcends the majority of real-world decisions. Pre-
sentation, and most importantly, the context of a decision is known to influence indi-
viduals when they make choices [150]. An influential type of framing is the perception
of risky or ambiguous decisions as either gains or losses, as already mentioned. In such
situations decision-maker’s risk attitude changes. The aforementioned view of informa-
tion security investment as potential business gain instead of a necessary cost can shift
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risk attitude of decision-makers, as our experimental findings of Section 4.3.3 strongly
suggest.
Framing effects related to the presentation of problems are also detected in the form
of preference reversals between willingness to pay and choice tasks. This can be a very
common issue in information security, although professionals would like to think the
way a problem is presented does not affect their decisions. These findings are presented
in Section 3.3.2.2.
The previous examples and characteristics of information security decision-making re-
veal a variety of factors and the complexity of the topic. Decision-makers in information
security can become risk seeking, but they can also act in a risk-averse fashion, being
repulsed by ambiguity. They might be eager to act and invest in security measures due
to the nature of their role. They are prone to behavioural biases and subjective evalu-
ations. An examination of certain behavioural patterns, attitudes towards risk and an
analysis of opposing behavioural components is presented in the following chapters.
2.1.4 Behavioural and Economic Approaches to Information Security
The importance of the economics of information security with extensions to behavioural
aspects has been highlighted in various papers of Anderson and Moore [11, 12, 14, 15,
16]. The main point of their approach is to highlight the inherent difficulties in infor-
mation security caused by misaligned incentives of the involved parties. Subsequently,
studies on specific behavioural aspects of information security, such as privacy [7], have
become more frequent. A significant amount of research has been focused on the be-
haviour and incentives of users [53, 71].
Outside of the information security field, behavioural economics has revealed a number
of “paradoxes” or systematic violations of expected utility theory [155], showing that
the assumed rational-agent “homo economicus” is not observed empirically [40, 91, 105]
in decisions that individuals make. An attempt to connect information security issues
with potential heuristics and biases decision-makers exhibit is sketched by Schneier,
in the “psychology of security”, in which issues related to the perception of risk and
uncertainty are described [134].
There are studies that use an expected utility theory [51] as well as prospect theory
approach to security [154]. Schroeder uses prospect theory and also explores the di-
chotomy between security and operations in military-context empirical research [137].
Insights from psychology and sociological factors, as well as biases in security, are pre-
sented by Baddeley [20]. There has been research focus on the decision-making process
of security professionals from a decision support system point of view [30]. Shiu et al.
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conduct an experiment on security professionals with economic framing controls, re-
vealing the existence of the confirmation bias [21]. Other biases, like the status quo and
present bias have been specifically targeted, albeit from a privacy perspective [5, 6, 7].
The effect of biases on security design has also been explored [65]. Timing preferences
about security investment have been studied by Ioannidis et al. [84].
Researchers have focused on the decision-making process [6, 84] and proposed models
for security investment [72, 41]. The majority of these studies propose formal models
for optimising the level of security investment. However, real world investment can be
environment-specific and might depend on the organisational structure [24], as well as
on the roles of the involved risk owners and stakeholders [25]. This fact implies that
formalising investment decisions might be of limited practical value. Risk management
and policy [31, 73, 86] constitute the framework in which investment decisions are made,
and thus can be considered as another important aspect of security investment.
Decisions are inherently related with perception of information security risk, and it has
been pointed out by researchers that such a perception entails a variety of dimensions
[85, 119]. However, the empirical examination of risk perception and risk attitude of
active information security decision-makers can greatly contribute to de-biasing and
optimising security investment. To the best of our knowledge, this aspect has been
relatively less studied.
2.2 Economics and Behaviour
The approach of this research is interdisciplinary between Information Security and
Economics. In particular, for the purpose of examining how information security pro-
fessionals react to risk, and which biases potentially make their decisions suboptimal,
we use methodologies from behavioural and experimental economics.
The scope of behavioural economics is to increase “the explanatory power of economics
by providing it with more realistic psychological foundations” [47].
Perception of risk and attitude towards risk, as well as violations and limitations of
“rational choices”, have been extensively studied in behavioural economics [91, 105, 138,
139]. Behavioural research has revealed systematic violations of expected utility theory
[155] suggesting that decision-makers as rational agents are rarely observed in real-
world decision-making scenarios. By contrasting individuals’ choices with predictions
of expected utility theory, we discover a variety of biases and systematic errors in
information security decision-making.
In this section, we describe how preferences of security professionals can be elicited
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and we present the core theories on which we base our approach. We also propose an
approach for modelling information security investment decisions.
2.2.0.1 Experimental Elicitation of Risk Attitude
In this research risk preferences of subjects are elicited by online experiments. Risk
preferences of individuals are specified by the extent to which they are “willing to take
on risk” [43], that is, they are expressed by their attitude towards risk. Willingness-
to-pay (WTP) in this study is treated as the maximum amount that the individual is
willing to sacrifice in order to avoid an undesirable event. We use WTP as a technique
to model choices in the experiments. Subjects reveal their preferences by stating their
WTP in order to avoid risky or ambiguous lotteries with negative outcomes across
a variety of experiment designs and conditions. Such an approach also reveals the
subjects’ belief about how plausible events are to occur ([33], Ch.15.2.2). It should be
noted that all lotteries used in the experiments are decision-based, with no feedback
given after a choice is made.
Laboratory experiments are susceptible to low incentives and therefore to unrealistic
results regarding measurement of behavioural aspects. The approach taken here is
that subjects are presented with simple WTP or choice tasks and are incentivised with
monetary rewards that depend on their “performance” in the experiments. That is,
participants are paid for real-stake lotteries in the experiments that follow.
Full details on the incentivisation of participants and on the allocation of participants’
payments are presented in Sections 3.2.3 and 4.2.3.
2.2.0.2 Surveys
We enhance the accuracy of experimental results by combining them with survey data.
In general, data produced by experiments in a controlled fashion is considered more
reliable, mainly because of incentivised elicitation design. Survey data, on the other
hand, might amplify the effects of misunderstanding of questions and allow for various
types of the response bias, like information recalling or alignment with socially accept-
able answers. Experiments are considered free from such measurement errors and are
also immune to other biases present in self-reported statements, e.g. as is observed
when people respond differently to hypothetical than to real situations, or when they
reply as if they were another person [109].
A question that follows naturally is whether behaviour that is observed in experiment
tasks is correlated with self-assessment statements about willingness to take risks or
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with self-reported replies to survey questions. A study which gives strong evidence
supporting the validity of survey results is [52], in which risk attitudes are accurately
depicted both by survey data and experimental input. In this sense, elicitation of risk
attitudes via lottery-type questions and survey data can complement each other.
Except for typical demographic questions, we use surveys to convey to participants
questions in an information security context. For example, we present participants with
threat scenarios, alternative security measures and hypothetical situations in which they
are asked to make choices.
2.2.1 Decision-making Models of Risk Behaviour
A short review of the theory and development of economic models of decision-making
is provided in this section.
In developing a model for decision-making, there are three possible approaches to follow,
as noted by Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky in [27]:“First is descriptive, which is concerned
with how and why people think and act the way they do. Second is normative, which
is empirical in nature and deals with an idealized super rational intelligent person who
thinks and acts as they should. Third, prescriptive studies such as subjective expected
utility tell us what an individual should do and offer a great deal of pragmatic value”.
Expected utility theory is the standard theory of individual decision-making under risk
and uncertainty in Economics. After three decades of research on this subject, and
especially on the direction of connecting experimental observations and theory, there
have been quite a few models developed. The von Neuman-Morgenstern axiomatisation
of Expected Utility [155] approached the decision-making questions from a normative
(idealised decision-maker, the homo economicus) and prescriptive (practical directions
for choices) view. A common formalisation is the notion of a prospect or lottery or
gamble, which is “a list of consequences with associated probabilities”. More precisely,
a prospect q is represented by a probability distribution p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) over a set of
corresponding outcomes X = (x1, x2, ..., xn) which are exhaustive and mutually exclu-
sive. Therefore, prospects or lotteries can be formalised in the following manner: if the
consequence (outcome) q has an assigned probability p, then the alternative outcome r
would occur with probability 1− p and the lottery can be formalised as (q, p; r, 1− p).
Formalisation is similar for any number of finite outcomes. The alternative options
that the decision maker faces depend on uncertain factors and can produce different
consequences. These uncertain factors are called events, or states of nature or states
of the world (in Arrow [18], an event consists of all states of nature which satisfy some
given condition). The mappings from the states of nature to the consequences are called
acts. It is practical, for the purposes of decision-making, to consider a finite amount of
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possible states that completely determine a finite amount of consequences. If the conse-
quences are ordered then they can be considered as utilities that the decision-maker has
to choose from or maximise. This is the “rational model of choice under uncertainty”
[18] and it can be assumed that the individual can assign subjective probabilities in
each state of nature.
In the various models, there is a distinction, originally established by Knight [94, 93],
between risk, in which outcomes and probabilities of lotteries are known, and uncer-
tainty, where at least some of the outcomes or probabilities are unknown. Another
possible distinction is between risky and riskless choices. Risky decisions consist of
lotteries, i.e. outcomes with assigned probabilities, whereas riskless decisions have to
do with the acceptability of transactions (in which “goods and services are exchanged
for money of labour” [91]). This is the choice situation that can be considered along
risk and uncertainty, the, so to say, trivial situation of choice under certainty. These
three alternatives in individual decision making create a partition of decision-making
models.
Table 2.1: Properties of the Expected Utility Hypothesis
(1a) Completeness: ∀q, r : q  r or r  q or both.
(1b) Transitivity: ∀q, r, s : if q  r and r  s, then q  s.
(1a) and (1b) ⇒ (1) Ordering
(2) Continuity: ∀q, r, s: if q  r and r  s, then ∃ p :
(q, p; s, 1− p) ∼ r.
(3) Independence: ∀q, r, s: if q  r then (q, p; s, 1 − p) 
(r, p; s, 1− p).
(1) and (2) ⇒ (4) ∃ representation by a V (.) ∈ R: V (q) ≥ V (r)⇔ q  r.
(1) and (2) and (3) ⇒ (5) ∃ representation by a V (q) = Σpiu(xi), i = 1, .., n.
The expected utility hypothesis is derived from three axioms (properties): Ordering,
Continuity and Independence. Ordering consists of Completeness and Transitivity.
Ordering and Continuity allow preferences over prospects to be represented by a real
number produced by a function V(.). Independence along with function V (.) allow
preferences over prospects to be represented in a form: V (q) = Σpiu(xi), i = 1, .., n,
where xi are the potential outcomes of the lottery, u(.) is the subjective utility that the
decision-maker evaluates the outcomes with, and pi are the probabilities assigned to
these outcomes. Strict and weak preferences are symbolised by“”and“”respectively,
whereas indifference between two prospects q and r is true when q  r, and r  q and
is symbolised by “∼”. The aforementioned attributes are presented in Table 2.1:
We say that a prospect q, “first-order stochastically dominates”prospect r, if Σqiu(xi) ≥
Σriu(xi).
Monotonicity is the property where first-order stochastically dominating prospects are
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always preferred to the dominated ones, and it is accepted in either normative or
descriptive models.
In particular, regarding the third property, (i.e. the“independence axiom”), systematic,
(i.e. predictable), violations have been experimentally observed, such as the common
consequence and the common ratio effects, shown by Maurice Allais [9]. A useful tool
for the study and visualisation of the independence property has been the “Machina
Triangle” [105], which is described in more detail in Section 2.2.1.2. The triangle-tool
visualises the indifference curves of the decision-maker’s preferences. The slope of the
curves reflects the risk-attitude of the individual: the more risk-averse the individual
is, the steeper the curves are. Moreover, expected utility theory assumes “curves”
with upward slopes which are linear and parallel to each other. Different models are
produced by the relaxation of the parallel property and of the assumption of linearity.
A particular form of relaxation of the independence axiom is called betweenness, which
corresponds to the linearity of the indifference curves. Betweeness is defined in the
following way: if q  r then q  (q, p; r, (1 − p))  r, ∀p : 0 < p < 1, where strict
preference “” can be translated as “preferred to”.
Models which are not based on objective probabilities, but on monotonic transforma-
tions of probabilities, such as decision weights pi(pi), are a know case where betweenness
does not hold.
The set of decision-making theories can also be divided into conventional and non-
conventional. Conventional theories preserve the use of a function V (.) in order to
describe individual preferences and, although they allow for the violation of the in-
dependence axiom, they maintain monotonicity. Conventional theories also assume
“procedure and descriptive invariance”, i.e. they assume independence between prefer-
ences and the method used to elicit the preferences. An elicitation method can even
be the way by which alternative options are described; this is usually called a “framing
effect”. A particular observation of procedure invariance failure is “preference reversal”
[99] when, for example, the procedure changes from “selling” to “valuating”. This fail-
ure might be interpreted by the invocation of different mental processes which elicit
different orderings of the prospects, in other words, there is no unique ordering. At the
same time, failure of procedure invariance means violation of the property of transitiv-
ity. Models which try to predict failure of procedure invariance and framing effects are
not able to describe preferences with a single function V(.).
Another common assumption made in expected utility theory models, is that the pref-
erences are elicited from stable traits of behaviour that the individual possesses. Self-
perception theory [28], on the other hand, states that the individual creates its own
behaviour by observing its previous actions, as an outside observer would (indicatively,
[97]). This notion is related to, but still different from, attempts made to produce pro-
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cedural models which describe a number of choice-heuristics that the decision-maker
possesses and uses in an adaptive way [118], and consequently “decides how to de-
cide”. The initial paper of Kahneman and Tversky on prospect theory [90] includes
such heuristic-rules that the decision-maker uses during the first stage of the decision-
making process.
Experimental evidence on lotteries have revealed overestimation of small probabilities
and underestimation of more common events [40, 90]. This subjectivity in weighting
objective probabilities gave rise to the aforementioned decision weighting models. An
attribute of a preference function which depends on a probability weighting function pi
and on a utility u, is that it does not generally satisfy monotonicity. To cope with this
consequence, the idea of rank-dependent expected utility was introduced [121, 122].
In rank-dependent utility models outcomes xi are ordered from worse to best, and
weighting depends on the relative position of the outcome in the ordered list, that is,
weighting is a monotonic function normalised on the space (0, 1). Intuitively, probabil-
ity weighting functions express the way individuals subjectively distort a probability
(psychophysics of risk) and they can explain the observed overestimation of small prob-
abilities in gains (risk-seeking, e.g. lottery buying) and in losses (risk-aversion, e.g. in-
surance purchasing). Axiomatisation of rank-dependent models focuses on a weakened
form of the independence property, the comonotonic independence (the name derived
from common independence) which asserts that normal independence is preserved as
long as there are no hedging effects in the outcomes ([33], Ch. 10.3.2.1). The usual
independence requirement of Table 2.1 which should hold when we substitute out-
come x in some prospect with outcome y, does not, generally, hold for rank-dependent
models, because the substitution might change the ranking of the decision weights,
and therefore might change the preference order. Ordinal independence allows sub-
stitution in lotteries which have common tails of events. The common tail is the one
that can be substituted between lotteries whithout changing them, and is required in
rank-dependent models.
The endowment effect [88, 96, 146] is the situation in which individuals find it difficult
to depart from assets. Kahneman and Tversky [151] used the idea of a reference state,
which corresponds to the current state and is usually preferred to be maintained by
individuals, similarly to the endowment effect. Prospect theory assembles many of
the pre-mentioned attributes. There are two domains defined by the reference point
(current status): the domain of losses and the one of gains. Concavity of the gains
domain is mirrored by convexity in the losses domain (the reflection effect) and this is in
accordance with observed risk-averse behaviour regarding gains and a risk-seekingness
regarding losses (see Figure 2.1). Moreover, the preference for avoiding losses is stronger
than the preference to acquiring gains (loss-aversion), by a roughly estimated factor of
two. Considering high and low probabilities and the domains of gains and losses, we
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can construct the four-fold pattern of risk attitude (FFP) (see Table 2.2) [87]. This
construction describes four possible pairs: high- and low-probability in both gains and
losses, and is very useful in analysing the corresponding behaviour. It is not known
whether the FFP holds for all decision-making contexts, or whether the manifestation
of the pattern depends on the decision elicitation process [74].
In the original paper on prospect theory [90], an editing phase was assumed, during
which the decision-maker coded the outcomes as gains or losses. In the extension of the
theory, cumulative prospect theory (CPT) [152], a rank-dependent approach was fol-
lowed and decision weights were used in this context, making the coding phase obsolete
and the theory more concrete. The advantage of using the cumulative decision-weights
is that we can have a transitive preference function that is monotonic, thus allowing for
stochastic dominant preferences. Another important property is that we can use differ-
ent weighting functions for the positive and the negative outcomes (sign-dependence).
Subsequently, cumulative prospect theory moves away from the procedural approach,
i.e. the editing/coding phase, where a number decision rules are applied (this is also
found in Payne’s model [118]) and gets closer to the realm of conventional models,
providing a single preference function. Prospect theory works on risky prospects, but
can be extended to uncertain prospects as well [153].
A combination of loss aversion and a parameter of how frequently an investment is eval-
uated, produced the notion of myopic loss aversion [29], setting a context of decision-
makers with “short horizons and a strong distaste for losses” [147]. Myopia is a special
form of framing, which allows the decision-maker to only consider some parts of the
prospects more frequently and is similar to Kahneman’s and Tversky’s isolation effect.
Another category of models are the ones related to regret and disappointment theory
[26, 102]. According to this theory, the individual compares the possible outcomes
of a specific lottery. In the decision-making case, each possible choice produces an
outcome which can be compared to alternatives that “might have been”. This way,
the decision-maker estimates his/her expected disappointment. The main property
of regret theory is that it does not require transitivity. Another important point is
that lotteries are considered statistically independent and therefore their outcomes are
uncorrelated (this is equivalent to the so-called weighted-utility theory). The idea of
regret-aversion [102] sketches the fact that the existence of large differences between an
outcome and its possible alternatives leads to very large regrets. Regret-aversion allows
for the violation of transitivity by producing a cycle of preferences, but it also allows for
the violation of monotonicity, and in this sense can be categorised as a non-conventional
theory.
Starmer [143] highlights three distinct attributes which have been experimentally ob-
served and should be incorporated in any conventional model for decision-making that
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can be tested with a Machina triangle (see Section 2.2.1.2 for more details). Namely:
 generalised fanning-out of indifference curves should not be assumed,
 betweeness should also not be assumed, i.e. indifferent curves should not be
considered linear,
 it should be taken into consideration that the behaviour of the probabilities inside
the triangle is more closely related to expected utility theory than the behaviour
on the borders of the triangle (i.e. where extreme probabilities, whether very
small or very large, dwell) which tend to cause the violations.
A rough conclusion from field evidence is that probability weighting functions with
inverse s-shaped probability transformations (e.g. as in Figures 2.2 and 2.3) tend
to fit the observed data better. Given that there are many ways to describe such
weighting functions, a question that emerges is how many parameters should be used
in the models. Indeed, there have been many different approaches [98, 70] which take
advantage either of the simplicity of a one-parameter-function or of the flexibility of a
function with two parameters.
Dynamic choice is a more complex framework for decision-making. In such models
we consider decision nodes which depend on events and the decision-maker chooses
the appropriate paths of a choice tree. There are issues of dynamic consistency, but
dynamic choices can be consistent with rank-dependent models [131].
Finally, consequentialism is an assumption which states that a choice of a decision
node is made independently of risks foregone in the past and also of decisions which
cannot be reached via the decision tree. Intuitively this is a very strong assumption
which might not hold for many real-world decision-making environments, including
information security.
To conclude this short review, we highlight prospect theory and its cumulative version.
There is strong evidence that predictions of this theory align with many empirical
observations, and thus the theory can provide a tool for analysing behaviour of decision-
makers either under risk or uncertainty. 2
In this short review we have described the main attributes which pertain economic
models relating to decision-making. More specific experimental studies which relate to
information security are presented in Section 2.1.4. In the following sections we describe
the main theories we use in evaluating and explaining various experiment results of this
study.
2It is worth mentioning the existence of a formal proof for prospect theory, through an additive
conjoint measurement model [95].
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2.2.1.1 Prospect Theory
We use prospect theory in order to explain various observed behavioural traits of secu-
rity professionals and potential violations of expected value maximisation. The details
and the main characteristics of the theory are presented in this section.
The original version of the theory, prospect theory (PT) was presented by Kahneman
and Tversky in 1979 [90]. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) was presented in 1992
as an advancement [152]. The initial theory assumes there is a value function v which
represents the valuation of monetary outcomes by the individual, i.e. the psychological
impact of outcomes to individuals. This value function is the equivalent of the tradi-
tional utility function, although Kahneman and Tversky never used the word “utility”,
probably in order to make a clear diversification from expected utility theory (EUT).
Figure 2.1: Prospect theory’s hypothetical value function.
The theory also assumes a weighting function w that distorts the probability pi of
each event i. Function w describes risk attitude towards probabilities of outcomes.
An important point is that prospect theory, similarly to other non-expected utility
theories, uses a non-linear weighting function. It is shown that expected utility theory
fits observations reasonably well, in the case of linear moderate probabilities, but not
when sufficiently small or sufficiently large probabilities are involved [40]. In Figures
2.2 and 2.3 the estimated weighting function w is shown for the domains of gains and
losses respectively (images taken from [152]):
The certain monetary amount c for which an individual becomes indifferent between a
risky choice and c, is called certainty equivalent. The estimation of the transformations
is elicited by the medians of c/x plotted against probability p, where x is the maximum
lottery outcome (either a gain or a loss) and c is the certainty equivalent. In Figure 2.3,
c represents the certainty equivalents subjects chose in order to avoid a lottery of the
form (x, p; 0, 1−p); this amount is divided by the corresponding non-zero outcome x on
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Figure 2.2: Risk attitude for gains: ratio c/x by the probability of gain.
Figure 2.3: Risk attitude for losses: ratio c/x by the probability of loss.
the vertical axis. In particular, the part of the curve that lies above the diagonal y = x
denotes risk aversion as the individual accepts to lose a larger c/x ratio than the actual
probability of loss. Whereas, the part of the curve beneath y = x indicates risk seeking
behaviour as the probability of loss is larger than the ratio that the decision-maker is
willing to give away, i.e. the individual takes the risk.
In CPT, f is called an uncertain prospect (or act), and is a function from the set of all
states S to the set of all consequences X, f : S → X :: s→ x.
Considering a partition (Ai) of the states of the world S, a prospect (act) f is repre-
sented by a sequence of pairs of the form (xi, Ai), where xi is the ordered outcome, in
case that the corresponding event Ai occurs. The notion of capacity is used by Choquet
in [44]. A capacity W is a non-additive set function, such that it maps subsets A of
S to real numbers, W : S → R :: A → κ. Additionally, W (∅) = 0 and W (S) = 1 and
∀A,B subsets of S : B ⊂ A⇒W (B) ≤W (A).
Capacities are considered separately for positive and negative prospects, that is, prospects
with only positive or only negative outcomes. Mixed prospects f are possible, as
we consider the positive f+ or the negative f− part of each prospect: for example,
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f+(s) = f(s), if f(s) > 0 and f+(s) = 0, if f(s) ≤ 0 for the positive part of a prospect
and similarly for the negative part. Decision weights pii are defined for the positive
(gains) and the negative (losses) domain as:
pi+n = W
+(An) and pi
+
i = W
+(Ai ∪ ...An)−W+(Ai+1 ∪ ...An), for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
pi−−m = W−(A−m) and pi
−
i = W
−(A−m ∪ ...Ai)−W−(A−m ∪ ...Ai−1), for −m ≤ i ≤ 0.
The value function v is defined from the set of outcomes X to the real numbers,
v : X → R, v(x0) = 0 and v is strictly increasing. So, by CPT there is a func-
tion V , such that: the valuation of the positive prospects is V (f+) = Σpi+i v(xi) and
the valuation of the negative prospects is V (f−) = Σpi−i v(xi). Finally, the total valu-
ation is the sum of the positive and the negative one: V (f) = V (f+) + V (f−). The
difference between the two versions of prospect theory is that in the cumulative ver-
sion, the weighting function w that transforms probabilities is rank-dependent, i.e. the
outcomes of the lotteries have to be ordered, and the weights, which are for simplicity
formalised as w(pi), depend on the ranking position of the corresponding outcomes.
In fact, as the name implies, it is the cumulative probabilities which correspond to
the outcomes that are subject to the weighting transformations. The main reason
for this modification was that the initial prospect theory failed to maintain stochastic
dominance. Moreover, CPT expands to many-outcome prospects.
A variety of experiments reveal a particular phenomenon, called the four-fold pat-
tern (FFP) of risk behaviour [87]. The FFP describes the suspected non-linear trans-
formation of probabilities and the attitude towards loss aversion. The phenomenon
categorises risk behaviour into risk-seeking or risk-averse, depending on the magni-
tude of the probability and the domain (gains or losses) of the lottery. A visu-
alisation of the FFP elicited from the sets of lotteries (0.95,±10, 000; 0.05, 0) and
(0.05,±10, 000; 0.95, 0) is shown in Table 2.2 (adapted from [87]).
Table 2.2: The Four-fold Pattern of Risk Attitude
Gains Losses
95% chance to win $10,000 95% chance to lose $10,000
High
Probability
Fear of disappointment Hope to avoid loss
(Certainty
Effect)
RISK AVERSE RISK SEEKING
Accept unfavourable settlement Reject favourable settlement
5% chance to win $10,000 5% chance to lose $10,000
Low
Probability
Hope of large gain Fear of large loss
(Possibility
Effect)
RISK SEEKING RISK AVERSE
Reject favourable settlement Accept unfavourable settlement
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The most unexpected result of prospect theory is the risk-seeking behaviour for high
probability losses. It is not known whether, or how, the FFP is manifested in various
contexts. We discover this pattern, for the domain of losses, in various instances of the
experiments that follow. It is noteworthy that there are boundaries which allow for the
manifestation of the phenomenon. For example, probability weights w(pi) have to be
relatively large compared to outcome valuations v(xi), i.e. the overweighting for small
and the underweighting for large probabilities has to be sufficiently large in order to
overcome the effects caused by the valuation function v [74]. This means, that the FFP
might be underlying in a decision-making process, but there is a possibility that it is
not sufficiently intense to be detected. The experimental settings in which we detect
the FFP are presented in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.
2.2.1.2 The Machina Triangle
A very useful instrument for visualising preferences amongst lotteries is the“probability
triangle” also called “Machina triangle”. We use this instrument as the basis of the
proposed decision-making model for information security investment which is presented
in Section 2.2.2.
Interestingly, the instrument was presented originally by Marschak [108] and later by
Machina [104], and has been widely used in the economics literature. The instru-
ment requires that the outcomes of choice alternatives are ordered in increasing order,
whether they are in the domain of gains or losses. Then, in the case of three outcomes,
for example, x1 < x2 < x3, we have a corresponding triplet (p1, p2, p3), where pi is the
probability of occurrence of outcome xi. We can plot probability p1 against probability
p3, and the remaining probability p2 is: p2 = 1− p1 − p33. Assuming that the individ-
ual decision-maker possesses a utility function u, from the set of outcomes to the real
numbers, u : X → R, then, the solutions of the equation:
Σu(xi)pi = u(x1)p1 + u(x2)(1− p1 − p3) + u(x3)p3 = constant (2.1)
depict the risk attitude of the individual, as they reveal the points in the triangle that
are indifferent to the decision-maker (i.e. they have the same expected utility). These
lines are called indifference curves and are depicted in Figure 2.4 (image taken from
[105]).
The slope of the indifference curves can be calculated to be λ = [u(x2)u(x1)][u(x3)−u(x2)] .
3The instrument setting concerns an objective perception of probabilities; experimentally elicited
subjective preferences are presented in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.4: Indifference curves in the “Machina Ttiangle”
In the case of omitting the utility function:
Σxipi = x1p1 + x2(1− p1 − p3) + x3p3 = constant, (2.2)
the graphical result is a family of curves (here lines) called iso-expected value lines.
A comparison between the iso-expected lines and the indifference curves reveals the risk
attitude of the decision-maker. In particular, if the indifference curves are steeper than
the iso-expected lines, then the individual shows risk aversion, whereas in the opposite
case the decision-maker is risk seeking. In Figure 2.5 iso-expected lines are depicted
with dashed lines and indifference curves are the solid lines (image taken from [105]).
Figure 2.5: Iso-expected lines and indifference curves
Since the decision-maker has an incentive to move from a point of larger potential losses
to a point of smaller losses, the “movements” in the triangle which give stochastically
dominating lotteries and are therefore preferable, are the ones with North-West direc-
tion. The opposite is true for South-East movements. In this framework, we can define
information security investment as monetary amounts, say zi, that need to be spend for
conducting a “movement” or “jump” from the current point in the Machina triangle to
a more preferable one. This “jump” has a cost, and the cost can be exactly specified by
the difference between the expected utility of the initial point and the destination point,
as depicted in Figure 2.6, which has been adapted from [152] (a formal representation
of this idea is presented in Section 2.2.2).
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Figure 2.6: Investment for achieving a more preferable state
Considering the information security environment, it is not necessary to separate be-
tween physical, technical and administrative measures, as they can all be considered as
indistinguishable controls deployed by the act of investing. The elicitation of the indif-
ference curves, however, is not a trivial task. As stated in Section 2.2.1.1, indifference
curves can be the product of a value function v and a weight function w. The form
of such curves has been investigated by Kahneman and Tversky for gains and losses
separately (see Figure 2.7; diagrams taken from [152]).
Figure 2.7: Indifference curves for the domain of gains (left) and losses (right)
In the spirit of the review of Section 2.2.1, it is noteworthy that an approach presented
by Machina and Scmeidler [106] assumes that decision-makers have probabilistic be-
liefs, without needing to be utility maximisers. This is in contrast to one of the most
influential interpretations of probabilities, i.e. the subjective interpretation of Savage
[132], which requires both assumptions.
For the purposes of this study, however, the important point is the notion that the
probabilistic beliefs of the decision-maker can be represented by the decision-maker’s
subjective probabilities, which, in turn, correspond to the decision-maker’s risk prefer-
ences.
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2.2.1.3 Salience Theory
We use this theory in order to examine the behaviour of information security profes-
sionals with respect to their risk attitude towards worst-case outcomes. The reader can
find a detailed description of the theory in this section.
Salience theory [32] states that it is the salience of outcomes, instead of the probabilities,
which attract the focus of the decision-maker. Salience is the phenomenon in which
“when one’s attention is differentially directed to one portion of the environment rather
than to others, the information contained in that portion will receive disproportionate
weighting in subsequent judgements”([145]). For example, suppose that an information
security professional has to choose between two security measures. The professional’s
attention might be focused on the attributes of these security products which differ the
most, ignoring the other attributes.
Worst-case is a frequently used term in this study and it can be considered as an unusual
case: “our mind has a useful capability to focus on whatever is odd, different or unusual”
([87]). Salience is formalised by ordering and diminishing sensitivity, and is therefore
in accordance with rank-dependent models of choice, and cummulative prospect theory
in particular. Context is expressed by diminishing sensitivity relevantly to status quo:
“The role of context is captured by diminishing sensitivity (and reflection): the intensity
with which payoffs in a state are perceived increases as the state’s payoffs approach
the status quo of zero, which is our measure of context” ([32], p.16). There are two
differences between salience theory and classic rank-dependent models [122, 152]:
 Overweighting depends on the ranking of the outcomes, but it also depends on
their magnitude.
 The worst possible outcome might not have enough difference from the rest of the
choice context in order to be salient and therefore could be underweighted instead
of overweighted. This means that with this model, worst-case is salient only if
the difference between the worst-case and the rest of the choices is “sufficiently”
large.
We use salience theory in our experimental design of Chapter 3 to examine whether
ranking of lottery outcomes (or payoffs), as well as outcome-magnitude, influence de-
cisions of information security professionals. Local thinking is another term related to
disproportionate focus on some outcomes. Local thinking is defined as the phenomenon
in which decision makers do not consider all information available to them, but tend
to overemphasise the information their mind focuses on [67].
The set of the states of the world is S and we can choose between two lotteries, Li,
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i = 1 , 2, with risky prospects, which have corresponding minimum and maximum
outcomes xmins and x
max
s , respectively, for each lottery i in each state s. The proba-
bilities that correspond to each state are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. Salience
function σ is a continuous and bounded function with the following three properties
([32], p.7):
1. Ordering: for states s and s¯ ∈ S,
if [xmins , x
max
s ] ⊆ [xmins¯ , xmaxs¯ ], then σ(xis, x−is ) < σ(xis¯, x−is¯ ). (2.3)
where xs = (x
i
s)i=1,2 are the payoff vectors for state s, for lotteries 1 and 2.
(x−is denotes the payoff in state s for lottery j, so that j 6= i).
Finally, xmins and x
max
s are the smallest and largest payoffs in xs.
2. Diminishing sensitivity: if xis > 0, for i = 1, 2 then ∀ > 0,
σ(xis + , x
−i
s + ) < σ(x
i
s, x
−i
s ). (2.4)
3. Reflection: for any two states s and s¯ ∈ S, with xis, xis¯ > 0, for i = 1, 2:
σ(xis, x
−i
s ) < σ(x
i
s¯, x
−i
s¯ ) if and only if σ(−xis,−x−is ) < σ(−xis¯,−x−is¯ ). (2.5)
Figure 2.8: Values of salience function σ(x, y) = |x−y||x|+|y| ,
for x ∈ (−1000, 0) and y ∈ (−1000, 0).
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A visual representation of the values of a simplified salience function is presented in
Figure 2.8. The extreme values of the representation are 0 and −1000, because these
are the values used in the experiment tasks that follow. We observe that higher values
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occur for the variable pair values (x, y) = ( − 1000, 0) and (x, y) = (0,−1000), whereas
the function takes zero values for x = y.
The methodology for calculating salience theory-predicted preferences over two lotteries
can be summarised in the following steps. The Mathematica [2] code for executing these
steps for the purposes of Experiment 1 (see Chapter 3) can be found in Appendix A.1.12.
 Step 1: write all possible state space pairs by combining all outcomes from the
first and the second lottery.
 Step 2: rank all pairs by their salience σ:
σ(xis, x
−i
s ) =
|xis − x−is |
|xis|+ |x−is |+ θ
. (2.6)
Note that a salience function serves as the connecting link between the cogni-
tive notion of salience and the properties of ordering, diminishing sensitivity and
reflection. Thus, any function which maintains these properties is eligible. The
vector containing the payoffs of the lotteries in state s is xs = (x
i
s)i=1,2 and x
−i
s
is the state s-outcome of lottery Lj , where j 6= i. Parameter θ is estimated as
θ = 0.1 ([32], page 24). 4
 Step 3: assign a number k to each pair, starting from the most salient pair. For
example, the most salient pair across all states σ(xmaxs , x
min
s¯ ) has k = 1.
 Step 4: compute the sum:
∑
s∈S
δkspis[υ(x
1
s)− υ(x2s)], (2.7)
where, pis is the smallest probability of the two outcomes of the pair. Note that the
utility function υ(.) has to be linear, for calculating the differences υ(x1)−υ(x2).
For example, for two lotteries Li and Lj , we have Li  Lj if and only if the sum
(2.7) is positive. An important part of the calculation is the value of δ ∈ (0, 1],
which expresses the degree of local thinking for a decision-maker. For δ = 1, the
decision-maker’s probability weighting is exactly the objective probabilities. For
δ < 1, local thinking favours the first lottery, Li, when it “pays more” in the more
salient lottery states. The salient states are the ones that are less discounted by
δ due to the exponent k. In our case, only negative outcomes are considered, so
δ < 1 favours Li when it has smaller losses in the most salient states
5.
4Note that outcomes are presented to belong to the same state s here; however, we can allow for all
possible combinations of state comparisons, as is explained in detail in Chapter 3.
5It is noteworthy that δ has been estimated as δ = 0.7 and that for δ = 0.73 the Allais Paradox is
explained by the narrow framing of the local thinker.
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2.2.1.4 Uncertainty and Ambiguity
This section provides further details on the notions of uncertainty and ambiguity that
are frequently used throughout the study.
In the initial approach of Knight in 1921 [93], risk and uncertainty are two separate
things, with risk being “a quantity susceptible of measurement”, whereas uncertainty
being “immeasurable risk”. During the same year as Knight’s publication, Keynes
[92] studied the type of uncertainty that has to do with the outcome of an event,
e.g. whether something will be successful or not. In the context of Ellsberg’s work
[55] uncertainty or ambiguity has to do with the success probability itself, i.e. in this
terms “ambiguity is the uncertainty about probabilities”. In many cases, ambiguity
is considered as a special case of uncertainty which focuses on probability estimation.
In contrast, the term “uncertainty” is used more loosely and generally in decision-
making. Einhorn and Hogarth [54] define ambiguity as the “intermediate state between
ignorance and risk”. In this research ambiguity denotes a range of lottery probabilities
or a range of outcomes, in contrast to risk which defines specific lottery probabilities
and outcomes.
Uncertainty does not involve complete information about the states of nature, as is
described in the Ellsberg paradox [55]. The experimental setting of the “paradox”
presents two pairs of gambles to the decision-makers to choose from:
“There are exactly 30 red and also 60 black and yellow balls in an unknown ratio in an
urn”. The first question regards which of the two gambles is more preferable:
 Gamble A: “win 100$ if you draw a red”.
 Gamble B: “win 100$ if you draw a black”.
The second question concerns the preference between two other gambles:
 Gamble C: “win 100$ if you draw a red or yellow”.
 Gamble D: “win 100$ if you draw a black or yellow”.
The majority of people systematically prefer Gamble A to B and Gamble D to C. This
leads to the paradox of considering probability P (red) > P (black) in the first choice,
whereas implying P (black) > P (red) in the second.
But, there can be different degrees of uncertainty of probability, namely two, as stated
by Camerer and Weber in [39]. Assuming states si which correspond to outcomes
(consequences) via an act f(.) and assuming a utility for each outcome, we can plot
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the utility of the consequence of an act of each state u(f(si)) against its corresponding
probability of occurrence. When the individual does not know the probability distri-
bution which corresponds to each state, but he or she can assign a probability to each
possible (conceivable) distribution, then we have the so-called uncertainty as second-
order probability. In contrast, when the decision-maker is not in position to apply
probabilities to distributions, uncertainty is the expression of a set of distributions.
These two levels of uncertainty are depicted in Figure 2.9 (diagrams taken form [39]).
Figure 2.9: Levels of uncertainty.
In the event of not having available information regarding the occurrence of events, we
deal with fully subjective models. In contrast, there can be some information available
to the decision-maker, but not enough to shift the decision from uncertainty to risk.
It is noteworthy that, in a different approach, some researchers favour the explicit
characterisation of ambiguity as the amount of missing information [64].
Ambiguity can be represented similarly to risk (see Section 2.2.1). All possible and
conceivable states are represented by the state space S. Elements s ∈ S are the states
of nature, and sets of elements E ⊂ S are the events. We can denote a σ-algebra A of
the events. Outcomes are represented as elements of the outcome space X. Acts are
the mappings from S to X, over which the decision-makers reveal their preferences.
Finally, the equivalent of a probability distribution in risky choices for uncertain and
ambiguous choices is the notion of capacity, as introduced in Section 2.2.1.1.
2.2.2 Modelling Investment Decisions
A formalisation of investment decisions in information security is presented in this
section, including two attributes: security and the operational posture of the system.
The purpose of this formalisation is two-fold. On the one hand, it provides a proposed
codification for information security investment. On the other hand, it assists the reader
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in understanding certain experiment tests found in Chapters 3 and 4 by presenting the
reasoning behind the tests, in a formal manner.
The starting assumption is that the “system” under protection6, with its broader sense,
has a current state, the status quo, which consists of two main attributes: security
(SEC) and operability (OPS). Operational advantages or disadvantages represent
any kind of efficiency or deficiency in time, personnel, procedures and other resources
that are needed for the completion of some business function. Such multiattribute
utility models are proven to preserve certain advantages, e.g. utilities maintain their
properties even if they are built on non-expected utility models, and specifically on
rank-dependent models and prospect theory [114].
The probability space of each attribute is described by a simplex ∆ = ∆(n), where
n expresses the number of specific probabilities associated with given outcomes, and
n ∈ N. Each state of nature can be represented by a risky prospect, i.e. a finite set
of pairs of the form: (probability, outcome). Therefore, for example, for ∆(1) each
attribute is described as SEC = (p, x1; 1− p, x2) and OPS = (q, y1; 1− q, y2) and the
current state is (SEC,OPS). For simplicity, we can have xi and yi fixed (e.g. equal to
the value of the assets under protection) and describe the two attributes only by the
pair of probabilities, e.g. for ∆(1): SEC = (p, 1− p) and OPS = (q, 1− q).
A shift from the current state to a new state is described by a function S such that:
Sn : ∆(n)×∆(n)× R→ ∆(n)×∆(n) (2.8)
E.g. for ∆(1):
S1 : ∆(1)×∆(1)×R→ ∆(1)×∆(1) :: ((p, 1−p), (q, 1−q), z) 7→ ((p′, 1−p′), (q′, 1−q′))
(2.9)
where z is the monetary amount of security investment which allows for a new (more
beneficial) state to be reached, so that:
S((SEC,OPS), z) = (SEC ′, OPS′). (2.10)
E.g. for ∆(2):
S((p1, p2, 1− p1− p2), (q1, q2, 1− q1− q2), z) = ((p′1, p′2, 1− p′1− p′2), (q′1, q′2, 1− q′1− q′2)).
(2.11)
S is assumed non-injective and surjective, so that different states with different in-
vestment amounts can lead to the same security and operational posture and also all
6We use the term “system” in the spirit of [133], i.e. as a complex structure, that allows for
interactions with other systems, bears emerging properties and can misbehave in certain ways (manifests
“bugs”).
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postures can be achieved by an appropriate amount. If z > 0 then (p′1, p′2, 1− p′1 − p′2)
is expected to second-order stochastically dominate (SSD) (p1, p2, 1 − p1 − p1) and
(q′1, q′2, 1− q′1 − q′2) second-order statistically dominates (SSD) (q1, q2, 1− q1 − q2), but
first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) is not required 7.
To make the investment scenarios more realistic, transition to the new state can oc-
cur with some probability r and the current state of nature can be maintained with
probability 1− r.
Preferences on various states of the form (SEC,OPS) can be defined as a binary rela-
tion on the Cartesian product A = ∆×∆. The conditions for numerical representation
of these preferences can be explored by conjoint measurement (CM) techniques [33].
Conjoint measurement theory studies binary relations defined on Cartesian products
of sets. Such relations can be defined for various attributes and/or different states of
nature between which the decision-maker has to state his/her preference. The theory
sprang from mathematical psychology in an attempt to quantify psychological attitudes
and utilities [103].
In general, for n-dimensional elements x and y on space A, an additive utility model is
at the core of CM, and a preference relation  (or ) is defined as:
a  b⇔
n∑
i=1
ui(ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
ui(bi), (2.12)
where utilities ui are real-valued functions over the set Ai, and A is the finite product
set A = A1 × A2 × .. × An, where n represents the number of attributes (in our case
n = 2 and A = A1 ×A2 = ∆×∆).
The abstraction ui, for our purposes, is the corresponding utility which values security
level (u1) and the utility that values operability (u2). So, preference of position (state)
a to position (state) b, is given by:
a  b⇔ u1(p) + u2(q) ≥ u1(p′) + u2(q′), (2.13)
given that only probabilities are used to describe positions and that in ∆(1) probabilities
p and q are enough to describe the positional prospect. The pair of security level and
7Lottery A has first-order stochastic dominance over lottery B, if A has at least as high a probability
of receiving at least the same outcome (gain) as in the case of B; and equivalently for losses.
Lottery A has second-order stochastic dominance over lottery B, if B is a mean-preserving spread of
A. An expected utility maximiser should always choose the dominant lottery.
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operational capacity which represents the current state of the world is:
a = (SEC,OPS) = (p, q) = ((p; 1− p), (q; 1− q)) = ((p, x1; 1− p, x2), (q, y1; 1− q, y2)).
(2.14)
Preference between the two positions a and b ultimately means a preference amongst
pairs of gambles:
a  b⇔ ((p, x1; 1− p, x2), (q, y1; 1− q, y2))  ((p′, x1; 1− p′, x2), (q′, y1; 1− q′, y2)).
(2.15)
There are three ways of constructing models of relations on a product set, as described
by Bouyssou and Pirlot in [33]. One approach would be the combination of individual
valuations of each alternative state for each attribute; and the preference relation would
be defined by a real-valued function F on the product set
∏
ui(Ai):
a  b⇔ F (u1(p), u2(q), u1(p′), u2(q′)) ≥ 0. (2.16)
In terms of cumulative prospect theory-“utility”, the preference relation can be pre-
sented as:
a  b⇔
F (pi(p) · v(x1) + pi(1− p) · v(x2),
pi(q) · v(y1) + pi(1− q) · v(y2),
pi(p′) · v(x1) + pi(1− p′) · v(x2),
pi(q′) · v(y1) + pi(1− q′) · v(y2)) ≥ 0.
(2.17)
This expression does not pre-assume any completeness or transitivity requirement.
A more realistic scenario would be to allow for non-fixed amounts of losses or gains to
be included in the prospects. Namely, for security gains and losses x = (x1, ..., xn+1)
and operational outcomes y = (y1, ..., yn+1), both being (n+ 1)-dimensional vectors of
X = X1 × ...×Xn+1.
In this case and for ∆(1), the shift function can be defined as:
S2 : (∆(1)×X)2 ×R→ (∆(1)×X)2 ::
((p, x1; 1− p, x2), (q, y1; 1− q, y2), z) 7→ ((p′, x′1; 1− p′, x′2), (q′, y′1; 1− q′, y′2)).
(2.18)
S1 and S2 are the shift or “jump” functions that were depicted on a Machina triangle
in Section 2.2.1.2 (Figure 2.6). S1 and S2 are useful in defining the positional shifts
given an investment amount z. But, if the decision-maker has to choose between future
alternative investment amounts, say z1 and z2, then it would make sense to define a
preference relation on (future) outcome triplets of the form σ = (SEC,OPS, ζ), with
ζ representing the amount needed to be invested, in order to reach state σ. Expanding
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on the pre-mentioned formalism, we can consider necessary investment amount ζ as a
third attribute, so that preferences can be established on space A = (∆×X)2×Z, where
ζ ∈ Z ⊂ R. This process is cognitively more natural, because it allows the decision-
maker to directly compare future outcome postures of any investment in information
security, including the investment amount.
There are two main tools for analysing the preference relations on additive value func-
tion models and on their generalised forms, namely, marginal preferences and marginal
traces on levels. These tools are beyond the scope of this study and the interested
reader can find more information in Appendix A.3.0.1. We do not pursue the afore-
mentioned model any further; instead, we focus on eliciting risk attitudes of security
professionals experimentally.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter we argued the importance of information security and the role of the
security professional. We described the context of information security and risk man-
agement in order to convey to the reader the kind of decisions that professionals have
to face. We discussed a number of risk behaviour patterns and biases that potentially
influence these decisions.
We described the research methodology followed in this study for eliciting risk attitudes
of individuals by the use of experiments and surveys. A variety of research approaches
that bridge information security and economics was also presented.
A review on the evolution of economic models of behaviour was presented and the main
attributes and limitations of these models were analysed. Details on the notions of risk,
ambiguity and uncertainty were provided. We focused on prospect and salience theory,
as these theories are used throughout the study for examining experimental data.
Finally, we proposed a formalisation for modelling investment decisions in information
security. Our approach focuses on two attributes of the information security environ-
ment, namely, security and operability.
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3.1 Approach and Background
This first experiment contributes in understanding the attitude of active information
security professionals and practitioners across various levels of risk and uncertainty
and in comparing risk behaviour of professionals against the behaviour of the general
population.
A sample of students is randomly drawn from the database records of the Laboratory
for Decision Making & Economic Research at Royal Holloway, University of London
(RHUL), in order to be contrasted with a sample of security professionals. These are
students that come from all departments and faculties of the university. We avoid using
the terms “general population” and “student sample” as synonyms, based on the logic
of [75].
The original paper describing this experiment was presented in the Workshop on the
Economics of Information Security (WEIS 2015) [111] and a revised version was pub-
lished in a special issue of the Journal of Cybersecurity [112].
The rest of this Chapter is organised in the following way. Section 3.1 describes the
background and the approcah taken in the experiment. Section 3.2 presents our core
hypotheses and experiment design. The approach to data analysis is explained and the
survey and experimental findings are presented in Section 3.3. Finally, a discussion on
findings takes place in Section 3.4.
3.1 Approach and Background
A clear understanding of potential behavioural biases can constitute a useful tool for
decision-makers as it can lead to the development of appropriate strategies for mitigat-
ing (or amplifying) the relevant biases.
For the purpose of eliciting risk attitudes of security professionals, potential vulner-
abilities (probabilities) and losses (outcomes) are abstracted in the form of lotteries.
The environment of information security has inherent characteristics which shape the
context of decisions. We have designed our experimental scenarios focussing on sev-
eral intrinsic attributes of the information security environment, which has operational
losses and defence costs and direct losses, in the spirit of [13].
In particular, we focus on the following distinctive set of features, which are examined
in our experimental approach:
1. Loss domain: each security investment decision can be described as a lottery with
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losses only. The best outcome is zero, thus, the scope of the decision-maker is
loss prevention.
2. Ambiguity of probabilities and outcomes: security professionals face threats that
are not precisely known. Often they do not know either the probability of a loss
incurring or the likely size of the loss should it occur.
3. Evaluation by other parties: decision-makers in information security need to jus-
tify proposed security investment to others, e.g. to business managers or hierar-
chical superiors.
We find that professionals typically do a somewhat better job of maximising expected
value than the student sample, although they too exhibit systematic behavioural bi-
ases and they have, to a certain degree, a distorted understanding of probabilities
(Section 3.3).
At the end of the experiment we ask our subjects several survey questions relating
to their professional role and to their willingness to trade off security and operability.
There is considerable heterogeneity across professionals in their security / operability
preferences associated with their professional roles. Most professionals are considerably
biased towards one of the two domains and display loss aversion in their preferred
attribute.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Research Hypotheses
We analyse the behaviour of security professionals and students in our experiment and
survey in order to test a series of hypotheses motivated by the following commonly
observed behavioural patterns: 1
1. Risk and ambiguity aversion: Risk aversion implies that given a lottery with a
specific probability of loss, an individual is willing to pay more than the expected
value of this loss to avoid playing the lottery. Ambiguity aversion implies that for a
lottery with the same expected losses, an individual is willing to pay an additional
amount above the risk premium to avoid the lottery (ambiguity premium) if,
instead of a specified probability or outcome, there is a range of probabilities or
1Loss aversion, i.e. a disproportionate weighting given to outcomes of less than zero, is another
anomaly that has received considerable attention in the behavioural and experimental economics lit-
eratures. We do not focus on loss aversion in this research question because the information security
environment involves losses only.
63
3.2 Methodology
outcomes. However, prospect theory implies that for large probabilities of losses,
the same individuals may engage in risk-seeking behaviour [90]. It is possible
that security professionals differ systematically from the student population with
regards to risk and ambiguity aversion because the nature of their work implies
greater exposure to risk and ambiguity. Security professionals face continual
threats of losses, which are often not well defined.
2. Worst-case aversion: This implies that individuals pay disproportionate atten-
tion to the worst possible outcomes [32]. Their WTP to avoid playing a lottery
increases in the maximum possible loss, even if the expected value and variance
of a lottery is held constant. Worst-case thinking may be particularly common
among security professionals [135], as the field has seen a number of high-profile
cases of catastrophic losses due to security breaches in recent years. On the other
hand, small losses due to security breaches may be regarded as a normal part of
the operating environment and not be worthy of any expenditure.
3. Other-evaluation: This implies that when decisions are evaluated by other par-
ties, individuals might tend to be more risk-averse, ambiguity-averse, and worst-
case-averse. Since evaluators do not observe ex ante probabilities, only ex post
outcomes, and thus may blame the decision-maker for bad outcomes even if the
decision that led up to it was ex ante correct; “a decision maker, [...] makes the
choice that is perceived to be most justifiable to others.” [50]. Other-evaluation
may be particularly important in a security context, as security decision-makers
normally have to justify their investment proposals to business managers, chief
officers, the board of directors, etc.
We examine these behaviour patterns for both professionals and students in this exper-
iment. In the case of security professionals, we also explore a fourth aspect of decision
making in the survey part:
4. Security and Operability : We expect that security professionals will tend to value
security more than operability. In other words, when balancing the costs of
implementing security controls against the resulting loss of efficiency of business
operation, security professionals will select a trade-off position that prioritises
security ahead of operability.
3.2.2 Experimental Procedure
We conducted the experiment with two different samples. The sample of information
security professionals was drawn from current and previous students of the distance
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learning MSc in Information Security at RHUL and consisted of 59 individuals (6
female) with an average age of 39. This group consists of security professionals who
work in the industry and were undertaking the distance learning master’s program on a
part-time basis or had finished the program in the past. The mean industry experience
of this group is 9.6 years and professionals hold a variety of security positions in the
industry (see Table 3.6). The student sample was drawn from individuals registered in
the database of the Laboratory for Decision Making and Economic Research at RHUL.
This group consists of 58 active full-time students (34 female) from all departments of
the university with an average age of 22.4.2
Our experiment consists of several lotteries designed to test our hypotheses. The lotter-
ies were framed neutrally for two reasons. First, we are trying to measure the underlying
preferences of security professionals, not their interpretation of professional standards
regarding threats. Secondly, the neutral framing means that student subjects are not
being asked to make decisions on matters they have never previously experienced. Thus
the student and professional samples can be considered directly comparable. All lotter-
ies in the experiment require “one-off” decisions, with no feedback given after a choice
is selected.
One set of lotteries elicits risk and ambiguity attitudes across three levels of expected
losses and three levels of probabilities. Specifically, subjects are asked to choose between
lotteries where ambiguity of both probability and loss are changed one at a time, or
simultaneously. This approach enables us to compare WTP between-subjects and also
within-subjects across different types of risky and ambiguous decisions.
In another set, the lotteries differ from each other in terms of worst-outcome, expected
value and variance. These lotteries allow us to examine whether subjects employ simple
decision rules (heuristics) to choose between the complex lotteries. Additionally, we
elicit both WTP and binary choices for a subset of these lotteries, allowing us to check
whether our subjects’ preferences are consistent across different framings.
A challenging point of the design was the creation of five-outcome lotteries for testing
the worst-case thinking hypothesis. The variables that are changed across the lotter-
ies are best-outcome, worst-outcome, expected value and variance. Moreover, certain
lotteries were built on power-law distributions, as it has been shown that occurrences
of many natural and social catastrophic phenomena follow such distributions [117].
Worst possible outcomes are deemed salient only if they are significantly different from
the rest of the choice context, otherwise their associated events can be underweighted
instead of overweighted by the participants. This means that both ranking and mag-
nitude of losses are important. The degree of distortion of the perceived probabilities
2Three subjects in the student sample were excluded from the analysis because they stated that
they were related to information security.
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was estimated by salience theory assumptions.
Participants were informed that they would receive a fixed participation payment of 3
USD and an additional potentially larger amount depending on their decisions in the
experiment. In particular, one of the lottery comparisons of Appendix A.1.3 was ran-
domly chosen for each participant, and their preferred lottery was“played”by a pseudo-
random probability generator.3 The outcome was mapped to a maximum performance
gain of 10 USD and was sent along with the participation payment to individuals, in
the form of an Amazon gift certificate.
Furthermore, it is possible that security professionals have a tendency to overemphasise
security issues at the expense of operational issues which could be important from a
business perspective. To examine this question, we ask subjects to choose between
security and operability in a realistic scenario. To make the distinction clear from
potential operational risks [42], operability was framed as the operational time needed
for task completion, and was measured explicitly in monetary terms, as was security. To
exclude other factors, the scenario described an information system of moderate-impact
to confidentiality, integrity and availability [129]. The experiment design measured not
only the actual preference between security and operational time, but also the relative
loss aversion in security and operability, by a series of questions dynamically linked to
subjects’ previous replies.
Information security managers and decision-makers have to justify their investment
proposals to business managers, chief officers, the board of directors or a similar body.
The other-evaluation hypothesis as defined by Curley et al. [50] states that: “a decision
maker, in making a choice, anticipates that others will evaluate his or her decision; and,
so, makes the choice that is perceived to be most justifiable to others. This choice is
for the option having the smallest degree of ambiguity”. The hypotheses aimed to
reveal evaluation by others as a possible psychological source of behaviour that directly
influences investment choices. Testing the other-evaluation hypothesis was ambitious
in the context of an online experiment, because a way had to be found in order to
provide an impression of an additional evaluation, on top of the standard statistical
analysis that subjects were aware that they were being subjected to.
Finally, subjects filled out a short questionnaire about their personal attitudes and
demographics. We use this data to examine correlations with behaviour in the main
experiment.
3This mechanism was coded in Javascript on the Qualtrics platform which was used for the experi-
ments and surveys. The code is available in Appendix A.1.7
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3.2.3 Experiment Design
We create a new instrument for measuring risk and ambiguity aversion, as a modifi-
cation of the Holt and Laury instrument [78] and similar to the alternative of Moore
and Eckel [115]. Some studies use outcome-ambiguous lotteries [56], while others use
probability-ambiguous lotteries [10]. Our approach uses sets of lotteries with different
levels of expected losses, in each of which there are four lotteries spanning from risky
lotteries to lotteries ambiguous in probabilities, in outcomes and in both probabilities
and outcomes. This design allows for between-subjects, as well as within-subjects anal-
ysis across lotteries of the same expected value. Experiment screenshots can be found
in Appendix A.1.6. Data from professionals was collected online between 05/06/2014
and 27/06/2014. The student-sample data was collected on 26/08/2014. 4
3.2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Risk and ambiguity aversion
We test risk and ambiguity preferences using 12 neutrally framed lotteries, divided
into three groups of four. Lotteries within a group have identical expected value, but
different degrees of ambiguity. Subjects are asked to state their maximum WTP in
order to avoid playing each lottery. For example, the four lotteries in group A (H11
to H14), which are presented to subjects as standalone lotteries, all have an expected
value of µ = −2.5 and contain the following text:
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid playing a
lottery in which there is..:
(i) ..a 5% probability of losing $50 and losing nothing otherwise?”
(ii) ..a probability between 0% and 10% of losing $50 and losing nothing otherwise?”
(iii) ..a 5% probability of losing between $20 and $80 and losing nothing otherwise?”
(iv) ..a probability between 0% and 10% of losing between $20 and $80 and losing
nothing otherwise?”
The lotteries in group B (H15 to H18) and group C (H19 to H112) contain the same
potential outcomes, but probabilities of 15% (0%-30%) and 50% (35%-65%), respec-
tively. Hence the ambiguous lotteries are all designed such that if there was a uniform
distribution of outcomes and probabilities over the range of ambiguity, the expected
4A pilot experiment was distributed to PhD students and research associates at RHUL before
launching the actual experiment. This provided us with useful feedback on the phrasing of tasks,
participants’ understanding, the average duration of the experiment and other presentation issues.
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value of losses would be the same as in the risky lottery. Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.2
contains the full set of groups of lotteries. In the following, we refer to lotteries of type
(i). as risky, lotteries of type (ii). as probability ambiguous, lotteries of type (iii). as
outcome ambiguous, and lotteries of type (iv). as fully ambiguous.
Subjects had to give their WTP for all 12 lotteries, but the order in which lotteries were
presented was counterbalanced to control for potential order effects. That means that
some subjects saw the risky lotteries first and some saw the fully ambiguous lotteries
first.
3.2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Worst-case thinking and other heuristics
This part of the experiment consists of five pairwise lottery comparisons (Appendix A.1.3)
for which subjects were asked to choose their preferred lottery. All lotteries consisted
of five outcomes; for conforming with salience theory [32], probabilities are kept the
same in both lotteries, whereas outcomes are different, so that the expected value is
the same in some pairs and different in others. For three of the lotteries involved in
the comparisons there was a subsequent WTP question (Appendix A.1.4) similarly to
the instrument of Hypothesis 1 (Appendix A.1.2). Thus, consistency of replies could
be checked between comparisons and WTP per lottery.
For example, lottery L6 (L7) contains the following outcomes:
 15% probability of losing nothing (nothing)
 30% probability of losing 166.66 (183.33)
 30% probability losing 300 (300)
 20% probability of losing 450 (450)
 5% probability of losing 900 (800)
While both lotteries L6 and L7 have the same expected value (−275), the highest loss in
lottery L6 (900) is greater than in lottery L7 (800). In other words, lottery L6 contains
the “worse worst case”.
More abstractly, if µi is the expected value of lottery Li, V ari its variance, and ‘’,
‘’ denote weak and strict preference respectively, then for example, for lotteries 9, 10
and 11 (Appendix A.1.3), theory predicts that:
L10  L9, as µ10 = µ9 and V ar10 < V ar9
L10  L11, as |µ10| < |µ11| and V ar10 < V ar11
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L9  L11, as |µ9| < |µ11| and V ar9 ≈ V ar11
So, for an expected value maximiser, the worst lottery would be L11, the least damaging
would be L10, and L9 would lie in-between: L10  L9  L11.
Instead of worst-case thinking, subjects may also use other heuristics or simple decision
rules to decide between lotteries. For example, subjects may put a lot of weight on
the best possible outcome (“best-case thinking”). Or they may pairwise-compare states
across lotteries and prefer the lottery which“wins” in more states. Finally, subjects may
also prefer lotteries with less variance, which would constitute a form of risk aversion.
In order to test whether subjects use any of these heuristics, we compare the majority
choice in our samples with the predictions of each heuristic. If any heuristic is consistent
with all or at least most of the majority choices, it would provide evidence that subjects
indeed rely on simple decision rules.
In total we have eight different lotteries which are used in five pairwise comparisons (two
lotteries are used twice); three with an expected value of −275 and five with expected
values ranging from −86.25 to −86.75. Appendix A.1.3 contains further details.
In addition to the pairwise choices, we also elicit subjects’ WTP to avoid three of the
eight lotteries (L9, L10 and L11, see Appendix A.1.4). Since these three lotteries are also
used in two pairwise choices, it allows us to check whether our subjects’ preferences are
influenced by the type of decision. Such inconsistencies would violate rational choice
theory since rational preferences should be unaffected by the way in which they are
elicited (choice or WTP). The three WTP questions are separated from the pairwise
choices by a different unrelated set of questions in order to disguise the similarities of
the decisions, and both types of questions were counterbalanced.
Some lotteries in the experiment are designed to approximate power-law distributions.
Such distributions simulate the occurrence of rare events that are observed in vari-
ous physical and social phenomena, from earthquakes to citations and web hits [117].
Moreover, there is evidence for the existence of power-laws in cyber risks and in the
growth of networks, relating these distributions with security issues like identity theft
and malware spreading [107, 66]. Five out of the eight lotteries of Appendix A.1.3 are
designed to approximate power-law distributions. In the general form of a power-law
distribution, probability p is specified as a function of outcome x: p(x) = κ(−x)α , where
α is the distribution exponent and κ a constant. A rough requirement that is sustained
by goodness-of-fit of various empirical data to such distributions [46] is that, α ∈ (0, 3).
For the purposes of our experiment, and in order for the discrete distributions of mon-
etary losses to approximate a power-law distribution, we have set α = 1.1, constant
κ = 20 and x ∈ [−1000, 0).
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3.2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Other-evaluation and behaviour
We examine other-evaluation using a between-subjects design in which subjects are
assigned to either a control group, which is presented with the standard version of the
experiment, and a treatment group, which is initially informed that all choices made
in the experiment would be “further viewed” and would “go through an additional
evaluation process“, according to the following statement:
“Important note: Your choices and their corresponding possible outcomes in the fol-
lowing experiment will be further viewed and will go through an additional evaluation
process, after the completion of the experiment.”
Participants are informed that the evaluators would have the same information as
themselves [45]. Ultimately any test of other-evaluation in an experiment such as
this is going to be fairly weak for two reasons. First, the experiment itself has fairly
low stakes, so any evaluation done within the experiment will not have much impact.
This alone may not prevent other-evaluation from impacting subjects’ behaviour [17].
Additionally, however, since our experiment was conducted online, we could not give
any public feedback, limiting the perceived social impact of the evaluation.
3.2.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Relative importance of security and operations
This part of the study consists of two sets of questions given to the professional sample
only. The first part elicits preferences between enhancing security and enhancing oper-
ability of the system. It consists of scenario-based questions in which the participants
have to choose between measures A and B, where A and B have different impact on the
security level and the operability of the system. Both attributes have equal monetary
values assigned to them. The specific questions asked are:
“Imagine the following scenario: You are managing an Information System that has
moderate-impact on the confidentiality, availability and integrity of information records
kept by your organisation.
The total worth of the system under protection is evaluated at $10,000.
Full operability of the system allows the business to gain a profit of $10,000.
Two new mechanisms A and B with the same cost are proposed for the system.
Which one of the following mechanisms do you prefer?” (Table 3.1)
Table 3.1: Initial question of Scenario 1: “Which one of the following measures do you prefer?”
Mechanism A Mechanism B
Enhances Security of the system by 10% Enhances Operability of the system by 10%
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Subsequent questions are formed dynamically depending on previous answers. In the
next question the value of the preferred measure is marginally decreased, while the
value of the other measure remains constant. This is repeated until the subject crosses
over from choosing one measure to the other, so that a switching point between security
and operability is specified.
The second set of questions elicits a measure for whether losses of the attribute preferred
in Scenario 1 (security or operability) are treated differently to gains. Subjects are asked
to choose between three options (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Scenario 2 template question
Choice A Mechanism B Choice C
Remains at the current
system state
Reduces Security by x%
Enhances Operability by y%
Indifferent between
A and B
Values x and y of choice B are taken from the switching point which is computed from
Scenario 1. If a subject selects choice B or C, this stage of the experiment ends. If the
subject chooses A, then the question is repeated, except if operability (security) has
been preferred in the previous scenario, the security (operability) reduction is lowered
by one percent. To illustrate, consider the following example: In Scenario 1 a subject
is indifferent between a 5% security enhancement and a 10% operability enhancement.
Subsequently, in Scenario 2, choice B gives a 5% reduction in security and a 10%
enhancement in operability. If choice A is selected (i.e. choice B is considered worse
than the status quo), the reduction in security in choice B is decreased to 4%, and so
on.
The difference between the values of Scenario 1 and 2 (if any) constitutes our measure
of loss aversion on the preferred attribute (security or operability). In particular, the
difference i between value x of Scenario 1, and the final value x − i, i = 0, 1, .., as
presented in Mechanism B in Scenario 2, is the magnitude of loss aversion on the
preferred attribute (security or operability).
If losses and gains of equal magnitude are weighted equally, subjects will always select
choice C. If, however, a loss looms larger than an equivalent gain, subjects will prefer
choice A.
We assume that utility functions of security and operability are Sec(.) and Ops(.)
respectively. The utility functions are defined on [−1, 1] −→ R, and also Sec(a) and
Ops(a) > 0 iff (if and only if) a > 0, Sec(a) and Ops(a) < 0 iff a < 0 and Sec(a) and
Ops(a) = 0 if a = 0.
For example, assuming that the switching point elicited from Scenario 1 was Sec(x)
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and Ops(10), x ∈ [0, 9], then we can assume for simplicity 5 that:
Sec(+x%) = Ops(+10%). (3.1)
Assuming that in Scenario 2, the current state A was preferred to Mechanism B:
Sec(−x%) +Ops(+10%) < Sec(0) +Ops(0) = 0 (3.2)
⇒ −Sec(−x%) > Ops(+10%) (3.3)
⇒ −Sec(−x%) > Sec(+x%). (3.4)
Inequality (3.3) implies that the individual manifests relative loss aversion between the
two attributes (security and operability), as x ∈ [0, 9], and Inequality (3.4) that there
is loss aversion on the utility of the preferred attribute (here on security). By the
assumed utility functions we see that the absolute value of the utility of a reduction
is greater than the utility of an enhancement of the same value. In other words, a
reduction “hurts more” than an enhancement satisfies.
If Mechanism B had been chosen in the initial question of Scenario 2, this would mean
that:
Sec(0%) +Ops(0%) < Sec(−x%) +Ops(10%)
⇒ Ops(10%) > −Sec(−x%)
⇒ −Sec(−x%) < Sec(x%). (3.5)
Therefore, no relative loss aversion is manifested between the attributes or on the
attribute of security. Quite the contrary: enhancement is preferred to reduction, so
reduction “hurts less” than enhancement.
If Mechanism B was chosen in subsequent questions of Scenario 2, then e.g.:
Sec(0%) +Ops(0%) < Sec(−(x− 1)%) +Ops(10%)
⇒ Ops(10%) > −Sec(−(x− 1)%),
which also does not imply any loss aversion. However, if Mechanism A was again chosen
in the first subsequent question of Scenario 2, then:
5It would be more precise, e.g. for Sec(5%) < Ops(10%) < Sec(6%), to have an approximation of
Ops(10%) = Sec(ζ%), ζ ∈ (5, 6).
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Sec(0%) +Ops(0%) > Sec(−(x− 1)%) +Ops(10%)
⇒ Ops(10%) < −Sec(−(x− 1)%)
⇒ −Sec(−(x− 1)%) > Sec(x%), (3.6)
which would mean that the magnitude of loss aversion is increased in Inequality (3.6)
in comparison to Inequality (3.5). This magnitude is captured in the variable named
LOSS AV SEC for individuals that initially preferred security and similarly in vari-
able LOSS AV OPS for operability (Figures 3.16, 3.17). So, an observed value of loss
aversion κ, say in security, is translated as −Sec(−κ%) > Sec(+λ%) or |Sec(−κ%)| >
|Sec(+λ%)|, with κ, λ > 0 and κ ∈ (0, λ]. 6
If Choice C was chosen in the initial question of Scenario 2, this would mean that:
Sec(0%) +Ops(0%) = Sec(−x%) +Ops(10%)
⇒ Ops(10%) = −Sec(−x%)
⇒ Sec(x%) = −Sec(−x%). (3.7)
That is, preferences would be linear. Therefore, no further actions need to be taken in
case of choices B or C.
The “Display Logic” diagram that was used for the design of this experiment phase in
the Qualtrics software [3] is presented in Figure 3.1.
Each box represents a question in the experiment. H5 is the coding used for this series
of choices; “1A” denotes a preference for security in Scenario 1 and “1B” for operability.
This first series of questions is used to trace the flip point where preference changes from
security to operability or vice versa, and is stored as variable “H5 2”. In the questions
with coding “H5 2”, the percentage value of the switching point is depicted (e.g. (9,10)
indicates Sec(9%) and Ops(10%)), and this pair is subsequently presented in a three-
choice question of Scenario 2. Finally, the“H5 3”questions serve the purpose of gradual
reduction of security or operability (coding 3A and 3B respectively) of Scenario 2,
whenever choice A (“Remains at the current system state”) is selected. The process is
terminated if choices B or C are selected at any point.
6The last pair of the utilities Sec(.) and Ops(.) that can possibly be compared by participants is
Sec(−1%) against Ops(+10%) or vice versa. So, if the last choice is still the current state, the final
(and maximum) loss aversion score is 9. With the current simplification in the formalism, this means
Sec(−%), with  > 0 and  very small;  cannot be interpreted as  = 0, as it was initially assumed
that Sec(0) = Ops(0) = 0.
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Figure 3.1: Display Logic diagram for Hypothesis 4.
3.3 Analysis and Findings
This section presents our findings for the main hypotheses outlined in the previous
section. Following standard experimental economics procedures, the experiment is
counterbalanced to control for potential order effects (Appendix A.1.11: Order Effects),
data has been checked for validity and cleaned accordingly (Appendix A.1.9: Data
Cleaning), and outliers are shown to be non-influential (Appendix A.1.10: Outliers) for
the relevant tests.
3.3.1 Risk and Ambiguity Aversion
The main hypothesis of risk and ambiguity aversion is examined both amongst inde-
pendent subjects and per subject. The following lottery categorisation is used for both
between- and within-subjects tests and its purpose is to examine whether the magni-
tude of losses and the nature of stakes (risky or ambiguous or both) have effects on the
WTP of participants.
 Group A: lotteries H11 to H14 with expected value µ = −2.5.
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 Group B : lotteries H15 to H18 with expected value µ = −7.5.
 Group C : lotteries H19 to H112 with expected value µ = −25.
Group A corresponds to the first four lotteries of Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.2 (H1
Instrument), Group B consists of lotteries 5 to 8, and the last four lotteries of the table
are in Group C. It should be noted that the first lottery of each group is a risky lottery,
that is, it contains specific probability and outcome values. The second lottery of each
group has specific losses and a probability interval, i.e. it is probability-ambiguous.
The third lottery of each group is outcome-ambiguous, and the last lottery of each
group is both probability- and outcome-ambiguous.
Findings on Risk Aversion
Finding 1: Both professionals and students are risk-averse for small- and
moderate-probability losses and become risk-seeking for high-probability losses.
Figure 3.2: Mean risk-averse (positive) and risk-taking (negative) WTP of Students
and Professionals per lottery. Bars represent participants’ mean WTP minus the EV
of each of the 12 lotteries.
Both information security professionals and students are willing to pay significantly
more than the expected value of almost all first eight lotteries (Groups A and B) of
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Table A.1, which include both risky and ambiguous lotteries. In particular, significant
risk aversion is manifested in the lotteries with small (p = 0.05) and medium (p = 0.15)
actual or average probabilities, which correspond to small ($2.5) and medium-range
($7.5) expected losses. Table 3.3 in Section 3.3.1.1 depicts mean differences between
stated WTP and expected value of each lottery for both samples. In other words,
Table 3.3 reveals the lotteries for which WTP of subjects is significantly different from
the expected loss.
However, both security professionals and students become risk-seeking when the prob-
ability of loss is large, switching from their risk-averse behaviour exhibited in the first
eight lotteries (Figure 3.2). In the experiment, “large” probability is manifested as
p = 0.5. The detailed methodology and the analysis of these results are presented in
Section 3.3.1.1. This finding is in accordance with the universally observed phenomenon
of the four-fold patter of risk attitude, as presented in Section 2.2.1.1.
Findings on Ambiguity Aversion
Finding 2: Professionals reveal ambiguity aversion in all of their choices; am-
biguity aversion is not consistently observed in the student sample.
Finding 3: Professionals seem to deviate less from expected value maximisation
(expected loss minimisation) than the student sample.
Security professionals become more risk-averse when they confront ambiguity, compared
to when they confront risky lotteries. This result does not hold for the student sample
in all cases.
We consider how WTP changes within-subjects, i.e. how each subject diversifies its
WTP when presented with different types of risky and ambiguous lotteries. Figures 3.4,
3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 show differences between risky and ambiguous lotteries within subjects
of both samples. In all three groups (A and B and C), professionals reveal significant
differences in WTP between at least one pair of lotteries; differences are revealed, as
expected, in the pair of each risky lottery with the lottery that is ambiguous in both
probabilities and outcomes. Students reveal significant differences only amongst the
lotteries of groups A and B. Detailed methodology and analysis for these results are
presented in Section 3.3.1.2.
No clear conclusion can be derived regarding the behaviour towards the two types of
ambiguous lotteries: the lotteries with ambiguous probabilities and the lotteries with
ambiguous outcomes.
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However, professionals’ WTP is closer to the expected value than the student sample.
Specifically, professionals’ WTP has smaller mean difference from the test value (zero),
i.e. from the lottery’s expected value, than the WTP of students in 13 out of the 15
lotteries (Table 3.3). Remarkably, the only two lotteries (H19 and H111) in which
professionals on average are willing to pay an amount that is more distant from the
expected value, than the amount that students are willing to pay, are lotteries that
are associated with a large probability of loss (p = 0.5). Starting with these lotter-
ies, all consecutive lotteries reveal risk seeking behaviour. But, overall, professionals’
estimations are closer to the expected value than students’ WTP.
The result that security professionals remain closer to the expected value is also con-
firmed by the interactions between the variable “professional or student” and the vari-
able of WTP with the self-reported risk attitude of the individuals. More precisely,
moderation analysis reveals a significant interaction with predictor X = Student or
Pro, outcome variables Y = WTP, and moderator the Likert-scale self-reported risk
attitude M=General Risk, interaction b = 2.06, 95% CI [0.15, 3.97], t = 2.14, p = 0.034
(indicatively, interaction with variable Y = H19 is shown in Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Interaction of Pro or Student and H19 with General Risk as moderator
General Risk is the survey variable that corresponds to the question “How willing are
you to take risks in general?” (low values indicate risk-averse and high values risk-
seeking behaviour).
So, amongst risk seeking individuals, being an information security professional has
a significant positive relationship with WTP to avoid a lottery; the effect is reversed
amongst risk-averse individuals, i.e. amongst risk-averse individuals, being a profes-
sional has a significant negative relationship with WTP. In other words, amongst risk-
seeking individuals, professionals are the least risk seeking, and amongst risk-averse
individuals, professionals are the least risk-averse. This result constitutes an additional
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indication that, overall, professionals are closer to risk neutrality than the student
sample.
3.3.1.1 (A) Between-subjects tests
There are overall fifteen WTP-type lotteries, all with negative-only outcomes. For each
of these lotteries there is a corresponding variable Hx y (for x = 1, y = 1 to 12, and for
x = 2, y = 6, 7 or 8); and an additional variable called RiskAversionHx y is computed
(as in Figure 3.2). The additional variable expresses the distance of the subject’s WTP
from the expected value (EV) of each lottery. Values are positive if the subject is willing
to pay more than the actual expected value, and negative otherwise. So, positive values
of this variable imply risk aversion and negative values reveal risk-seeking behaviour.
A risk-neutral subject would have RiskAversion = 0.
Table 3.3: One-Sample t-test for between-subjects risk aversion
One-Sample t-test (Test Value = 0)
Students N=58 Professionals N=59
EV µ diff 95%CI of diff µ diff 95%CI of diff
Lower Upper Lower Upper
H11 -2.5 7.4655*** 4.1751 10.7558 4.2118*** 1.7758 6.6479
H12 -2.5 9.1206*** 5.6006 12.6407 4.2627*** 2.2323 6.2930
H13 -2.5 10.4482*** 6.0415 14.8550 5.9745*** 2.9395 9.0095
H14 -2.5 13.6896*** 8.9826 18.3966 5.8389*** 3.7376 7.9403
H15 -7.5 5.3103*** 2.7723 7.8483 2.4152 -0.0069 4.8374
H16 -7.5 7.7931*** 5.1508 10.4353 4.9576*** 2.4686 7.4465
H17 -7.5 8.0689*** 4.5827 11.5551 3.9067** 1.5523 6.2612
H18 -7.5 11.0862*** 7.7232 14.4491 6.3135*** 4.1512 8.4758
H19 -25 -1.0689 -4.1174 1.9794 -2.1864 -4.6613 0.2884
H110 -25 -1.7586 -4.5304 1.0132 -0.8983 -3.8769 2.0803
H111 -25 0.1034 -3.3069 3.5138 -0.8474 -3.9392 2.2442
H112 -25 -0.7758 -4.5041 2.9524 0.6440 -3.0682 4.3563
H26 -86.6 40.3482 -4.4842 85.1807 16.3491 -10.4378 43.1361
H27 -86.6 34.8827 -2.9151 72.6806 22.6372 -15.4711 60.7457
H28 -89.75 24.0603 -8.9019 57.0226 18.7754 -12.2148 49.7656
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Test is performed on Hij variables’ WTP differences from each lottery’s expected value.
The statistical test used is the parametric one-sample t-test. This test determines
whether a sample belongs to a population of a specific mean; the mean in our case is
the expected value of the lotteries, but since RiskAversionHx y variables are computed
from the expected values of each group of lotteries, the actual values of the new variables
have zero as a reference point. As a result, all t-tests examine mean deviation from
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zero. The four assumptions for using the one-sample t-test require that the dependent
variable is measured at interval or ratio level, data need to be independent, the number
of significant outliers needs to be restricted and, lastly, the dependent variable needs
to approximate the normal distribution. All assumptions are met since the dependent
variable is WTP, measurement is between subjects and sample outliers are shown to
approximate the normal distribution (see Appendix A.1.10). 7
For Group A (µ = −2.5) (Appendix A.1.2), the one-sample t-test reveals significant
risk aversion for all lotteries for both professionals and students. The same result of
significant risk aversion is observed for Group B (µ = −7.5). However, in Group C
(µ = −25) statistical significance is not detected and behaviour shifts into being risk-
seeking. We can see the positive differences of the mean in Table 3.3 (risk aversion)
and how they become negative from the ninth lottery and on (risk-taking behaviour).
The last three lotteries with large losses do not reveal significant risk attitudes (see the
list of lotteries in Appendix A.1.2).
3.3.1.2 (B) Within-subjects tests
The within-subjects design increases the sensitivity of observed effects, as it is the same
participants who provide the data for the various conditions. The tests used for these
within-subject comparisons are the non-parametric Friedman test [63], which is used
to measure differences between more than two conditions having a dependent variable
of ordinal or continuous type, and the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test [157],
which also reveals the magnitude of pairwise WTP differences amongst lotteries. The
tests require that the variables are related, i.e. that the same subjects provide the
scores for the conditions. The Friedman test ranks all the conditions for each subject
separately and then sums up the ranks for each condition. The independent variables
are the expected values of all WTP lottery questions: H11 to H112. The dependent
variable is the amount that individuals are willing-to-pay in order to avoid each lot-
tery. Lotteries are categorised, based on their expected values into the aforementioned
groups.
For Group A both non-parametric tests reveal that students have significantly different
(increased) WTP amongst the pairs of lotteries, but professionals are more “robust”,
i.e. they only show significantly different behaviour between the risky and the fully-
ambiguous pair (ambiguous in both probabilities and outcomes; Figure 3.5), whereas
students also reveal significant differences amongst other pairs (Figure 3.4). The nu-
merical values on the diagram nodes of all lottery pairwise comparisons indicate the
7The t-test is robust against violations of normality, nevertheless, we show that outliers are dis-
tributed roughly normally.
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sample average rank for each lottery of the group by the Friedman test, and pairwise
significance is denoted by a yellow line.
Figure 3.4: Pairwise comparison of
Group A lotteries for Students
Figure 3.5: Pairwise comparison of
Group A lotteries for Professionals
The aforementioned differences between students and professionals of Group A are al-
most reversed in Group B, where students reveal significant WTP differences in two out
of the five possible pairs (Figures 3.6), and professionals in three out of five pairs (3.7).
Moreover, these lotteries involve realistic moderate-range probabilities and profession-
als’ choices are diversified for probability- and fully-ambiguous lotteries.
Figure 3.6: Pairwise comparison of
Group B lotteries for Students
Figure 3.7: Pairwise comparison of
Group B lotteries for Professionals
In Group C we observe that students do not diversify their WTP significantly due to
ambiguity, but professionals significantly change their WTP between the risky and the
fully-ambiguous lottery (Figure 3.8).
We observe that for both samples, as expected, WTP for avoiding a risky lottery is
significantly smaller than for avoiding a lottery ambiguous in both probabilities and
outcomes. It is not clear, however, whether ambiguity of probabilities increases WTP
more than ambiguity of outcomes (we test a relevant hypothesis in “Experiment 2:
Decision-making in Risk Treatment”, Chapter 4). Professionals are equally, or more,
prone than students to increase their WTP in order to avoid mean preserving spreads
of risky lotteries.
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Figure 3.8: Pairwise comparison of
Group C lotteries for Professionals
3.3.2 Worst-case Thinking
This section is divided into the analysis of three parts: potential heuristics for lottery
comparisons, preferences on lottery comparisons against stated WTP, and salience
theory calculations for each lottery comparison.
3.3.2.1 Lottery Comparisons and findings on potential heuristics
Finding 4: Both professionals and students reveal choice preferences which are
in line with expected values and state-by-state comparisons of lotteries.
Subjects are presented with five pairs of lotteries and are asked to chose the one they
prefer (see Appendix A.1.3). The lotteries of each comparison pair have different at-
tributes, e.g. they vary in their expected value, variance, best (least worse) and worst
outcome. Depending on the lottery of each pair that is chosen by each sample, we
examine whether this choice is in accordance, or in contradiction, with the relevant
attribute. In Table 3.4 we can see preference percentages per comparison for both
samples, as well as the “fit” of the various heuristics to the given preferences.
The major qualitative difference we observe between professionals and students is man-
ifested in the first comparison (Lotteries 9 and 10, Appendix A.1.3). The third compar-
ison is quantitatively different amongst the two samples. However, sample differences
are not statistically significant (Pearson’s chi-2 test).
We can observe (Table 3.4) that in the comparisons in which expected value is different
for each lottery, the lottery with the smallest expected loss is always chosen. Thus, the
possibility that choice is based on the expected value is sustained. If lottery preferences
are examined by the variance of the distribution of each lottery, we see that preferences
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are balanced. That is, choosing the lottery with the smallest variance is not clearly
preferred as a heuristic.
Examining the best possible outcome of each comparison, i.e. the least damaging loss,
we observe that in most of the cases, preferences of both professionals and students
are almost in line with this heuristic. One might argue that these choices reinforce
expected value as a heuristic, as three out of the five lotteries approximate power-law
distributions, and therefore their smallest losses are associated with large probabilities
(p = 0.85). However, such distributions underlie the lotteries of the first, second and
fifth comparison which do not clearly comply with this simple heuristic.
In a similar fashion, the worst-outcome column examines whether subjects avoid the
lottery with the worst outcome and choose the opposite lottery. It is notable that in all
cases except one, the lottery with the largest loss is chosen by both professionals and
students. This is arguably not surprising, as this heuristic is very simplistic.
Table 3.4: Lottery comparisons and accordance with heuristics
Lottery pair Ex-
pected
Value
Vari-
ance
Worst
out-
come
Best
out-
come
# of
domi-
nant
states
Most
salient
pair
(same
dice
roll)
Most
salient
pair
(indep.
dice
rolls)
Students
L9 VS L10 - - - - - - -
(50%, 50%)
L10 VS L11 X X × × X X ×
(60%, 40%)
L8 VS L6 - × × X - × ×
(48%, 52%)
L6 VS L7 - × × X - × ×
(60%, 40%)
L4 VS L12 X X × X X X ×
(52%, 48%)
Professionals
L9 VS L10 - × X X - × X
(59%, 41%)
L10 VS L11 X X × × X X ×
(53%, 47%)
L8 VS L6 - × × X - × ×
(36%, 64%)
L6 VS L7 - × × X - × ×
(61%, 39%)
L4 VS L12 X X × X X X ×
(54%, 46%)
‘X’: preference justifies heuristic
‘-’: heuristic does not influence choice
‘×’: preference contradicts heuristic predictions
Pairs of percentages indicate preference for each lottery above
Most salient pair is a potential heuristic that is examined under the assumptions of
salience theory. There are two separate columns for this choice rule. In the first
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column we assume “same dice roll” and salience is calculated by comparing all pairs of
outcomes of the same state amongst the two lotteries and specifying the most salient
pair. The most salient pair is the one which has a larger value of salience function
σ(x, y) for outcomes x and y (see Equations (2.6) or (3.8) in Sections 2.2.1.3 and 3.3.2.3,
respectively). The most salient pair practically means that the difference of the involved
outcomes is the most “noticeable” of all the differences, and consequently the subject
chooses the lottery with the smallest loss. Note that same states correspond to the same
probabilities in the compared lotteries. Same “dice roll” means that if, for example, the
worst outcome materialises in the future for lottery A, then the worst outcome will also
materialise for lottery B. So, in this heuristic the decision-maker compares the lotteries
“line by line”. It can be argued that presentation of the comparisons (Appendix A.1.3)
encourages the aforementioned rule of thumb for the decision-makers, as the states of
the lotteries under comparison are presented one next to the other. However, results
do not sustain such a decision rule, as preferences do not clearly favour the lottery with
the smallest loss in the most salient pair. A closer look at the lottery distributions gives
some indication that individuals might indeed be expected value maximisers. The third
and fourth comparisons are never in accordance with the most-salient-pair rule, but the
majority of comparisons: first, second and fifth, which follow power-law distributions,
are. Since the first states are very probable, choices might imply that the decision-maker
not only compares “line by line”, but also sums the outcomes when moving from one
line to the next. For example, in the first comparison of Appendix A.1.3, the decision-
maker, when reaching the second line, might add probabilities (p1 + p2 = 0.93) and
since the combination of the first two states gives a very likely event, the decision-maker
might choose the cumulatively smallest loss.
Similar reasoning holds for the most salient pair on “independent dice rolls”. This
heuristic allows for the two lotteries to be executed independently, so that, for exam-
ple, the best outcome might materialise in lottery A and the worst in lottery B. The
difference here is that the most salient pair is calculated from all possible outcome-
combinations amongst the two lotteries. The reasoning behind this particular heuristic
is that, by fixing the least-worst outcomes to very similar values, it is the worst-case
catastrophic outcome which potentially attracts the attention of the decision-maker.
We can observe in Table 3.4 that the majority of results do not favour such a decision
rule; there is only one indication that this heuristic complies with the choice of the
majority of professionals.
Number of dominant states is the sum of the same-dice-roll states that are strictly
preferable to the corresponding states of the opposite lottery. The “same dice roll”
requirement is important here, as it is the corresponding states of “line-by-line” com-
parison that produce preference for one of the two lotteries. Note that not all lot-
tery comparisons have a lottery that dominates the opposite lottery in the number of
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states, as in three of the comparisons lotteries have the same number of dominant states
(having one or three identical states). Only the second and fifth comparisons have a
states-dominant lottery. As we can see in Table 3.4 both these comparisons comply
with this heuristic, for both samples. Thus, the lottery with the most dominant states
is preferred by all participants.
3.3.2.2 Consistency across types of decisions
Finding 5: Security professionals exhibit preference inconsistencies between
willingness to pay and choice decisions. The level of inconsistency is similar to
the student sample.
There is an interesting finding pertaining lottery comparisons and WTP. For the three
lotteries involved in the first two comparisons (Lotteries 9, 10 and 11, Appendix A.1.3)
participants also state their willingess-to-pay to avoid them, at a different experiment
stage (Appendix A.1.4). This allows for examining the consistency of these replies.
For the first comparison of L9 against L10, two variables are created, CONSISTENCY L9
and CONSISTENCY L10vsL9. In case a subject prefers L9 to L10 in the comparison
and is willing to pay less to avoid L9 than to avoid L10, the subject’s replies are con-
sistent and they are coded with a variable value of 0. In case of an inconsistency, the
value is set to CONSISTENCY L9=1. Similarly, any contradiction regarding L10 is
examined. So, inconsistency here is the phenomenon of preferring one lottery (from
another) and at the same time be willing to spend more to avoid this lottery (than the
other). The same reasoning is applied to the comparison and WTP between L10 and
L11. Note that L10 is used in both comparisons, and therefore there are two variables
for L10, one for each comparison. Table 3.5 depicts the percentage of subjects across
both samples that choose Li over Lj and reveal an inconsistency by their stated WTP.
Table 3.5: Lottery comparisons and willingness to pay inconsistencies.
Comparison Comparison Preference % of subjects that choose Li over Lj
variable Li  Lj and reveal choice inconsistency by WTP
Students Professionals
H21 L9 VS L10 L9  L10 31% 46%
L10  L9 55% 63%
H22 L10 VS L11 L10  L11 57% 36%
L11  L10 17% 32%
There is no statistically significant difference amongst inconsistent percentages of pro-
fessionals and students. However, the percentage of inconsistent professionals is larger
than that of students in three out of four cases.
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3.3.2.3 Salience Theory calculations for lottery-comparisons
Finding 6: The majority of security professionals have a distorted perception
of probabilities. The student sample reveals overall more consistent preferences
than security professionals.
Salience theory is a theory of choice among lotteries that quantifies the decision weights
of salient lottery outcomes, and proposes that the attention of the decision-maker is
focused on the most salient outcomes. Such a focus favours the corresponding salient
lottery for positive outcomes and disfavours it when lottery outcomes are in the domain
of losses. For the purposes of the analysis of this section, it is assumed that the claims
of salience theory [32] are true, and consequently conclusions on the subjects’ local
thinking are derived from the experiment results.
We briefly repeat the methodology for calculating salience theory-predicted preferences
over two lotteries here; the full details are presented in Section 2.2.1.3:
 Step 1: write all possible state space pairs by combining all outcomes from the
first and the second lottery.
 Step 2: rank all pairs by the salience function σ, with θ = 0.1:
σ(xis, x
−i
s ) =
|xis, x−is |
|xis|+ |x−is |+ θ
. (3.8)
 Step 3: assign a number k to each pair, starting from the most salient pair.
For example, the most salient pair across all states σ(xmaxs , x
min
s′ ) has k = 1.
 Step 4: compute the sum:
∑
s∈S
δkspis[υ(x
1
s)− υ(x2s)], (3.9)
where, pis is the smallest probability of the two outcomes of the pair.
The following graphs are produced in Mathematica 9.0 [2] and depict the intervals of
δ8 for which the comparison Li or Lj is expected to reveal preference: Li  Lj . The
x-axis represents values of δ and the y-axis represents the sum (3.9). Percentages of
students and professionals that chose the first lottery and correspond to positive deltas
are also given. The Mathematica code, the detailed calculations for the estimation of
8As explained in Section 2.2.1.3, δ ∈ (0, 1] expresses the degree of probability distortion for a
decision-maker, with δ = 1 indicating objective probabilities.
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the δ intervals and the code for creating the corresponding graphs can be found in
Appendix A.1.12. Note that here we assume “independent dice rolls”, i.e. pairs are
formed by combining all outcomes of the first lottery with all outcomes of the second.
Figure 3.9 indicates that since the majority of professionals prefer L9, professionals are
associated with δ ∈ (0, 0.8). This result suggests that preferences of professionals reveal
a considerable degree of probability distortion. Students are equally split between the
two lotteries, so their choice potentially corresponds to all possible delta values.
Figure 3.9: L9 or L10: values of sum 3.9 for L9  L10, δ ∈ (0, 1]
(Students: 50%, Professionals: 59%)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0∆
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-3
-2
-1
1
2
Sum H9L
In Figure 3.10 we see that since the majority of both samples prefer L10, and L10 is
the first lottery in the comparison (i.e. corresponds to positive δ values), therefore,
both professionals and students reveal a δ ∈ (0.7, 1], which is an interval that contains
objective decision weights.
Figure 3.10: L10 or L11: values of sum 3.9 for L10  L11, δ ∈ (0, 1]
(Students: 60%, Professionals: 53%)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0∆
5
10
15
Sum H9L
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In Figure 3.11 the majority of both samples prefer the second lottery, therefore, choices
correspond to deltas which give negative values, i.e. δ ∈ (0.66, 0.96). So, truly objective
decision weights are excluded for both students and professionals; their preferences
necessarily indicate some probability distortion.
Figure 3.11: L8 or L6: values of sum 3.9 for L8  L6, δ ∈ (0, 1]
(Students: 48%, Professionals: 36%)
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10
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For the fourth comparison (Figure 3.12), the majority of both samples choose the first
lottery, but no additional information is extracted, since the whole range of deltas
corresponds to values which have the same sign.
Figure 3.12: L6 or L7: values of sum 3.9 for L6  L7, δ ∈ (0, 1]
(Students: 60%, Professionals: 61%)
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-20
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-10
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Finally, in Figure 3.13, the majority of both samples slightly prefer the first lottery,
which would give δ ∈ (0.82, 1]. Similarly to the second lottery comparison (with a
more narrow δ interval) this result reveals decision weights even closer to objective
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probability perception.
Figure 3.13: L4 or L12: values of sum 3.9 for L4  L12, δ ∈ (0, 1]
(Students: 52%, Professionals: 54%)
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0∆
-2
2
4
Sum H9L
Summarising the results, for information security professionals we observe that strong
local thinking seems to be prevalent in the first comparison, i.e. δ < 0.8. In the
first and the third comparisons objective deltas are completely excluded. Only the
second and fifth comparisons reveal local thinking which corresponds to delta-intervals
that include the value δ = 1, i.e. might imply objective perception of probabilities.
However, distance from objective weighting is not negligible: the lowest potential value
is approximately δ = 0.67 and in the same comparison (L8 or L6) objective weighting
of probabilities is excluded, allowing only for δ < 0.94. For the student sample the
intersection of the δ intervals is (0.82, 0.96). This means that there is some local
thinking, i.e. a distortion of objective probabilities that favours the lotteries containing
smaller losses in salient pairs. Interestingly, and due to professionals’ choice in the first
lottery comparison, intersection of the δ-intervals for professionals is the empty set.
We should note that interpreting this finding is not straightforward; it is, in any case
interesting that preferences of the majority of professionals are not consistent enough
to allow for a clear estimation of their degree of probability distortion.
3.3.3 Other-evaluation
Finding 7: There is no evidence that subjects change their risk behaviour when
they are informed that they will be evaluated by other parties, in our online
experimental setting.
No significant differences are observed between the control and the treatment groups
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of the hypothesis, in either lottery comparisons or WTP questions. The most probable
explanation is that it is hard to create a sense of “evaluation by other parties” in an
online environment. That is, participants already knew that their responses would be
subjected to “evaluation” for either statistical analysis or validity checks.
Maybe a more effective experimental setting could be designed in a lab, where the
experiment instructors could have served as an “observing party”. Or, presentation of
the experiment lotteries in the treatment group could have included a “watching eye”,
which would have given the participants of this group the impression that they are
being observed, in the spirit of [58, 116].
3.3.4 Security - Operability Trade-off
Findings on preferences between Security and Operability
Finding 8: Security professionals reveal a preference for operability over secu-
rity; this preference is significantly dependent on their job role.
Table 3.6: Security VS Operability preference across Security Job Titles
Job Title Total
Senior
executive
rolea
Managerial
roleb
IT &
Security
rolec
Compliance,
Risk or
Privacy roled
Other
Mechanism A 4 3 8 8 2 25
Enhances Security of
the system by 10%
(chosen by 45%)
Mechanism B 2 13 8 3 5 31
Enhances Operability
of the system by 10%
(chosen by 55%)
Total 6 16 16 11 7 56∗
a e.g. CEO, CIO, CISO, CSO etc.
b e.g. Project Manager, IT Director, Security Manager etc.
c e.g. Security Officer, System Administrator, Cyber Security Information Analyst etc.
d e.g. Governance, Risk & Compliance Consultant, Information Security Consultant, Auditor etc.
∗ Three subjects did not answer this question.
Pearson χ2(4, N = 56) = 9.946, p = .041
In the choice between two mechanisms that either enhance the security of a system
or its operational time (with the same monetary values assigned to each of the two
attributes), professionals reveal a preference (55%) for operability over security en-
hancement. However, preferences could be influenced by the information security roles
of the professionals, giving them a certain point of view. For this reason, we examine
how this preference varies amongst the various job roles, and significant diversification
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between security and operability preference is found across the various positions. The
role-related question presented to the participants is included in Appendix A.1.5 and
preferences are shown in Table 3.6.
Results in Table 3.6 show that compliance and risk professionals are security-oriented,
as might have been expected, due to the certification and regulatory issues they are
exposed to. Also, not surprisingly, professionals with managerial roles prefer operabil-
ity, as their positions are more project and task-oriented. However, IT professionals
express a balanced preference between operability and security. Finally, senior execu-
tives choose security.
Findings on Security-Operability trade-off
Finding 9: Preferences for either security or operability are non-negligible.
Finding 10: Professionals tend to weight losses in their preferred attribute more
strongly than gains.
This part of the analysis considers the estimation of a switching point between security
and operability and the measurement of the magnitude of loss aversion in both security
and operability.
Each participant reveals a “switching point” between security and operability. If the
subject initially preferred security to operability, then their consecutive preferences
are stored in the variable SWITCHPOINT SEC.9 In Figure 3.14, values on the x-axis
denote a switching point of enhancing security by x% (x < 10) and operability by 10%,
after which operability enhancement becomes more attractive to the subject. So, x can
be considered as a “balance point” for which the utility of x% of security equals the
utility of 10% of operability: Sec(x%) = Ops(10%).
Figure 3.15 depicts the operability equivalent. More precisely, both security-oriented
professionals and professionals who choose operability reveal switching points close to
the mean (µ = 4.5), which suggests they both weight their favourite attribute “twice
as much” as the attribute they do not choose (Figures 3.14 and 3.15). Practically, we
could state that, on average, an enhancement of their favourite attribute by x% has
the same utility as an enhancement of the not-preferred attribute by 2x%.
9Six participants in total did not take this task.
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Figure 3.14: Security switching points
(Sec(x%), Ops(10%))
Figure 3.15: Operability switching points
(Sec(10%), Ops(x%))
The second measurement performed in this series of questions is the relative loss aver-
sion between security and operability, as described in the design of Hypothesis 4 (Sec-
tion 3.2.3.4). Variables LOSS AV SEC (Figure 3.16) and LOSS AV OPS (Figure 3.17)
measure the difference between the aforementioned switching point and elicited prefer-
ences of Scenario 2 (see Table 3.2), which include reduction of the level of one of the
attributes.10
Figure 3.16: Loss Aversion in Security
(Sec(−x+ y%), Ops(10%))
Figure 3.17: Loss Aversion in Operability
(Sec(10%), Ops(−x+ y%))
10Another three participants did not finalise this task.
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The logic behind this measurement of relative loss aversion amongst the two attributes
is the following: sometimes loss, or marginal reduction of an attribute level in our case,
“hurts more” the individual than an equivalent enhancement “satisfies”.
Findings suggest subjects who reveal a preference for security exhibit relative loss aver-
sion between the two attributes (security and operability) and loss aversion in the
security attribute. More specifically, security-focused professionals weight reduction of
security almost as much as they value triple the enhancement of operability; this is
because the mean of loss aversion in security is µLOSS AV SEC = 2.27 and the mean
switching point for security is µSWITCHPOINT SEC = 5.52. Equation (3.6) implies
that: −Sec(−(x− i)%) > Sec(x%), where we can consider the mean value of x, instead
of x, and the average magnitude of loss aversion as i.
And since, −Sec(−(µx − i)%) > Sec(µx%) = Ops(10%), thus:
−Sec(−(5.52− 2.27)%) = −Sec(−3.25%) > Ops(10%).
Which means that reduction of security “hurts” about three times more than enhance-
ment of operability “satisfies” the decision-makers.
Loss aversion also holds for security itself: reduction of security is valued almost twice
as security enhancement, and since, on average, Sec(5.52%) = Ops(10%), thus,
−Sec(−3.25%) > Sec(5.52%). So, reduction of security, very roughly, “hurts” more
than about double (a factor of 1.7) as its enhancement “satisfies”. This result is in
accordance with prospect theory’s loss aversion findings on lotteries with gains and
losses.
Using the above reasoning, professionals who choose operability reveal, on average,
similar relative loss aversion between operability and security, as µLOSS AV OPS = 2.14
and µSWITCHPOINT OPS = 5.04, thus:
−Ops(−(5.04− 2.14)%) = −Ops(−2.9%) > Sec(10%).
Their loss aversion in operability is, on average, about double (a factor of 1.74), as:
−Ops(−2.9%) > Ops(5.04%).
Finally, findings could indicate that professionals who have a preference for operability
are likely to exhibit more linear preferences between reduction and enhancement of the
attributes in their consecutive choices. The revealed mean of loss aversion in operability
is smaller than that in security, many of operability-oriented professionals (11 out
of 28) reveal zero loss aversion in operability and the distribution of loss aversion is
concentrated around smaller values.
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3.3.5 Survey Analysis
A number of analyses are conducted on the survey data and its relations with the
experiment results. Some of the findings are presented here.
Finding 11: Security professional reveal different risk attitudes to the ones they
self-report.
Finding 12: Risk attitude for avoiding small and moderate probability lotteries
is significantly diversified across educational levels of participants.
A significant correlation is found between general risk attitude and WTP for some of
the twelve lotteries, for both samples. General Risk represents the survey question:
“How willing are you to take risks in general?” (low values indicate risk-averse and
high values risk-seeking behaviour). Student behaviour confirms literature findings
on correlation of self-reported risk attitude and actual behaviour [52], but responses
of professionals contradict the expected results. We observe in Table 3.7 that both
students and professionals reveal some significant correlations between self-stated risk
attitude and WTP. Students behave as expected, i.e. by revealing negative correlation
(significant negative correlation in 3 out of the 12 lotteries), whereas professionals
positive (significant positive correlation in 4 out of the 12 lotteries). This implies that,
in some cases, professionals who report themselves as risk taking are actually willing
to pay more in order to avoid the lotteries, so they behave in a risk-averse manner. It
is noteworthy that this inconsistency is not observed in the student sample.
A number of linear regression models are conducted for the analysis of survey and
experiment data, but results do not reveal significant predictors. The specifications for
the models are described in Appendix A.1.14.
The demographic variable of the number of family dependents is found to cause an
interaction. In particular, moderation analysis reveals a significant interaction between
predictor X = Student or Professional and the outcome variables Y = WTP (in-
dicatively, variable H16) and moderator M=number of Family Dependents, interaction
b = −3.22, 95% CI [−5.92, −0.5], t = −2.37, p = 0.019. In other words, when the
number of family dependents is high, being an information security professional has a
significant negative relationship with WTP; the effect is observed across all lottery level
stakes, except for very high (indicatively, Figure 3.18). The expected result would be a
positive relationship between number of family dependents and WTP, i.e. risk aversion,
which is manifested for students, but surprisingly, does not hold for professionals.
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Table 3.7: Spearman’s correlation coefficients for General Risk
Students (N=58) Professionals (N=59)
Rho Rho
Sig. (2-tailed) Sig. (2-tailed)
H11 -.030 .117
.823 .378
H12 -.080 .131
.550 .324
H13 -.086 .227
.520 .085
H14 -.113 .303*
.400 .020
H15 -.080 .213
.550 .291
H16 -.088 .291
.512 .025*
H17 -.177 .279*
.183 .032
H18 -.114 .363***
.393 .004
H19 -.266* -.007
.044 .616
H110 -.252* .131
.057 .322
H111 -.181 -.005
.174 .972
H112 -.187* -.008
.160 .952
Figure 3.18: Interaction of Pro or Student and H16 with number of family dependents
as moderator
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The educational level is also found to have a significant effect on WTP for small- and
medium-probability lotteries. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test on the merged
sample of professionals and students reveals significant differences in WTP amongst
the four levels of education: highschool, bachelor’s degree, master’s degree and PhD
(Table 3.8). The overall trend is a higher WTP for participants with bachelors, and sig-
nificant differences amongst the pairs of highschool-bachelor’s and highschool-PhD. An
explanation could be that the observed result is caused by the student sample, the sub-
jects of which are most likely at bachelor’s level. However, this explanation is rejected
as there is no interaction between educational level and the attribute “professional or
student” on WTP.
Table 3.8: Kruskal-Wallis Test with dependent variable WTP and 4 Educational levels
Kruskal-Wallis Test
(N=117, df=3)
Lottery Test statistic
H11 16.895***
H12 6.070
H13 7.887*
H14 11.622**
H15 8.062*
H16 3.177
H17 6.218
H18 5.846
H19 0.766
H110 6.818
H111 2.166
H112 4.545
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
3.4 Discussion
The scope of this experiment was to specify behavioural aspects of decision-making
under risk and ambiguity that information security professionals exhibit, and to con-
trast these attitudes against a student sample. In other words, the intention was to
examine whether security professionals are rational decision-makers, and investigate
whether certain underlying characteristics of information security shape a unique con-
text. The experiment was divided into four major hypotheses, containing a number of
sub-hypotheses and tests.
Security professionals exhibited significant risk aversion for small losses. This result,
for the case of professionals, might mean that they consider small losses inevitable
and therefore are willing to pay more to avoid them. This might have implications
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in a security environment, as such behaviour would always justify measures against
low-impact threats. However, these losses are also associated with small probabilities,
which could imply that professionals do not want to take risks, even if an event has
very little likelihood of materialising.
The observed behavioural pattern of professionals complies with the four-fold pattern
of risk attitudes for the domain of losses, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky [90].
Based on this pattern, professionals switched from being risk-averse and became risk-
seeking for large probabilities. This finding implies that professionals “hope” to avoid
a very likely loss, and they might consequently reject a favourable settlement. The
settlement in this case could be a security investment amount that is equal to the
expected loss, which the professionals might refuse to accept, as they would behave in
a risk taking manner.
The combination of risk aversion for small-losses and the four-fold pattern could im-
ply that preventive measures for common information security threats (e.g. malware,
viruses) are viewed as necessary, unavoidable investment; but it would be quite alarm-
ing if professionals were to maintain their risk taking attitude for highly possible threat
events. As was argued in Section 2.1.2.1, there is capacity for individual risk attitude
to be manifested in the currently accepted risk assessment methodologies.
In relevant lotteries, professionals were always, whereas students were not always
alarmed when they confronted ambiguous probabilities and outcomes. They expressed
this fact by becoming significantly more risk-averse. However, it is reassuring that
professionals consistently stated WTP closer to the expected losses than students did.
Moreover, professionals did not seem to separate between ambiguity in probabilities
and ambiguity in outcomes. These findings might indicate a “robustness” of profession-
als against ambiguity. The fact that professionals were alarmed by mean-preserving
spreads, but they always remained closer to expected losses than students, might reflect
their familiarity with similar presentation formatting of probabilities and losses.
Analysis on heuristics revealed that expected value and a line-by-line comparison of
lotteries are consistent with professionals’ choices. All subjects chose the lottery with
the number of most dominant states to its counterpart lottery; it is possible that these
states provide focal points for the decision-makers. It cannot be inferred whether sub-
jects used a more complex rule here, such as an estimation of “how strong” dominance
was in each state. This finding is interesting, because if it holds in general it would
imply that decisions could be “nudged” towards some direction. For example, an even
amount of states might promote indecisions, as it would make it easier to have the
same amount of dominant states. Another possibility would be to choose the states
that represent the distribution of each lottery in such a fashion that favours the choice
of one of the two lotteries.
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There were only indications that worst-case outcomes influenced the professionals’ de-
cisions, so, in this case, it seems that the rule that professionals followed approximates
expected utility maximisation.
However, we would not characterise security professionals as rational decision-makers,
with the strict definition of rationality. The inconsistencies they revealed between WTP
and lottery comparison tasks were in some cases more contradictory than students’
replies. The observed probability distortion, measured by the decision weights which
are disproportionately assigned to salient outcomes, was even more puzzling, as the
majority of professionals did not even manifest a consistent pattern in the way that
students did. So, security professionals are very likely to have a biased perception of
probabilities and, moreover, this perception is heavily influenced by the framing or
presentation of the problem at hand. This fact implies that calculations involved in
risk assessment methodologies are indeed susceptible to the subjective perception of
the security decision-maker. Thus, this can be considered as another aspect of risk
management that needs to be strengthened. A descriptive pluralism for relevant risk
methodologies might be a starting point towards this direction.
Findings indicate that operability-focused individuals might reveal a more balanced
understanding between security and operational time. This could suggest that a portion
of the operations-oriented professionals are more objective in balancing losses and gains
(reduction and enhancement) than their security-focused colleagues. In conjunction
with the aforementioned finding on the influence of job position, this fact might imply
a relation of operability with a“more practical”business-oriented approach which allows
for a more objective (symmetric) contrasting of gains and losses.
Preference of the majority of professionals for operability might again be related to a
business-oriented point of view, whereas the focus on security might indicate a more
traditional approach.
Senior positions are usually associated with risk ownership and liability; also, positions
higher in the hierarchy are able to see “the big picture” of the security environment.
The fact that these individuals chose security over operability might indicate that
professionals in such positions are inclined to consider the potential catastrophic and
disastrous outcomes which can disrupt business functions, and therefore choose the
“safer path” of security prioritisation.
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3.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented an experiment and survey for examining risk behaviour of
information security professionals and students.
We tested subjects’ attitude towards risk and ambiguity. For that purpose we used
unfavourable lotteries with various levels of probabilities and outcomes. Research hy-
potheses tested worst-case aversion and other-evaluation aversion. We examined pos-
sible heuristics that individuals use when they make risky choices. A mechanism was
also devised for measuring preferences regarding the security-operability trade-off.
Both samples are found to have distinct risk behaviour and they cannot be considered as
rational decision-makers. For both professionals and students, risk aversion is detected
in small-probability and low-impact lotteries and risk seeking behaviour is observed for
more probable and more damaging stakes.
One behavioural anomaly which we did not find evidence for in the experiments is that
information security professionals were prone to worst-case thinking. When presented
with lotteries with different worst-case scenarios, professionals consistently minimised
expected losses. Neither do we find evidence that decisions in our lotteries are affected
when subjects are told their choices would be further evaluated. However, the lack of
influence of other-evaluation on decisions may be due to a weak treatment manipulation.
Preference inconsistencies between willingness to pay and choice decisions are evident
for all participants. Professionals are better at estimating expected losses and they
consistently react to ambiguity. Students, on the other hand, seem to have a less
distorted perception of probabilities than professionals. Professionals insist strongly
on their choice between security or operability. Operability is preferred over security,
overall, and this preference depends on the job position of professionals.
In conclusion, both the information security context and individual risk attitude, seem
to have a significant role in professionals’ risk behaviour.
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Experiment 2:
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In the previous experiment (Chapter 3) decision-making biases and risk attitude of
information security professionals are investigated in terms of WTP in order to avoid
risky and ambiguous prospects. Professionals are found to be risk and ambiguity averse
and they are also found to consider small losses as inevitable. The four-fold pattern
of risk attitudes that was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky [90] is confirmed.
Professionals are risk-averse for small and moderate probability lotteries (p ≤ 0.15)
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and become risk-seeking when losses are associated with large probabilities (p = 0.5).
Risk attitude of security professionals is also found to be measurably diversified from
that of a student sample.
Decision-making in an information security context is often complicated, as it typically
involves several separate decision points requiring individual attention. Risk manage-
ment lies at the core of information security. Professionals need to assess risk and make
decisions on how to treat risk, in order to minimise expected losses. Risk perception
and judgement of individuals are inherently involved in this process. For these reasons,
in this second experiment we examine whether professionals’ risk attitudes hinder ex-
pected value optimisation of their decision-making. The contribution of this chapter is
to estimate the extent of several potential biases which may impact the risk manage-
ment process by measuring the extent to which risk attitudes deviate from expected
value maximisation. We also show that professionals are likely to make different deci-
sions over objectively similar risks depending on whether the decision is framed as a
gain or a loss.
More precisely, preferences of information security professionals are solicited using risky
lotteries. Framing of decisions as gains, losses, or individually separated losses is tested
in order to examine whether it has an effect on professionals’ WTP. Framing is found to
diversify professionals’ risk behaviour significantly. Experimental findings suggest that
professionals reveal a preference for paying to reduce risk instead of paying to eliminate
it. They also prefer to reduce the expected loss of threat scenarios rather than reducing
the vulnerability associated with this loss. Overall, professionals are risk-averse when
they face lotteries with small probabilities of loss and risk-seeking for lotteries with
large probabilities.
This chapter is organised in the following way. Section 4.1 presents the background and
theoretical framework of the study. Section 4.2 presents the methodology, hypotheses
and design of the experiment and survey. Detailed data analysis along with findings are
provided in Section 4.3. Finally, Section 4.4 presents a discussion of the main findings
and their potential implications for organisations.
This experiment was presented in the Workshop on the Economics of Information
Security (WEIS 2016) [113].
4.1 Approach and Background
In this experiment it is shown that throughout the risk management process there are
certain decision points which are susceptible to individuals’ subjective and potentially
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biased risk perception. Experimentally elicited risk attitude of information security
professionals is examined and their behaviour is analysed against expected utility theory
[155]. We target two activities in the risk management process: risk analysis and risk
treatment.
An illustrative example-scenario, which expands the scenario presented in Section 1.1,
and highlights the issues approached in this experiment is the following. An informa-
tion security professional in an organisation needs to protect an asset of specific value
against a threat. She possesses historical data on the frequency of this threat material-
ising, but data provides only an estimation of the threat probability. She has conducted
an assessment on how vulnerable the asset is and she needs to decide whether additional
protection is needed based on the expected value of loss. She might consider accept-
ing the risk and not investing or she might propose investing in security measures for
reducing the identified vulnerability. Alternatively, she can choose to implement mea-
sures for containing the potential damage in case it occurs, instead of making the asset
less vulnerable. Finally, she can buy insurance in order to transfer the risk. In this
scenario the professional might have preferences over the available actions, even if the
expected value of the alternative choices is the same. The professional can view pro-
tection of the asset as a necessary cost subtracted from the budget, or she can view
it as an investment with business return. Her view, might diversify her willingness to
invest. In addition, the entire budget for protecting all assets might be initially allo-
cated or a per-project budget could be allocated instead. The investment decision the
professional makes is potentially influenced both by these factors and by her individual
attitude towards risk. In such a case, decisions are very likely to be suboptimal by not
maximising the organisation’s profits.
The contribution of the experiment is the specification of the points which allow for
the manifestation of potential biases throughout the risk management process (Sec-
tions 4.3.1 and 4.3.2) by measuring variations of risk attitude from the expected value
of lotteries. Findings also show that framing of risk decisions as gains or losses can have
a measurable effect on risk attitudes (Section 4.3.3). This is important for decision-
making within firms, as distorted risk perceptions are very likely to become a direct or
indirect influence on investment decisions.
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4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Research Hypotheses
We conduct an online experiment and survey in order to analyse the behaviour of
security professionals with respect to the following hypotheses:
1. Information security professionals reveal preferences over risk treatment actions:
In this hypothesis, the intention is to examine whether security professionals are
favourably dispositioned towards accepting, eliminating or reducing risk. It is
examined whether professionals prefer to eliminate risk completely (e.g. transfer
risk by buying insurance) rather than reducing either the probability or the out-
come of a lottery, if the expected value of the outcomes of the alternative actions
is the same. Consequently, it is expected that participants are willing-to-pay
relatively more for eliminating (avoiding) risk completely, instead of minimising
it. We detected potential risk acceptance in professionals by examining whether
their WTP is less than the expected loss of a lottery.
2. Information security professionals reveal preferences between reduction of prob-
abilities and reduction of outcomes: Based on expected utility maximisation, a
rational decision-maker should not differentiate between reducing the probabil-
ity of a loss and reducing the loss itself in a case where both reductions reduce
expected losses by the same amount. It is hypothesised that professionals will
exhibit behavioural traits to favour the reduction of probabilities over the reduc-
tion of negative outcomes. The reason is that probabilities, but not consequences,
dominate choices in“good or bad”lotteries. This can be explained by the existence
of an experiential form of thinking involved in decisions (proportion dominance),
as well as the analytical form of thinking [140].
Traditional information security approaches are mostly focused on prevention
of losses (proactive security). A more recent approach also highlights the im-
portance of loss containment (reactive security [23, 144]). Perception and con-
sequently preference between reduction of probability and reduction of losses,
is vital in information security, however it has not attracted proper attention.
Such a potential preference is tested via WTP for reducing risk in abstract and
scenario-type lotteries.
3. Framing of decisions as gains or losses influences the risk attitude of profession-
als: the effects that framing of lotteries as losses or gains has on risk attitude is
tested. In other words, it is tested whether the manner of presentation or com-
munication of a risk situation affects professionals’ choices.
A common view in information security is that investment in a security measure
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is perceived as a loss and that the maximum “gain” is a zero loss. However, in-
formation security can be also viewed as a gains-generating business component.
The goal is to examine differences in the risk attitude of professionals, by ran-
domly assigning them to groups of different framing and asking for their WTP
to avoid or reduce risk in abstract lotteries. Three conditions for framing are
used: losses, gains and a step-by-step losses procedure, which will be explained
in detail in Section 3.2.3.3. Previous research on framing effects, starting from
Kahneman and Tversky [150], concludes that decision-makers are generally risk
averse in choices involving gains and risk seeking in choices involving losses.
4. Four-fold pattern of risk behaviour : The prediction of prospect theory states that
decision-makers are risk-averse for small-probability losses and large-probability
gains and risk-seeking for small-probability gains and large-probability losses [90].
Risk aversion for large-probability gains is caused by fear of disappointment,
whereas risk aversion for small-probability losses is caused by fear of loss. In
contrast, risk-seeking behaviour for large-probability losses and small-probability
gains is caused by hope to avoid loss and hope to receive a gain, respectively.
It is expected that this pattern is detected for the lotteries used throughout the
experiment.
4.2.2 Experimental Procedure
The majority of the 78 participants (17 female) in the experiment and survey are
working information security professionals who are current students and alumni of the
on-campus and distance learning MSc programmes in Information Security offered by
Royal Holloway, University of London (RHUL). The mean industry experience of these
professionals is 7.6 years and their average age is 39.
We use abstract lotteries in order to examine context-free risk attitude of subjects, and
scenario-type lotteries framed as information security problems to examine decisions in
context. The lotteries used to elicit risk attitude are an adjusted version of those used in
our previous experiment (Chapter 3). We set three levels of loss probabilities (p1 = 0.05,
p2 = 0.15 and p3 = 0.5) to reflect a realistic range of breach probabilities in information
security1. Participants are presented with 27 lotteries in three treatment groups (nine
in each group), nine abstract lotteries that are common to all subjects and another nine
common-for-all scenario-based lotteries; there is also one lottery used for participants’
payments. A complete list of the lotteries can be found in Appendix A.2.1.1.
Participants are informed that their reward is choice-dependent, but they do not know
1The instrument follows the design logic of the Holt and Laury instrument [78] and shares similarities
with the alternative instrument of Moore and Eckel [115].
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which lottery they will be paid for. Payment is based on their choice in one specific
lottery in which they were asked to chose between three mean preserving spreads (see
“Payment Lottery” in Appendix A.2.1.1). Participants’ choice indicates the range of
potential outcomes and a pseudorandom javascript function determines the amount
of payment (the code is available in Appendix A.2.4). Participants are asked about
their preferred Amazon website at the end of the survey. All payments are sent to
participants in the form of an Amazon gift certificate.
4.2.3 Experiment Design
Professionals’ replies were collected online between 22/01/2016 and 14/02/2016. 2
Screenshots from the experiment are included in Appendix A.2.2.
4.2.3.1 Hypothesis 1: Preferences over risk treatment
For the first hypothesis we use nine abstract lotteries labeled as Lij and another nine
scenario-based lotteries labeled SLij , with i = 1, 2, 3 and j = A,B,C (see all lotteries
in Appendix A.2.1.1 and definitions of variables in Appendix A.2.3). Each of the six
lotteries L1 to L3 and SL1 to SL3 is presented to participants followed by three risk
treatment actions: A, B and C. “A” refers to a lottery that proposes reduction of the
probability of loss, and is phrased as: “What is the maximum amount that you are
willing to pay in order to reduce probability of loss from p1% to p2%?’ ’.
In a similar fashion, “B” refers to the reduction of the negative outcomes of the lottery:
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce potential
loss from $x1 to $x2?”.
“A” and “B” represent risk reduction (modification) actions. Lotteries with label “C”
represent risk elimination (avoiding playing the lottery) and are phrased in the following
way: “What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid playing
the lottery completely?”3.
In particular, for scenario lotteries SLij we consider an asset of specific value and we
ask participants to state their WTP in order to modify or eliminate the risk from a
potential breach of confidentiality, integrity or availability (Appendix A.2.1.1). We use
asset value as the potential loss of the scenario, as it is common practice to assess risk
2As in Experiment 1, we distributed a pilot experiment before launching the actual experiment as
a means of enhancing the presentation and increasing the understandability of the tasks.
3Reducing risk is related to the term “risk modification” and paying in order to eliminate risk (i.e.
paying for not playing the lottery) is related to“risk transfer”, as will be also explained in the Discussion
Section 4.4.
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considering the overall value of an asset [62, 148].
For the purposes of this study, we do not consider the risk treatment action of risk
avoidance (as defined in ISO 27005 [81]), as it is usually related to changing business
operations in order to keep away from certain threats. The risk treatment action of
full risk acceptance is also available to participants, represented by a WTP of zero4.
4.2.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Preferences between probabilities and outcomes
The design of this hypothesis is embedded in the design of the first hypothesis. The
scope here is to examine the pairs which only have to do with risk modification, i.e.
with WTP for reducing probability of loss and WTP for reducing the magnitude of
the negative outcomes. What is examined here is the differences amongst lottery pairs
(LiA, LiB), for the abstract lotteries, and (SLiA, SLiB), for the information security
scenario lotteries, for i = 1, 2, 3.
4.2.3.3 Hypothesis 3: Framing of decisions as gains or losses
This hypothesis is tested in the experiment by creating the following treatment: sub-
jects are randomly divided into three groups. Each group is presented with nine lot-
teries, with a different framing. The first group of participants, Group A, is presented
with the following setting:
“In the first stage of the experiment you are asked to make decisions in three lotteries.
The lotteries have potential losses and you have an initial amount of money of $30. In
each lottery, you have to specify the maximum amount that you are willing to pay so
that you can modify lottery values or avoid the lottery completely.”
This constitutes the loss-framing, as participants have to face either zero losses or suffer
losses that are to be reduced from their given amount. In a similar fashion, Group B,
the gain-framing group, presents participants with lotteries that involve gains-only, and
participants start without any monetary amount (see Appendix A.2.1.1). Finally, the
third group, Group C, is a mixture of gains and losses, in the following way: participants
are given an amount of $10 to play before they make choices in each of the three lotteries.
The lotteries involve losses-only again, so this condition can be considered as a“step-by-
step” loss-framing, in order to model decisions that are considered by decision-makers
one at a time and independently from one another.
4No lottery from the three treatment groups, used for testing Hypothesis 3, was used in this hypoth-
esis, although the lotteries of Hypotheses 1 and 3 have similar structure. This is because Hypothesis 3
lotteries were not fully randomised and participants often try to be consistent in their replies when
they face similar questions.
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All group lotteries have a maximum gain or loss outcome of $10 in order to diversify
the outcome level from other hypotheses (which have a maximum loss of $50). The
nine lotteries of each group are presented in collections of three. The characteristic we
measure across the three groups is the difference between WTP and the change in the
expected value of each lottery from Li to Lij : RA Lij = Lij − EV Lij for i = 1, 2, 3
and j = A,B,C; equivalent variables are used for the scenario-type lotteries SLij (see
Definitions in Appendix A.2.3). Positive values of the RA Lij variables imply risk
aversion, whereas negative values denote risk-seeking behaviour.
4.2.3.4 Hypothesis 4: Four-fold pattern of risk behaviour
The design of the previous hypothesis involves the creation and use of the aforemen-
tioned “risk aversion variables” (RA). These variables are analytically convenient as
they have zero as a reference point, against which risk attitude is measured for the
purpose of the fourth research hypothesis.
4.2.3.5 Order Effects
The whole design includes randomisation of certain parts in order to avoid order effects.
Firstly, the three framing groups are randomly assigned to participants. A counter is
used to check the number of replies in each group so that groups could be kept at
similar sizes. The number of the received valid responses is N = 78, and these are split
into NA = 25, NB = 28 and NC = 25 for groups A, B and C, respectively. The lotteries
of each group were subsequently presented in a fixed order.
The nine abstract lotteries and the nine scenario-type lotteries span across three levels
of probabilities (p1 = 0.05, p2 = 0.15 and p3 = 0.5), with three lotteries being assigned
into each probability level (see Appendix A.2.1.1). Lotteries are presented in ascending
probability level order. The presentation order of lotteries inside each level is fully
randomised, i.e. for lotteries Lij and SLij presentation order of LiA, LiB and LiC is
randomised for each i = 1, 2, 3 (see Appendix A.2.2.1).
4.3 Analysis and Findings
Analysis for each hypothesis is presented in this section. In all hypotheses except
one, we use non-parametric tests since they do not require any assumptions about the
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sample distribution (e.g. normality)5. The experiment was created with the Qualtrics
software v37 [3] and analysis was conducted with SPSS v21 [1].
4.3.1 Preferences over Risk Treatment Actions
Finding 13: Information security professionals reveal a preference for paying
to reduce risk compared to paying to eliminate risk.
Finding 14: The possibility of eliminating risk by paying does not have an ad-
ditional effect on professionals’ risk attitude compared to the option of reducing
risk.
Finding 15: Information security professionals are willing to accept some risk
by being risk-seeking for large probabilities of loss.
The scope of the first hypothesis is to examine whether there is a preference amongst
actions by which risk can be treated.6 In particular, participants are presented with
losses-only lotteries and they are asked about their WTP regarding the risk treatment
actions of risk reduction, elimination and acceptance. Risk reduction is expressed by
two variables (lotteries) and risk elimination by another one, so we need to exam-
ine WTP differences per individual across these three variables (see Table 4.1). Risk
acceptance corresponds to WTP that is less than the expected loss of a lottery.
The absolute difference between the expected value of the original lotteries Li, i = 1, 2, 3
and the expected value of lotteries with modified risk (lotteries with index “A” and
“B”) is the same for each Li, and we symbolise these differences as “Delta EV ”. The
equivalent absolute difference for lotteries of type “C” is double that of “A” and “B”
(Table 4.1). For this reason, for the analysis, we halve the WTP values that correspond
to LiC and SLiC, i = 1, 2, 3 (variables indicated by “ half ”; see definitions of variables
in Appendix A.2.3). This way we compare WTP of each participant indirectly. We
use the non-parametric within-subjects Friedman test [63], which is used to compare
differences between more than two conditions for continuous or ordinal dependent vari-
ables. A risk neutral decision-maker with a linear utility function should reveal multiple
WTP for dealing with multiple expected losses. In this case, risk elimination allows
for avoiding the lottery completely, whereas risk modification (reduction) only halves
5The sample size N = 78 is sufficient for the parametric one-sample t-test at level p = 0.05 with
statistical power 0.8, for the observed values of µ and σ [128].
6The numbering of findings is continued from the previous chapter in order to provide the reader
with a broad view of the thesis findings. These findings are also be summarised in the next chapter.
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Table 4.1: Initial and adjusted lotteries with probability p and loss x. ∆EV is the
expected value difference between initial and adjusted lottery.
Experiment (Abstract) Lotteries Lij
Variable Initial Lottery Adjusted Lottery |∆EV |
L1A
p = 0.05, x = −50
p = 0.025, x = −50 1.25
L1B p = 0.05, x = −25 1.25
L1C p = 1, x = 0 2.5
L2A
p = 0.15, x = −50
p = 0.075, x = −50 3.75
L2B p = 0.15, x = −25 3.75
L2C p = 1, x = 0 7.5
L3A
p = 0.5, x = −50
p = 0.25, x = −50 12.5
L3B p = 0.5, x = −25 12.5
L3C p = 1, x = 0 25
Survey (Scenario) Lotteries SLij
Variable Initial Lottery Adjusted Lottery |∆EV|
SL1A
p = 0.05, x = −75, 000
p = 0.025, x = −75, 000 1,875
SL1B p = 0.05, x = −37, 500 1,875
SL1C p = 1, x = 0 3,750
SL2A
p = 0.15, x = −75, 000
p = 0.075, x = −75, 000 5,625
SL2B p = 0.15, x = −37, 500 5,625
SL2C p = 1, x = 0 11,250
SL3A
p = 0.5, x = −75, 000
p = 0.25, x = −75, 000 18,750
SL3B p = 0.5, x = −37, 500 18,750
SL3C p = 1, x = 0 37,500
the expected loss of the lotteries (see all lotteries in Appendix A.2.1.1); therefore ob-
jective decision-makers are expected to be willing-to-pay double in the risk elimination
lotteries compared to their WTP in the risk reduction lotteries.
Figure 4.1: Ranks for L1A, L1B, L1C half
Figure 4.2: Ranks for L2A, L2B, L2C half
Figure 4.3: Ranks for L3A, L3B, L3C half
Results indicate that WTP for eliminating risk is significantly smaller than for reducing
risk. This is clearly depicted in Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, as the smaller ranks
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Figure 4.4: Ranks for SL1A, SL1B, SL1C half
Figure 4.5: Ranks for SL2A, SL2B, SL2C half
Figure 4.6: Ranks for SL3A, SL3B, SL3C half
of the “C half ” lotteries indicate smaller WTP. This difference is significant between all
pairings of both probability and outcome reduction lotteries (“A” and “B” respectively)
with the risk elimination lotteries“C”. The result is depicted in Table 4.2, which specifies
the significant pairs, and the associated z-scores (standard deviations from the mean,
in a normalised distribution) of the Wilcoxon signed rank test7. Mean values of each
variable also allow for an interpretation of the direction of the differences. For example,
given that variables“C half”have smaller means than variables“A”and“B” for a given
i = 1, 2, 3, this denotes that differences of the form LiA−LiC half and LiB−LiC half
are always positive and so, subjects are willing to pay less for lotteries “C half”. The
same result holds for the scenario-type lotteries SLij .
The fact that halved WTP for eliminating risk is smaller than WTP for reducing risk
implies an “indirect preference” for risk reduction. The interesting part is that in order
to avoid double the expected loss, and because risk is eliminated completely in lotteries
“C”, participants would be expected to state more than double the WTP than in “A”
and “B”. That is, the certainty of risk elimination should have made participants more
willing to pay to avoid the lotteries; but it did not. In other words, participants are
not willing to increase their WTP in order to avoid lotteries completely, i.e. either risk
elimination (lotteries“C”) does not have an additional effect on them, or risk elimination
is perceived similarly to risk reduction (lotteries “A” and “B”) by the professionals. In
this sense, we observe an insensitivity of decision-makers between risk reduction and
elimination. The mean WTP for lotteries “C” not only is not double the mean WTP
for lottery questions “A” and “B”, but it is of similar magnitude. Thus, professionals
either underestimate the choice of completely eliminating risk or overestimate the act
7For samples with N>10 we have acceptable approximations of the Normal distribution [59].
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Table 4.2: WTP mean values for all lotteries and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for
pairwise comparisons between the following within-subjects conditions:
Probability Reduction (lotteries LiA, SLiA), Outcome Reduction (lotteries LiB,
SLiB) and Risk Elimination by WTP (lotteries LiC half , SLiC half).
Experiment (abstract) lotteries
Lottery variable Mean Compared Pairs Z
L1A 8.77 (L1A, L1B) -1.221
L1B 7.95 (L1A, L1C half)
∗∗∗ -4.771
L1C half 4.28 (L1B, L1C half)
∗∗∗ -4.916
L2A 8.63 (L2A, L2B) -1.503
L2B 9.03 (L2A, L2C half)
∗∗∗ -5.985
L2C half 4.31 (L2B, L1C half)
∗∗∗ -6.392
L3A 11.73 (L3A, L3B) -.147
L3B 11.55 (L1A, L1C half)
∗∗∗ -5.847
L3C half 6.53 (L1B, L1C half)
∗∗∗ -5.234
Survey (scenario) lotteries
Lottery variable Mean Compared Pairs Z
SL1A 7764.99 (SL1A, SL1B)
∗∗ -2.912
SL1B 10533.88 (SL1A, SL1C half)
∗∗∗ -5.436
SL1C half 6070.60 (SL1B, SL1C half)
∗∗∗ -3.511
SL2A 10753.14 (SL2A, SL2B)
∗∗∗ -3.536
SL2B 12783.05 (SL2A, SL2C half)
∗∗∗ -5.492
SL2C half 8065.85 (SL2B, SL1C half)
∗∗∗ -3.453
SL3A 17240.65 (SL3A, SL3B) -.715
SL3B 19063.21 (SL3A, SL3C half)
∗∗∗ -4.859
SL3C half 12846.50 (SL3B, SL3C half)
∗∗∗ -4.520
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed): * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
of risk reduction.
At the same time, professionals remain risk-averse for small-probability lotteries and
become risk-seeking for large probabilities of loss (Section 4.3.4). Therefore, overesti-
mation of risk reduction or underestimation of risk elimination is prevalent across all
probability levels and for both risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviour.
The risk treatment action of risk acceptance can be considered equivalent to a WTP
that is less that the expected loss of a lottery. Such behaviour is observed in lotteries
with large probability of loss, as is explained in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.2 Preferences between Probabilities and Outcomes
Finding 16: Information security professionals reveal a preference for reducing
losses in threat scenarios, instead of reducing small or moderate probabilities
associated with these losses.
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This second hypothesis is related to the previous one. In order to measure potential
preferences between reduction of probability of loss and reduction of loss itself, we
conduct a number of within-subjects tests in which it is the same subject who provides
the input for each test condition. Namely, we compare WTP of each participant on the
lottery pairs (LiA, LiB) and (SLiA, SLiB), with the corresponding variables (A or B)
serving as the independent variables of the tests. Lotteries with an“A”indicator refer to
modification of probabilities and lotteries with a “B” refer to reduction of the potential
negative outcomes. We use the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test [156, 157] to
measure pairwise differences amongst the two conditions of risk modification. The test
calculates the absolute differences between related pairs and ranks them in increasing
order; it then adds the ranks of negative and positive differences separately. Differences
in professionals’ WTP amongst the two types of risk reduction are shown in Tables 4.3
(abstract lotteries) and 4.4 (scenario lotteries).
Table 4.3: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for pairwise comparisons of abstract lotteries
between the within-subjects conditions of probability reduction (LiA) and outcome
reduction (LiB).
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
L1B - L1A Negative Ranks 23
a 33.72 775.50
Positive Ranks 38b 29.36 1115.50
Ties 17c
Total 78
a: L1B < L1A, b: L1B > L1A, c: L1B = L1A
L2B - L2A Negative Ranks 28
d 32.09 898.50
Positive Ranks 39e 35.37 1379.50
Ties 11f
Total 78
d: L2B < L2A, e: L2B > L2A, f: L2B = L2A
L3B - L3A Negative Ranks 32
g 36.33 1162.50
Positive Ranks 35h 31.87 1115.50
Ties 11i
Total 78
g: L3B < L3A, h: L3B > L3A, i: L3B = L3A
It is interesting that professionals reveal a statistically significant preference for the risk
treatment action of reducing actual losses, instead of reducing the probability (vulner-
ability) that could lead to these losses. More importantly, this result is not revealed in
professionals’ risk attitude on any of the abstract lotteries, but only when professionals
face decisions framed as information security scenarios (this is also indicated, but not
explicitly stated, in Table 4.2 of the previous hypothesis).
However, there is no significant difference revealed in the third pair of scenario lotteries.
A potential explanation for this fact could be that lotteries SL3j have a large probability
of loss (p = 0.5), so perhaps professionals may estimate expected values more easily for
these lotteries. Or it could be the case that professionals show such a preference only
for small, and more realistic, in terms of actual threats, probabilities.
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Table 4.4: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test for pairwise comparisons of scenario lotteries
between the within-subjects conditions of probability reduction (SLiA) and outcome
reduction (SLiB).
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
SL1B - SL1A
∗∗ Negative Ranks 23a 30.28 696.50
Positive Ranks 45b 36.66 1649.50
Ties 10c
Total 78
a: SL1B < SL1A, b: SL1B > SL1A, c: SL1B = SL1A
SL2B - SL2A
∗∗∗ Negative Ranks 22d 26.05 573.00
Positive Ranks 45e 37.89 1705.00
Ties 11f
Total 78
d: SL2B < SL2A, e: SL2B > SL2A, f: SL2B = SL2A
SL3B - SL3A Negative Ranks 34
g 32.00 1088.00
Positive Ranks 35h 37.91 1327.00
Ties 9i
Total 78
g: SL3B < SL3A, h: SL3B > SL3A, i: SL3B = SL3A
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
We thus see that there is no preference when abstract choices are concerned but, when
it comes to information security scenarios, professionals reveal an inclination towards
a reactive, i.e. “try to minimise losses if they occur”, rather than a proactive, “try to
avoid losses”, approach to loss minimisation.
4.3.3 Framing of Decisions as Gains or Losses
Finding 17: Information security professionals are significantly more risk-averse
when risky choices are framed as gains compared to when choices are framed as
losses, in the process of either securing gains or eliminating losses.
Finding 18: Information security professionals are significantly more risk-averse
when losses are subtracted from individual budgets compared to when losses are
reduced from a single budget, in the process of eliminating losses.
The purpose of the corresponding hypothesis is to examine whether the samples of
the three condition groups, i.e. framing of decisions as gains, losses, or individually
separated losses are drawn from identical populations (see also Section 3.2.3.3). That
is, whether there are differences with respect to the mean amongst the three treatment
Groups, A, B and C. To test this hypothesis, we used the non-parametric between-
subjects Kruskal-Wallis test for all lotteries in the groups (Table 4.5). In particular,
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we set a flag variable to denote which group the participant was assigned to, then we
unified replies of the three groups into a single variable called Groups Lij , i = 1, 2, 3,
j = A,B,C. Finally, we computed a new variable to express the difference of WTP
from the expected value of each group lottery, symbolised by RA Groups Lij . It is
actually these “risk aversion variables” that are used in the non-parametric tests. These
variables constitute a transformation of WTP around zero and allow for a comparison
across groups, as group lotteries have the same absolute difference in expected value
between their original version Groups Li and their modified versions Groups Lij (see
all the lotteries in Appendix A.2.1.1).
Table 4.5: Kruskal-Wallis Test for comparing WTP mean differences across the three
independent framing groups (see also Section 4.3.3.1).
Kruskal-Wallis Test
(N=78, df=2)
Lottery Test statistic
RA Groups L1A .314
RA Groups L1B 2.413
RA Groups L1C 23.015
∗∗∗
RA Groups L2A .314
RA Groups L2B 1.824
RA Groups L2C 26.611
∗∗∗
RA Groups L3A 5.873
RA Groups L3B .466
RA Groups L3C 25.616
∗∗∗
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
Analysis reveals that there is significantly different WTP manifested amongst all ques-
tions of type “C” across the groups (see Section 4.3.3.1).
For the lotteries that reveal significantly diversified WTP amongst the three groups,
we can see the detailed differences in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. Groups A, B and C,
correspond to values 1, 2 and 3, respectively; numerical values on the triangle apexes
indicate the sample average rank by the Wilcoxon signed rank test for matched-pairs,
for lotteries LiC across the groups. Significantly different pairs are connected with a
yellow line.
It is apparent from the average ranks in Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 that WTP of profes-
sionals is significantly larger in the second group, i.e. in the group of the gain-framing.
Probabilities of winning in this group are all large (p1 = 0.95, p2 = 0.85 and p3 = 0.5),
so it was expected that participants would become very risk-averse because of fear
of disappointment of not winning anything. In the other groups where we have loss-
framing, WTP is significantly smaller. In other words, increased risk aversion in the
gain-framing group (denoted by “2” in the triangles), compared to the loss-framing
group (denoted by “1”) was expected. However, the interesting finding is that risk
attitude is also significantly diversified between the loss-framing group (“1”) and the
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step-by-step-loss-framing group (“3”). Distribution of WTP across the three groups is
depicted in Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12.
Figure 4.7: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
pairwise risk aversion comparisons for L1C
(risk elimination) across the three groups.
Figure 4.8: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
pairwise risk aversion comparisons for L2C
(risk elimination) across the three groups.
Figure 4.9: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
pairwise risk aversion comparisons for L3C
(risk elimination) across the three groups.
Figure 4.10: Risk Aversion Boxplots for Lottery Groups L1C across the three indepen-
dent groups. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test significant values for comparisons of pairs:
Groups A-C (Z = −2.53, p = 0.034), Groups A-B (Z = −4.797, p < 0.01).
Although the lotteries involved in the three treatment groups were not randomised in
order, the risk attitude pattern manifested in all other lotteries also holds for the group
lotteries. Manifested behaviour confirms the four-fold pattern of risk behaviour that is
presented in detail in Section 4.3.4 (Table 4.6).
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Figure 4.11: Risk Aversion Boxplots for Lottery Groups L2C across the three indepen-
dent groups. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test significant values for comparisons of pairs:
Groups A-C (Z = −2.706, p = 0.02), Groups A-B (Z = −5.158, p < 0.01).
Figure 4.12: Risk Aversion Boxplots for Lottery Groups L3C across the three indepen-
dent groups. Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test significant values for comparisons of pairs:
Groups A-C (Z = −2.665, p = 0.08), Groups A-B (Z = −5.061, p < 0.01).
4.3.3.1 More Analysis on the Three Framing Groups
In order to examine these differences in more detail amongst pairs of groups, we created
another three variables in the following way. In case Group A was presented to the
participants, we set variables AB and AC equal to 1. If Group B was answered then AB
and BC are set to 2, and if Group C was activated, variables AC and BC are set to 3.
This way each participant has two of these Groups set to 1, 2 or 3 and, for example, by
using Group AC we can compare between subjects, considering only subjects assigned
to Group A or Group C. Mann-Whitney tests reveal a distribution-wise comparison
between the three pairs of groups in Figures 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.20, 4.21
and 4.22. The Kruskal-Wallis test for all three Groups is presented in Figure 4.13.
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Figure 4.13: Kruskal-Wallis Test for Risk Aversion between the three Groups.
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Figure 4.14: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
Figure 4.15: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
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Figure 4.16: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
Figure 4.17: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
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Figure 4.18: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
Figure 4.19: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
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Figure 4.20: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
Figure 4.21: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
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Figure 4.22: Mann-Whitney Test for Risk Aversion between Groups.
4.3.4 Four-fold Pattern of Risk Attitude
Finding 19: Information security professionals behave according to the four-
fold pattern of risk attitude: they are risk-averse for small probabilities of loss
and risk-seeking for large probabilities.
As we observe in Figures 4.23 and 4.24, professionals are risk-averse for small-probability
levels (p1 = 0.05 and p2 = 0.15). Risk aversion gradually diminishes from level p1 (first
three lotteries in each figure) to p2 (lotteries four to six), until it switches to risk-seeking
behaviour (significant for some of the lotteries) at probability level p3 = 0.5 (last three
lotteries in the figures). The finding reproduces the prediction of prospect theory [90]
for professionals, which we also detected in the experiment of Chapter 3.
Significance of risk aversion in WTP for the lotteries is measured with the parametric
one-sample t-test on the “risk aversion variables”, and is presented in Table 4.7 for both
abstract and scenario lotteries. The test determines whether the sample belongs to a
population of a specific mean, with the mean in our case being the test value zero,
which would be the choice of risk neutral decision-makers. The statistical requirements
for the parametric test are met. Namely, the dependent variable is measured at least
at interval level, data is independent (i.e. between-subjects), significant outliers are of
restricted number and, finally, distribution of the dependent variable is approximately
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normal.
Figure 4.23: Mean risk-averse (positive) and risk-taking (negative) WTP of Profes-
sionals per Abstract Lottery. Bars represent participants’ mean WTP minus the
∆(Expected Value) between initial and modified lotteries.
Figure 4.24: Mean risk-averse (positive) and risk-taking (negative) WTP of Profes-
sionals per Scenario Lottery. Bars represent participants’ mean WTP minus the
∆(Expected Value) between initial and modified lotteries.
It is noteworthy that the pattern also persists in the group-lotteries of the previous
hypothesis (Table 4.6), including lotteries with high-probability gains, although pre-
sentation order of these lotteries was not randomised.
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Table 4.6: Mean differences of risk aversion values RA Groups Li from test value zero
with the one-sample t-test (TestV alue = 0, N = 78).
Group Lotteries (Unified Variables) (N = 78)
Lottery |∆EV| µ difference 95%CI of difference
Lower Upper
RA Groups L1A .25 2.30
∗∗∗ 1.72 2.87
RA Groups L1B .25 2.52
∗∗∗ 1.99 3.04
RA Groups L1C .5 3.24
∗∗∗ 2.47 4.02
RA Groups L2A .75 1.80
∗∗∗ 1.22 2.37
RA Groups L2B .75 1.87
∗∗∗ 1.41 2.32
RA Groups L2C 1.5 2.42 1.65 3.19
RA Groups L3A 2.5 .38 -.08 .85
RA Groups L3B 2.5 .55
∗ .08 1.01
RA Groups L3C 5 -.67 -1.38 .02
* p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.001
Table 4.7: Mean differences of risk aversion values RA Li and RA SLi from test value
zero with the one-sample t-test (TestV alue = 0, N = 78).
Experiment (Abstract) Lotteries Lij (N = 78)
Lottery |∆EV| µ difference 95%CI of difference
Lower Upper
RA L1A 1.25 7.52
∗∗∗ 5.06 9.97
RA L1B 1.25 6.69
∗∗∗ 4.99 8.39
RA L1C 2.5 6.08
∗∗∗ 3.43 8.73
RA L2A 3.75 5.02
∗∗∗ 2.56 7.47
RA L2B 3.75 5.28
∗∗∗ 3.58 6.99
RA L2C 7.5 1.14 -1.12 3.39
RA L3A 12.5 -.77 -2.68 1.14
RA L3B 12.5 -.95 -2.76 .86
RA L3C 25 -11.93
∗∗∗ -14.35 -9.51
Survey (Scenario) Lotteries SLij (N = 78)
Lottery |∆EV| µ difference 95%CI of difference
Lower Upper
RA SL1A 1,875 5,890
∗∗∗ 3,899 7,880
RA SL1B 1,875 8,659
∗∗∗ 6,296 11,022
RA SL1C 3,750 8,391
∗∗∗ 5,217 11,565
RA SL2A 5,625 2,140
∗ 149 4,130
RA SL2B 5,625 7,158
∗∗∗ 4,505 9,810
RA SL2C 1,1250 4,882
∗∗ 1,459 8,304
RA SL3A 18,750 -1,509 -4,158 1,139
RA SL3B 18,750 313 -2,944 3,570
RA SL3C 37,500 -11,807
∗∗∗ -15,220 -8,394
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
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In risk management there is no standard procedure for treating risk and decisions very
often depend on the subjective judgement of the decision-maker. The scope of this
study was to examine risk behaviour of information security professionals with regards
to risk treatment and risk communication.
In the results of the first hypothesis regarding preferences amongst risk treatment ac-
tions, we observe that professionals preferred to reduce risk rather than eliminate it.
These two choices are related to the risk treatment actions of risk modification and
risk transfer (purchasing insurance), respectively. In the case of insurance purchasing,
risk is transferred to another party. This preference was unexpected as eliminating risk
completely should have an amplifying effect on professionals’ risk aversion. Perhaps
preference for risk modification is related to professionals’ roles. It is, generally speak-
ing, their job to modify risk by proposing and implementing security measures, not
transfer it to some other party. It might be the case that many security professionals
see the very existence of their role as one of modification of risk.
Another possible interpretation of this result is that professionals diminish the benefits
of transferring risk because they feel that risk cannot be completely eliminated. In
addition, there might be a sense of uncertainty and lack of control in professionals’
perception when they place security in somebody else’s hands. It would be interesting to
examine the effect of “having control of your own risk” on professional’s risk perception.
This finding implies that professionals could be inclined to invest in security measures,
even in situations in which buying insurance would be a more optimal solution in terms
of expected returns.
In the second hypothesis we measured differences in WTP between reduction of prob-
abilities and reduction of losses in risky lotteries. The results revealed significant dif-
ferences between these two actions, in favour of losses reduction. This finding was
also unexpected, as previous literature suggests that probability, as a value between
zero and one, can be more easily “mapped” in the decision-maker’s perception as “good
or bad”, which is not true for arbitrary outcome values. Thus, decision-makers can
more easily characterise probabilities rather than outcomes as preferable or not [140].
However, effects were traced only in lotteries which were presented to the professionals
as information security scenarios. This implies that professionals do not reveal such a
bias in abstract lotteries, but it was the information security scenarios in which they
changed their risk attitude. This means there must be context-related factors which
cause preference for loss reduction.
Moreover, significant effects hold for realistically small and moderate probability levels
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only (p1 = 0.05 and p2 = 0.15). This result might have relevance to the debate
between proactive and reactive security. Namely, measures that reduce probability of
loss, i.e. vulnerability, effectively minimise the exposure of an asset to a threat and
are therefore proactive. Reactive measures, on the other hand, focus on containing
the damage caused after a threat has materialised. Reactive security is constantly
attracting attention in the industry [144] and academia [23], as there appears to be a
general consensus that both preventive and detective measures should be implemented.
Another explanation for the manifested preference for loss reduction could be that
professionals consider security breaches inevitable. Such an argument is reinforced by
findings on increased WTP for avoiding small probability lotteries, in the experiment
of Chapter 3. It could be the case that small losses are perceived as inevitable by
professionals and that this leads to amplified risk aversion as well as a tendency to
adopt a reactive approach to security. Therefore, professionals could be dispositioned to
spend more on business continuity or disaster recovery measures, rather than reducing
vulnerabilities.
The third hypothesis targeted different forms of risk framing. Three framing groups
were used: losses, gains and a mixture with a step-by-step loss-framing. Findings did
not reveal differences in the risk reduction variables amongst the groups. However,
variables that measure WTP for avoiding lotteries were all found to be significantly
different amongst groups. This difference is two-fold. Firstly, risk aversion is signifi-
cantly larger for the gain-framing group, compared to the loss-framing group. These
results are related to either the possibility effect or the certainty effect [90]. In the case
of gains (Group B), the large probabilities of gaining (0.95, 0.85 and 0.5) accounted for
professionals’ fear of disappointment, fearing they would win nothing instead of secur-
ing the gains. So, they stated increased willingness to pay to secure lottery outcomes
(certainty effect). In the case of losses (Groups A and C), the probabilities of loss
(0.05, 0.15 and 0.5) also accounted for professionals’ fear of disappointment, fearing
they would lose something instead of securing a zero loss (possibility effect).
Findings indicate that the certainty effect for gains causes professionals to underweight
very probable gains relatively to certain gains. The possibility effect for losses causes
professionals to overweight unlikely losses. What was found is that the former under-
estimation is larger than the latter overestimation, in absolute terms. Thus, distortion
of risk perception in the process of changing risk probabilities for either securing gains
or avoiding losses is larger for gains than losses. In this sense, findings comply with
prospect theory and, in particular, with risk behaviour across the probability ranges
of the four-fold pattern [87]. Additionally, findings allow for a comparison between
the magnitude of perceived probability distortion for large-probability gains and small-
probability losses. In any case, such risk perception constitutes a violation of expected
value maximisation, a fact which should be a concern in risk management.
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However, information security can be viewed in two ways: either as a necessary cost,
i.e. a costly process with zero return, or as a business enabling operation with return
on investment. Findings imply that professionals would be more risk-averse and would
invest more in the second case.
The second interesting result in this hypothesis is that WTP for transferring risk is sig-
nificantly larger in the step-by-step loss-framing group than in the loss-framing group.
In the former group we rewarded participants with a monetary amount of $10 be-
fore each lottery choice. In the latter, we gave them $30 initially, and then presented
them with the same three lotteries. Per-lottery payment made professionals more risk-
averse, whereas they were less risk-averse when they were given the whole amount
upfront. Actions of professionals on risk modification were not diversified by framing,
but risk aversion was diversified in risk elimination. So, framing does not have effects
on attitude towards risk reduction, but it affects perception when paying to eliminate
risk.
A potential extension of this design in the real world could be a variation in budget al-
location. For example, security professionals could be supplied with their entire budget
from the start, or they could receive a per-project budget. If we were to hypotheti-
cally extend our conclusions, professionals would be significantly more risk-averse in
eliminating risks by per-project budget allocation. A possible explanation is that the
individual’s attention on available budget becomes stronger if budget allocation is more
frequent, in contrast to a single initial allocation. Thus, such a budget setting would
make professionals spend more on insurance as a security investment.
The manifestation of risk aversion in professionals’ decisions underlies the whole ex-
periment. We reproduced the so-called four-fold pattern of risk attitude for losses [90],
as subjects are found to be risk-averse for small probabilities of loss and become risk-
seeking for large probabilities. This pattern is observed in both abstract and scenario-
type lotteries, as well as in the group lotteries. Observations also confirmed increased
risk aversion for high-probability gains in the group-lotteries. So, for realistic small (to
moderate) probabilities of security breaches, we expect professionals to act in a pre-
dictably risk-averse manner, by investing more on security measures than the estimated
expected loss. However, risk-taking behaviour for large-probability losses implies that
professionals are willing to accept risk and this might be an issue of concern.
126
4.5 Summary
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In this chapter we presented an experiment and survey for the purposes of studying
the behaviour of information security professionals in tasks related with treatment of
risk, after it has been assessed.
We examined preferences amongst equally-beneficial risk treatment actions. We also ex-
plored potential preferences towards probability- or outcome-reduction, given negative-
outcome lotteries. We framed identical problems as gains and losses and we created
experiment conditions in which losses were either extracted form a single budget or
from individual budgets. We also measured the overall attitude towards risk, for vari-
ous levels of probabilities and outcomes.
Findings revealed that professionals prefer to take action towards modifying risk, rather
than transferring risk to another party. They also showed a preference for outcome
reduction instead of probability reduction, in risk modification. The prospect of elimi-
nating risk completely, does not have an effect on professionals’ risk attitude. Budget
allocation has a significant influence in professionals’ risk behaviour making them more
risk-averse when provided with separate budgets. Presenting security problems as gains,
instead of losses, also increases professionals’ risk aversion significantly. Professionals
are observed to be risk-averse in small-probability and low-impact lotteries and become
risk-seeking as stakes increase.
As a conclusion, professionals reveal characteristic preferences for treating risk. Most
importantly, their risk attitude is influenced by the presentation of security problems,
like viewing security as a loss or a gain, or allocating budget differently. These findings
indicate that except for individual risk attitude, there are decision points inherent in
risk management that can influence decision-making in information security.
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In this Chapter we summarise experimental results, we further examine risk perception
of professionals via a survey, and we explore the significance of research findings by
interviewing information security experts.
The Chapter is organised in the following way. The most important findings of the
previous experiments are presented in Section 5.1. We conduct a supplementary survey,
which examines additional aspects of information security professionals’ perception of
risk. A description of the survey and the analysis of its findings are presented in
Sections 5.2 and 5.3. The full details of the survey are provided in Appendix A.4.0.1.
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We interview three information security experts and ask them for their view on the
importance and consequences of the research findings. The interviews are presented in
Section 5.4.
We discuss the implications of our research findings in Section 5.5. Finally, we pro-
vide a number of recommendations for organisations, for the purposes of minimising
the manifestation of observed biases and moderating deviations from expected value
maximisation in decision-making.
5.1 Summary of Findings
A summary of the most important findings of the aforementioned two experiments is
presented in a condensed fashion in this section. These findings were presented and
discussed with renowned experts in information security both from the industry and
academia (see Section 5.4).
Finding 1: Both information security professionals and students behave ac-
cording to prospect theory: they are risk-averse for small probabilities of loss
(p1 = 0.05 and p2 = 0.15) and risk-seeking for large probabilities (p3 = 0.5).
Finding 2: Information security professionals reveal ambiguity aversion in their
choices.
Finding 3: Information security professionals deviate less from expected value
maximisation than the student sample.
Finding 4: Information security professionals exhibit preference inconsistencies
between willingness to pay and choice decisions and reveal different risk attitudes
to the ones they self-report.
Finding 5: Information security professionals have significantly different pref-
erences for either security or operational time; these preferences are to a great
extent dependent on their job role. Professionals are loss averse in their preferred
attribute (security or operational time).
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Finding 6: The possibility of eliminating risk by paying does not have an ad-
ditional effect on professionals’ risk attitude. Information security professionals
reveal a preference for paying to reduce risk compared to paying to eliminate
risk.
Finding 7: Information security professionals reveal a preference for reducing
losses instead of reducing the probabilities associated with these losses, in threat
scenarios.
5.2 Supplementary Survey
A short supplementary survey was conducted by contacting information security profes-
sionals who are current and past students of the masters program in Information Secu-
rity at Royal Holloway University of London. The purpose of the survey is to get more
detailed responses on the perception of professionals on various risk-related aspects of
information security. Participants took part in the survey online, from 5/09/2016 to
19/09/2016 and were presented with a series of questions that we discuss in Section 5.3.
All survey questions can be found in Appendix A.4.0.1.
5.3 Survey Findings
This survey was conducted for the purpose of better understanding risk perception
of security professionals regarding their personal attitude, as well as the attitude of
their colleagues and other security professionals. The survey was answered by 155
information security professionals and practitioners; five participants stated that they
are not related to information security and were removed from the sample.
Participants were asked to choose the security role which most closely matches their
current or past job position (Figure 5.1); we assign roles in four broad categories,
as in the previous surveys, along with an additional category “Other”, which allows
participants to state a different position.
One of the survey questions refers to a choice between two same-expected-loss gambles.
The first gamble involves a probability of loss twice as large as the second gamble,
whereas the second gamble has a loss that is two times the loss of the first gam-
ble (Figure 5.2). Based on the previous experiments, the expectation would be that
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Figure 5.1: “Your current or last job role most closely resembles:”
professionals prefer the gamble with the minimum losses, as this was the statistically
significant choice elicited in 4.3.2. The majority of participants (about 62%), chose the
gamble with the lower probability of loss, which indicates a context-relation of Section
4.3.2 findings.1.
Figure 5.2: “Which one of the following gambles do you instinctively prefer, at first
glance?”
Professionals’ perception of risk is elicited via five risk-related survey questions in which
participants had to choose their replies from a Likert scale ranging from one to five.
The first question regards professionals’ perception on the risk attitude of other security
professionals (Figure 5.3). We observe that the majority of professionals consider other
1Experiment results of Section 4.3.2 did not reveal significant preferences of professionals between
probability and negative outcome reduction, in abstract lotteries, but only in information-security-
scenario questions.
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professionals as slightly risk-averse (µ = 2.81, with value 3 denoting neutrality).
Figure 5.3: “In your opinion, how willing are Information Security Professionals to take
risks in general?”
The majority of professionals report themselves as being risk-seeking with µ = 3.38
(Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.4: “How willing are you to take risks in general?”
A similar risk-taking attitude is observed in professionals’ risk attitude in the context
of their information security role with µ = 3.26 (Figure 5.5).
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Figure 5.5: “How willing are you to take risks in your [ ] role?”
In comparison to their colleagues, professionals believe that they are slightly more risk
taking than their colleagues with µ = 3.06 (Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6: “Are you less or more willing to take risks compared to your colleagues in
your [ ] role?”
Finally, professionals report that they are more risk-averse in their job roles than in
their personal lives with µ = 2.75 (Figure 5.7).
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Figure 5.7: “Are you less or more willing to take risks in your [ ] role than in your
personal life?”
Professionals perceive themselves as somewhat better in their mathematical skills com-
pared to the general population; µ = 3.79 (Figure 5.8).
Figure 5.8: “Do you think that your mathematical abilities are worse or better than
the average person’s in the general population? (E.g. with respect to probabilities and
expected values)”
The next questions depict the perception of professionals on the prioritisation of either
security or operational time, amongst the various roles of security professionals. We
observe a clear dichotomy in perceptions indicating that security is perceived as a
priority for IT and security related professionals as well as for compliance, risk and
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privacy related professionals (Figure 5.9). Prioritisation of operational time is perceived
as a characteristic of senior executive and managerial roles (Figure 5.10). 2
Figure 5.9: “In your opinion, which of the two attributes: Security or Operational Time,
is perceived as more important by the following professional roles?” (Participants that
chose “Security”)
Figure 5.10: “In your opinion, which of the two attributes: Security or Operational
Time, is perceived as more important by the following professional roles?” (Participants
that chose “Operational Time”)
2Security roles, when examined separately, do not reveal statistically significant differences on per-
ceived importance of security or operational time (Pearson’s Chi-Square, Likelihood Ratio and Linear-
by-Linear Association tests).
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This self-reported perception contradicts previous experimentally elicited findings on
the preference between security and operational time. Namely, in Experiment 1 senior
executives as well as compliance-related professionals reveal a preference for security,
managers prefer operational time and IT & security professionals are divided amongst
the two attributes (3.6).
Professionals reveal the following prioritisation for 11 criteria that were presented to
them in two settings. In the first setting they are asked to classify and rank their
preferred criteria as important and less important in a hypothetical scenario. In the
second case they are faced with the same task, but in the context of their job role.
In Figures 5.11 and 5.12 criteria which correspond to odd numbers are priorities and
criteria that correspond to even numbers are the choices of secondary importance.
The list of the 11 criteria is presented here:
1. Estimating expected losses, e.g. Asset Value×Vulnerability×Threat Probability
2. Considering losses of the worst-case scenario
3. Estimating a specific probability of loss instead of a range of probabilities
4. Prioritising security of the system
5. Prioritising operational time of tasks
6. Investing in security measures for small-probability threats
7. Investing in security measures for large-probability threats
8. Eliminating existing risk completely
9. Containing potential losses in case of a security incident
10. Reducing the vulnerabilities of the system
11. Obtaining appropriate insurance
There is a significant difference in the ranking of criteria between the hypothetical
scenario and the job role-dependent prioritisation per participant, per criterion that
is considered as a priority and per criterion that is considered as of having secondary
importance (Table 5.1).
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Figure 5.11: “Imagine you are responsible for the Information Security budget; you have
to consider potential information security threats and take an approach for protecting
assets to an optimal level. Evaluate and rank the following decision criteria in two
groups: the most important decision criteria and the criteria of secondary importance:”
Figure 5.12: “Which of the following decision criteria, for protecting assets to an optimal
level, do you think that you are mostly focused on or worried about as a result of your
[ ] role?”
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Table 5.1: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for pairwise comparisons of decision criteria
between hypothetical scenarios and professional-role questions.
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
# Criterion Prioritisation Statistic
1 Estimating expected losses
priority −3.592b∗∗∗
of secondary
importance
−1.706c
2 Considering losses of the worst-case scenario
priority −.378b
of secondary
importance
.000a
3 Estimating a specific probability of loss
priority −.243c
of secondary
importance
−2.502b∗
4 Prioritising security of the system
priority −1.800c
of secondary
importance
−3.307b∗∗
5 Prioritising operational time of tasks
priority −3.053c∗∗
of secondary
importance
−3.087b∗∗
6
Investing in security measures for
small-probability threats
priority −.728c
of secondary
importance
−1.512b
7
Investing in security measures for
large-probability threats
priority −2.414b∗
of secondary
importance
−.408b
8 Eliminating existing risk completely
priority −2.714c∗∗
of secondary
importance
−3.922b∗∗∗
9
Containing potential losses in case of a
security incident
priority .000a
of secondary
importance
−.577b
10 Reducing the vulnerabilities of the system
priority −.192b
of secondary
importance
−.192c
11 Obtaining appropriate insurance
priority −2.268b∗
of secondary
importance
.000a
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001
a. The sum of negative ranks equals the sum of positive ranks.
b. Based on positive ranks.
c. Based on negative ranks.
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5.4 Semi-structured Interviews
Three highly experienced individuals in information security were contacted and pre-
sented with the experimental approach, the design and the specific findings. A semi-
structured interview was conducted with each of the three experts during which they
were asked about their views and opinions on the importance and the potential im-
plications of the findings. The following questions were presented to and discussed
with the interviewees; however, the interviews allowed for a broader discussion on risk
management, behavioural issues and decision-making in information security.
Interview question 1: Did you find any of the findings surprising? If so, please
indicate why.
Interview question 2: According to ISO 27005 risk perception and risk attitude are
factors that need to be taken into consideration in current information security risk
management methodologies.
 To what extend do you think individual risk perception and risk attitude of in-
formation security professionals is an important factor in decision-making?
 How important do you think these factors are for making decisions regarding risk
treatment?
 How can we address this issue in your opinion?
Interview question 3: What do you think the potential implications of these findings
are? How can organisations benefit from these findings?
Interview question 4: Which aspects of decision-making in information security do
you think need to be further examined?
5.4.1 Interview with David Brewer
Dr. David Brewer was one of the first consultants to advise the British Government on
information security matters, providing assistance to establish the first ever computer
security evaluation facilities and evaluation criteria. He was a founder member of the
Department of Trade and Industry’s Commercial Computer Security Centre (1987-
1992) and became a co-author of the European IT Security Evaluation Criteria (the
forerunner of ISO/IEC 15408) and associated evaluation manual and a co-author of
the original ISMS standard, BS 7799 Part 2. He is now an active member of the UK
delegation to ISO JTC1 SC27 WG1, which is responsible for the ISO 27000 family of
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standards; and is co-editor for the revision of ISO/IEC 27004 (Measurements). He has
conducted a wide variety of consultancy assignments in information security spanning
32 years in over 23 countries. He is well known for his work in rolling out ISO/IEC
27001 to the whole of the Civil Service in Mauritius, which is an exemplar of his ISMS
implementation methodology, and his ability to train people to train others. His seminal
research papers include The Chinese Wall Security Policy, published in 1989 [36] and
Measuring the Effectiveness of an Internal Control System, published in 2003 [35].
Risk ownership
During our interview (28/08/2016) David’s first remark was the distinction between
an asset owner and a risk owner. Indeed, this aspect has been emphasised in the ISO
27001 changes, from the 2005 to the 2013 edition [37]. Although assigning asset owners
is a means for assigning responsibility for an asset, a risk owner is a “person or entity
with the accountability and authority to manage a risk”. This person, and it should
preferably be a person rather than an entity, needs to have an incentive to resolve
risk and also needs to be positioned highly enough in an organisation to be able to
act. So, David highlighted that the diversification of incentives between risk owners
and other professionals is vital in the risk management process. The main reason is
the responsibility of risk owners in accepting any residual risk. In our research we
approached a wide range of information security professionals, including risk owners,
as we wanted to examine risk perception across various roles.
Probabilities vs Outcomes
The research finding in which professionals reveal a preference for minimising conse-
quences (losses) instead of probabilities was welcomed by David. As he stated, this is
the way to think about a potential threat, i.e. what the potential impact of a threat
is. This mindset is important because when a decision is to be made, the consequences
are discussed and the risk appetite is examined based on these consequences. The rea-
son is that the actual probabilities associated with the threat at hand are most likely
unknown. David pointed out that after the 9/11 incidents some business continuity
plans worked exactly because they were not based on specific, and quite unpredictable,
events, but on consequences and on the severity of these consequences.
Subjective Perceptions
Regarding the existence of biases in decision-making, David recognises that biases are
inherent in the process. He mentioned a example of physical security, namely a scenario
in which a laptop is snatched from its owner. Retrospectively, after the theft, the
decision-makers might want to analyse what they would have done differently in order to
avoid the incident. They might change their plan, for example, use a backpack instead
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of holding the laptop, or have someone else carry the laptop next time. So, firstly, it
is the consequence, the theft itself, that is taken into consideration, not the likelihood
of the the event. Secondly, the bias in this case is that “our view of the consequences
changes” for a variety of reasons (here due to experiencing the theft incident), but the
actual consequences do not change. Thus, we would protect ourselves more after this
unpleasant experience, but, we would possibly not take adequate measures beforehand.
So, subjective views can be considered inherent in the process of learning and improving
risk management.
Imitating and Learning
David argued that a typical phenomenon in information security is learning from your
“neighbours”, i.e. from watching the measures that competitors or organisations of
similar nature take, or even from observing breaches and losses that others suffer.
Indeed, an educated decision needs to be made by each organisation on whether to
follow other approaches or to stick to its own plan. This point was interestingly also
mentioned by the next interviewee.
Business Orientation
One of the main points that David made was the importance of the business part of
an organisation. It is the business objectives that the focus is on. In other words, the
stakeholders make decisions on ceasing or creating opportunities to meet these busi-
ness objectives. Some of the dangers associated with these decisions are information
security-related, and have to be dealt with. So, information security risk management
depends on business exploitations. In this sense, information security is not the epicen-
tre of importance but business objectives are. From this point of view, David argued
that it would be interesting to further examine the link between information security
and business objectives. In particular, it would be useful to examine the ability to
connect security needs to business and consequently to inform risk owners.
Risk Communication
David also agreed that the opinion and recommendations of security professionals are
important. From his own experience he highly values an effective way of communication
between security and business people. In order for this communication to be effective,
David proposed that security professionals should convey their message as if “telling a
story”. This“tell it like a story”approach is probably another argument for the decision-
makers lack of understanding in probabilities and outcomes, and by this approach both
parties can effectively share the same “decision context”. It is the simple storyline of
an unwanted consequence that we want to achieve and David’s approach highlights
this. This might be a straightforward and effective way to bridge the gap between the
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security and the business point of view.
5.4.2 Interview with Paul Dorey
Professor Paul Dorey (Ph.D. CISM F.Inst. ISP) is a visiting professor in Information
Security at Royal Holloway, University of London, Chairman Emeritus at the Institute
of Information Security Professionals, a former CISO BP PLC and Group Operational
Risk Director at Barclays Bank. Paul has over 30 years management experience in
information security and is an acknowledged thought leader. He has received several
industry awards including Chief Security Officer of the Year, IT Security Executive of
the Year, and IT Security Hall of Fame. He now acts as a lecturer, consultant and
expert witness and is helping major companies and government departments devise
their cybersecurity strategies and future risk management, measurement and report-
ing approaches. His recent project work includes developing strategies in managing
the security of the “Internet of Things” (www.trustedthings.com) and how executives,
engineers and IT teams will need to work together in new ways.
Probabilities vs Outcomes
In our interview (12/09/2016) Paul found the observed preference of professionals to-
wards loss (impact) reduction compared to probability of loss (vulnerability) reduction
very logical and indeed, understandable. Paul argued that this is what security profes-
sionals are trained to do: reduce the potentially worst-case negative impacts.
Influence of Security Professionals
We explained during the interview that we realise that the security professionals who
participated in the research are not necessarily those who make the final call in the
decision-making process, i.e. they are not necessarily the risk owners. Paul’s reply
very much coincides with our own reasoning behind this design choice. He mentioned
a personal story from his early career as an information security officer in which he
expressed the same consideration to a senior executive, i.e. that he was not the person
that made the final call in a security decision. The senior executive replied that the
impact of the suggestions which security professionals make should not be underesti-
mated; and this is the belief that Paul conveyed during our interview. In other words,
the effect of these suggestions, albeit not the final decision, can directly or indirectly
influence the decision at hand.
Influence by Fear
Another point related to this aspect is that, based on Paul’s experience, security profes-
sionals can attempt to influence decisions by fear. In information security environments,
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he reported that he has witnessed and very much disagrees with, an additional exagger-
ation on potential losses by a few security professionals, in their sometimes desperate
attempt to obtain a larger budget. A relevant concern that Paul raised was that there
could be other agendas on the professionals’ mind when they consider various solutions.
These agendas can include the ease of justification of professionals’ choices, considera-
tions about their career progression as credible managers, potentially lost opportunities
and so on. It is noteworthy that behaviour of participants in our incentivised economic
experiments coincides with their attitude in the information security scenario-based
questions. In this sense, professionals acted in a similar fashion in almost all the ab-
stract experiments and the surveys. Moreover, given our experimental findings, with
the clear risk aversion of professionals towards low- and moderate-probability threats,
we believe that the “influence by fear” approach, which would be an intentional be-
haviour, as well as the possible agendas considered by the professionals, would only
amplify the risk aversive behavioural trait that was observed.
De-biasing Decisions
Paul suggested that our research findings might help in de-biasing the process of
decision-making in information security. More specifically, he believes that these find-
ings show that to estimate the level of investment by adjusting risk perception is not
the right way of doing it. So, professionals, should, when they can, try to get the most
optimal risk perception they can, that is, eliminate biases from their own decisions, so
that they make informed decisions. In an idealised view, security professionals would
bring knowledge to the table for discussion with business people. This would, hopefully,
allow for a common conclusion to be reached between the business and the security side,
based on the given facts and not as an adversarial compromise between the two sides.
So, in Paul’s view information security should eventually rely more on data.
Risk Communication
Another important remark was that the aforementioned need for facts-driven decisions
is that the final decision-maker is usually not fully aware of context and the role of
the security expert is to describe this context objectively. Paul reported that it is not
unusual for security professionals to have to intervene in a situation at the last minute,
exactly because of this “lack of context” that the business-oriented decision-makers
understandably exhibit.
Security - Operability trade-off
The diversification of preferences between security and operability (operational time)
was welcomed as an interesting and realistic finding by Paul. He noted that the mind-
set, for example, of the most senior executives, which have the most broad view of the
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business, is inherently different to the view of project managers. Managers, in par-
ticular, very often fear small losses that senior executives are willing to accept. Yet
the same managers may miss the importance of damaging strategic risks such as to
reputation, which executives focus on immediately.
Risk Aversion
In Paul’s view, one would expect security professionals to be very conservative, as they
constantly worry with ideas of bad outcomes. Behaviour elicited in the experiments
indeed shows that professionals are risk and ambiguity averse (except for large proba-
bility losses); however, survey findings report that only 24.52% of professionals consider
themselves as risk-averse in general (Figure 5.4) and only 27.75% state that they are
cautious and not willing to take risks in their professional roles (Figure 5.5).
Worst Scenarios
Another point that Paul made was regarding the worst scenario that he can think of in
a security environment. His view is that this worst-case scenario would be a misplaced
security investment, which can be worse than a non-investment, in some cases. For
example, if a professional decides to invest a few million dollars on a specific system
and a significant breach manifests on another system, the professional would regret his
or her choice, as poor risk management.
Risk Seeking Behaviour
A hard-to-interpret research finding is the participants’ shift towards risk seeking be-
haviour for large probability lotteries (p = 0.5) as in [90]. Paul expressed his puzzlement
in interpreting this result from an information security perspective.
Imitating and Learning
In terms of other relevant interesting aspects of behaviour in information security, Paul
believes that professionals, in general, like to “follow the crowd”, particularly in the
world of security solutions. For example, if there is a new technology that is trending
in the field, then security programs will start adopting this technology on the basis
of peer benchmarking and direction. It could be the case that there is a better non-
trending solution which covers even more of the risks that the organisation has to
defend against, but this latter solution would likely be neglected. Such a phenomenon
of finding safety in the crowd might be related to the previously mentioned example of
misplaced security investment. Following practices which other professionals adopt can
be a way of justification, especially in the case of a materialised security incident, in
the spirit of an “everybody does it” type of argument. Moreover, it is easier to justify
a “commonly made” mistake, than justifying a mistake made by one individual.
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5.4.3 Interview with Bruce Schneier
Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a “security
guru” by The Economist. He is the author of 13 books, as well as hundreds of arti-
cles, essays, and academic papers. His influential newsletter “Crypto-Gram” and his
blog “Schneier on Security” are read by over 250,000 people. He has testified before
Congress, is a frequent guest on television and radio, has served on several government
committees, and is regularly quoted in the press. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman
Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, a Lecturer in Public Policy
at the Harvard Kennedy School, a board member of the Electronic Frontier Founda-
tion, an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and
the Chief Technology Officer at Resilient, an IBM Company.
Probabilities vs Outcomes
During our interview (16/09/2016) Bruce, similarly to the other interviewees, was pos-
itive towards the preference of professionals for reducing losses instead of reducing the
probabilities associated with these losses. He believes that this might signify a conscious
choice of resilience over defence. In his view such a choice indicates a reactive approach
to security that is more sensible, because if the futility of prevention is recognised by
information security professionals, then the next logical step is to focus their efforts on
survivability, adaptability and resilience. In which case, probability reduction becomes
a secondary issue.
Risk Behaviour and Risk Management
Bruce stated his concerns about generalising the research findings too much. However,
he notes that this kind of research is demonstrating the need for taking risk percep-
tion and risk attitude into consideration in information security risk management. The
observed deviations from perfectly rational behaviour and from expected losses min-
imisation reveal why risk attitude is important in the risk management process. What
companies spend on, what they take seriously, and which factors they underestimate
or overestimate, are all subject to these suboptimal decisions.
Bruce agrees that embedding risk perception and attitude into a risk management
process is not an easy task. His view is that knowledge of the existence of potential
biases on its own could significantly contribute to objectifying the decision-making
process. As he points out, professionals should be aware of their own biases and be
aware of their bounded rationality which determines their own “box of concern”, which
is not necessarily the “larger box”. So, even the fact of understanding these biases
could be incredibly valuable for making decisions. Bruce continued that in order to take
advantage of these research findings we can try to correct the biases and inconsistencies
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as we would want organisational choices to be rational and we would want the level
of security investment to be commensurate with the risks in ways that produce a
maximum effect. These cognitive biases or inherent attitude towards risk are factors
that we need to know about, so that we can correct them. Bruce gave an example
of a security manager that moves into a new company. The manager should notice,
for example, a uniform overspending or underspending on a security aspect. Such an
inflation or undermining in spending is very likely to be caused by the belief structure
of the individuals involved in decision-making. The security manager should be able to
recognise the existence of such beliefs and subsequently to try to correct the investment
approach.
Inconsistent Behaviour
The observed inconsistencies between decisions by choice and WTP were of interest to
Bruce, especially the alignment of inconsistent behaviour between the professionals and
the student sample; as he wittily phrased it: “inconsistencies were consistent” amongst
the samples and this fact implies that there exists an underlying behavioural trait in
the observations.
Bruce advocates that any research approach which focuses on biases and on how
decision-makers deviate from optimality is worth investigating.
5.5 Discussion on Implications
5.5.1 Risk Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion
Risk Aversion
One prevalent finding which emerges in both experiments is the manifestation of the
prospect theory pattern of risk attitude for the domain of losses. We observe that
professionals, as well as students, are significantly risk-averse for small- and medium-
probability losses and become risk-seeking for large-probability losses3. The pattern is
similarly manifested both in lottery-type questions in which participants had to play
with real money (Figures 3.2 and 4.23) and in hypothetical security investment scenarios
(Figure 4.24). The first leg of this finding, i.e. risk aversion via overweighting small
probability losses is explained by fear of disappointment in case an improbable event
happens. The fear of regretting having not invested enough in protecting against a low
probability threat makes individuals risk-averse. The second aspect of this finding, i.e.
3Compliance with prospect theory can be considered as not surprising, since it is an observational
theory.
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risk taking behaviour for avoiding very probable losses is hard to interpret from an
information security perspective, as all of the interviewees pointed out in Section 5.4.
A threat probability of 0.5, which was used in our experiments, can be considered as
“very probable” in information security. Based on prospect theory, consequences that
are almost certain, or very likely, tend to be given less weight by the decision-maker,
compared to the expected weight based on the associated probability. The fourfold
pattern of risk attitude for the domain of losses (Table 2.2) implies that professionals
hope to avoid losses when probability is high and thus become risk seeking. So, in the
mind of professionals, investing large amounts for avoiding such a loss is very painful,
hurting almost as much as the actual loss in the case of high probability threats. On the
other hand, the opportunity to avoid the loss completely is appealing, so individuals
systematically take risks in such lotteries. This implies that security incidents which
are manageable, either by investing in security measures or by buying insurance, could
turn into catastrophes, similarly to situations of desperate gambling. It is noteworthy
that this risk taking effect is manifested for both risky and ambiguous lotteries.
However, significant risk aversion is also exhibited for small losses. This might imply
that professionals do not want to take risks, especially for events which have little
likelihood of occurring. So, they might justify expenditure for low-impact threats and
they are willing to invest more to avoid them. It can be the case that small losses
are considered as inevitable by professionals, and thus the associated investment is
considered as unavoidable.
Risk-averse behaviour for small losses along with risk aversion for small probabilities
and risk-seeking behaviour for large losses could result in over-investment in simple pre-
ventive measures for common information security threats (e.g. malware, viruses); but
under-investment, as a willingness to accept some risk, in measures against potentially
catastrophic breaches.
A simple means of controlling for risk aversion and risk-seeking behaviour in quantita-
tive risk management approaches, is for information security professionals to take into
consideration the difference between the investment amount and the expected losses,
whenever information is sufficient. In case there are additional factors which influence
the investment level, they need to be inserted in the estimation of expected losses.
Ambiguity Aversion
At the same time, professionals are found to be ambiguity averse, so that they are
consistently willing to pay more than the expected loss of a threat, if losses are asso-
ciated with a range of probabilities instead of specific probabilities. The same result
holds for ranges of negative outcomes instead of fixed outcomes. Moreover, we observe
the gradual increase in WTP as we change the exposure of professionals from risky to
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ambiguous and then to fully ambiguous lotteries, i.e. with ranges of both probabilities
and outcomes (Table 4.7). Professionals’ risk behaviour is not differentiated between
outcome- and probability-ambiguous lotteries.
This phenomenon can be interpreted as a pessimistic expectation of the professionals,
which amplifies their risk aversion and thus, makes them invest more when facing
ambiguity. In a sense, professionals perceive the underlying probability distribution of
mean-preserving spreads, as skewed. In real world risk assessment, it is most likely
that probabilities of threats are expressed as ranges. This biased perception towards
worst-case outcomes can be unnecessarily costly in information security investment, in
case risk assessment follows similar quantitative methodologies.
In order to minimise subjectivity in ambiguity aversion, the underlying, and unknown,
distributions of threat probabilities have to be approached as if they were normal. Using
the expected values/losses as a point of reference can provide security professionals with
a measure of comparison against their subjective expectations.
Historical Data on Past Security Events
All three interviewees (Section 5.4) agree that risk management should rely more on
data and less on intuition. However, the amount of available data can vary significantly.
In the case of ambiguity, historical data on past security events that provide ranges
of probabilities and/or losses can be specified, and ambiguity aversion, if recognised,
can be constrained. However, the provision of data cannot circumvent the inherent
behavioural traits of the aforementioned risk and ambiguity aversion patterns. In other
words, one of the points of this research is that even if organisations were to possess an
exhaustive list of all threats along with their unambiguously associated probabilities
of manifestation, this dataset would not ensure rational decision-making by security
professionals. Needless to say, such complete datasets are exceedingly rare in practice.
5.5.2 Performance of Professionals and Students
Another question of potential interest is: how well do professionals perform in optimis-
ing decisions compared to the general population? In order to approach this question
we perform comparisons between risk behaviour of information security professionals
and the behaviour of a student sample. What is shown by the research findings is
that both professionals and students deviate from expected losses minimisation and
that they are both susceptible to choice inconsistencies and framing effects. Choice in-
consistencies are identified by asking professionals about their WTP in order to avoid
certain unfavourable lotteries and later, after other experiment tasks were completed,
we asked them to chose between pairs of these same lotteries. Results are summarised
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in Table 3.5, in which professionals are found to be no more consistent than the student
sample. In some cases, professionals also demonstrate higher ambiguity aversion than
students (Figure 3.8). However, a possible familiarity of professionals with calculations
of expected values and probabilities is reflected in Table 3.3, in which professionals, al-
beit not risk-neutral, state a WTP in order to avoid lotteries that is in almost all cases
closer to the expected value of the lotteries than students’ WTP. One interpretation of
this is that professionals’ ability to assess risks and minimise the consequence of threats
has been shaped by the constant exposure to risk inherent to the security environment.
However, students are found to be more consistent with regards to perception of proba-
bilities. Under the assumptions of salience theory, distortion of probabilities is found to
be fairly consistent in the student sample, with the distortion being reasonably close to
the objective probabilities. In contrast, professionals’ choices are not consistent enough
to allow for approximating the level of probability distortion. So, professionals exhibit
susceptibility to framing effects, namely, to the presentation of risky choices, and this
is very likely to imply a biased perception of probabilities.
So, quantitatively, we detect a proximity with expected values in professionals’ WTP,
but overall there is no qualitative difference in choice inconsistencies and deviations
from expected values between students and professionals. Of course, professionals use
their expertise and knowledge in evaluating information security requirements, priori-
tising measures and selecting mechanisms. But this expertise is not reflected in the
maximisation of expected values, nor is demonstrated in the way they perceive prob-
abilities, despite professionals’ reported beliefs. From this perspective, expertise of
security professionals does not provide an advantage in optimising investment levels.
5.5.3 Professional Roles
A number of role-dependent preferences of information security professionals are recorded.
Namely, professionals report differences between prioritisation of decision criteria as a
hypothetical question and as a role-based choice (Figures 5.12 and 5.12). As shown
in Table 5.1 in the survey analysis of Section 5.3, seven out of the eleven criteria
presented to professionals are self-reported with significantly different prioritisation,
within-subjects. In particular the following criteria: estimation of expected losses,
specification of exact threat probabilities, prioritising security, prioritising operational
time, investment in large-probability threats, risk elimination and buying insurance are
reported with different prioritisation from a hypothetical and a job role point of view.
Security and Operability
Preferences between security and operability are elicited in greater detail. Findings
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show that senior executives and compliance, risk, or privacy-related professionals are
more security focused and that managerial roles prioritise operational time of tasks;
IT-related professionals are split amongst priorities (Table 3.6). An explanation of
the preference that senior executives exhibit for security might be that risk ownership,
liability and a greater examination of the “big picture” of the security environment are
closely associated with senior positions. Hierarchical superiors have a more clear view
of the organisation’s needs and threats. Consequently, individuals in these positions
might realise that a breach can turn out to be catastrophic, halting business processes.
Thus, they choose the “safer path” of security prioritisation.
Both types of professionals, based on this dichotomous categorisation, exhibit loss aver-
sion in their preferred attributes: they value the reduction of security/operability level
in absolute terms twice as much as they value security/operability enhancement (loss
aversion). So, professionals, depending on their role, tend to fear reduction of their pri-
oritised attribute more than they would welcome enhancement of the same attribute.
The possibility of operability-focused professionals revealing more linear preferences be-
tween reduction/enhancement of security/operational time is also worth considering in
decision-making, as it reveals more “balanced” preferences. In other words, operations-
oriented professionals could be considered more objective or more practical with an
approach that is more symmetrical between reduction and enhancement of the two at-
tributes. This could imply that operations-related positions allow for a more balanced
view of how security “fits” in the organisation.
So, professionals reveal different preferences in prioritising and evaluating the relative
importance of security and operability, based on their professional roles. It would thus
be misleading to assume that decision-makers approach risk-related issues indepen-
dently of their position. Appreciation of this fact can be useful in achieving security
investment agreements between involved parties from different parts of the organisation.
5.5.4 Proactive vs Reactive Security
Professionals reveal a preference for reducing losses compared to reducing the proba-
bilities associated with these losses; this preference is manifested in hypothetical threat
scenarios, i.e. in an information security context. All three interviewees welcomed this
finding (Table 4.4). In particular, David Brewer stated that this is the way risk deci-
sions should be thought of, i.e. as a means to minimise unwanted consequences. Paul
Dorey highlighted that this is the training that professionals have, a focus on negative
impact reduction, and Bruce Schneier suggested that this preference might indicate a
choice for resilience over defence. The aforementioned explanation by which profession-
als consider low-impact losses inevitable, reinforces this finding. If small losses cannot
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be avoided, then the magnitude of the impact can be at least contained.
In addition, the possibility of eliminating risk completely is shown to be considered of
secondary importance in our final survey (Figures 5.11 and 5.12). This finding can be
considered to be in alignment with the experiment finding in which the possibility of
eliminating risk completely does not increase professionals’ WTP, so that professionals
prefer to pay for reducing risk instead of eliminating it. As depicted in the ranks of
Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, WTP for eliminating risk is significantly smaller
than for reducing risk. Theory expectation is that risk elimination by paying, i.e.
insurance buying, should be valued more by professionals as it creates a“certainty effect”
on their perception and it also provides them with “a problem less to deal with”. In this
particular case, findings are differentiated from both expected loss minimisation and
prospect theory. The most obvious explanation for this phenomenon is the realisation
by security professionals that risk cannot be eliminated completely. This explanation
was phrased by Bruce Schneier as “the futility of prevention” in Section 5.4.3 and
it indicates that professionals are fully aware of the limitations of security measures,
thus they exhibit a more realistic stance against potential threats. Thus, since perfect
security is unreachable, professionals are inclined to contain damages after they occur.
Combining the aforementioned findings i.e. a preference for loss reduction and the
absence of the risk-eliminating effect might signal professionals’ realisation for the lim-
itations of preventive security measures, and indicate a focus on resilience.These traits
might explain a favourable stance towards reactive security programs.
It is important that decisions which balance preventive, detective and reactive security
controls are clearly based on the impact analysis of potential threats on the business
and on the assessment of risk, and that they are not vaguely implied in investment de-
cisions. Thus, designing an overall investment plan based on the organisation’s security
strategy can provide a means to constrain certain behavioural traits of professionals
which potentially violate maximisation of expected gains.
5.5.5 Framing
One of the most interesting research results, which has already been highlighted with
relation to the student sample, is the susceptibility of professionals to framing effects.
These are expressed by choice inconsistencies and dependency on the presentation of
risky choices. We presented professionals with the same problems, but in different
forms. Initially they had to pay in order to avoid a number of lotteries, and at a
different stage of the experiment, they were asked to compare these same lotteries they
were previously asked to avoid. Their choices between the two tasks are found to be
inconsistent (Table 3.5).
151
5.5 Discussion on Implications
In the second experiment, we divided professionals into three random groups in which
the same lotteries were presented as gains, losses, or“step-by-step”losses (Section 4.2.3.3).
The three conditions were intended to simulate different budget allocations and per-
ception of security investment as a necessary cost or as business enabling function.
Elimination of risk is perceived as significantly different in the three condition groups
(Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12). In this sense, although a “budget frame” does not seem to
influence attitude towards risk reduction, it has a significant effect on risk-elimination
attitude.
If we were to hypothetically extend the conclusions of these findings, these would be of
interest to risk management in organisations for a number of reasons. First, the way
that budget is allocated can influence risk attitude of professionals; in our experimen-
tal setting findings indicate that they become more risk-averse if they have to consider
budgets in a per-project allocation, rather than as investment extracted from a single
budget. A possible explanation is that frequent budget allocation attracts the atten-
tion of professionals more, in contrast to a single initial allocation. Findings indicate
that such a setting would cause professionals to invest more in insurance. Secondly,
perceiving security investment as a business return function can make decision-makers
more risk-averse than perceiving security as a necessary cost with no related return on
investment. Notably, this view becomes more and more popular in the industry; due to
the increasing reliance on IT systems, a lot of corporations push information security
up in their agendas and, consequently, security is being perceived as an integral part of
the business. Lastly, decision-makers underestimate the probabilities of almost certain
gains more than they overestimate unlikely security losses. The fear for the prospect of
not earning (business) gains is bigger than the fear of a rare security event manifesting.
It is notable that framing options can have an effect in two ways. On the one hand, e.g.
perception of information security as a benefit or as a necessary cost can be part of the
organisation culture and therefore might have an effect on security professionals when
they examine investing in security controls. On the other hand, security professionals
can present their proposed solutions to senior management, say, as return on investment
mechanisms, and thus try to shift their risk perception accordingly.
5.5.6 Perception
Risk attitude in Professional Role and in Life
As far as perception of professionals is concerned, we observe in survey findings (Fig-
ure 5.3) that professionals consider that only 35.49% of other security professionals are
willing to take risks. In their job role, the majority of professionals (52.26%) consider
themselves as strictly risk taking, i.e. excluding risk neutrality, and 34.19% of them
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believe that they are more risk seeking than their colleagues. Risk seeking behaviour is
more prevalent outside the professional context, so that 59.36% of professionals state
that they are willing to take risks “in general”. More specifically, only 21.43% of pro-
fessionals are willing to take more risks in their professional role than in their personal
life. At the same time, survey findings report that only 24.52% of professionals consider
themselves as risk-averse in general (Figure 5.4) and only 27.75% state that they are
cautious and not willing to take risks in their professional roles (Figure 5.5).
So, the majority of professionals place themselves in the “risk-taking group” and they
believe that the majority of other professionals are more risk-averse than them. In
addition, these findings indicate that professionals are more cautious and less willing
to gamble in the context of their professional roles in comparison to their general, risk
behaviour in life.
Self-reported Risk Attitude and Experiment Findings
A related inconsistency is reported in our first survey (see Section 3.3.5), in which,
remarkably, risk behaviour of professionals in some WTP tasks is found to be positively
correlated with their own replies to the question: “How willing are you to take risks in
general?” (see Table 3.7). So that professionals who report themselves as risk seeking
reveal risk aversive behaviour in the experiment, and vice versa. Such an inconsistency
is not observed in the student sample.
So, we observe that there are indications of distorted perception and self-perception
of risk attitude amongst professionals. This fact can constitute a hindering factor
in reaching security investment agreements in organisations. The reason is that if
security professionals perceive risk differently than they act upon risk, they also possibly
communicate risk the way they perceive it. Thus, justifying investment on quantitative
arguments can be a way of minimising the risk-perception factor.
As highlighted in Section 2.1.2.1, it is an ISO 27000 recommendation that “perception
of risk by affected parties should be taken into account” [81]. The aforementioned
results indicate that such a goal may be hard-to-achieve.
Perception and Mathematical Skills
Professionals are found to deviate less from expected values than the student sample
when they state their WTP to avoid lotteries, for both risk-averse and risk-seeking
attitude. However, inconsistencies between choice and WTP are equally detected in
both samples. Professionals are in some cases more ambiguity averse than students.
Despite the fact that only 5.17% of professionals consider themselves worse than the
general population in their mathematical abilities and as many as 66.45% of them
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consider themselves better than the average person in terms of their mathematical skills
in probabilities and expected values, professionals seem to deviate from maximisation
of expected value about as often as the student sample (Figure 5.8).
So, overall, there is no qualitative difference between the performance of professionals
and students in expected value maximisation, even if professionals self-report strong
confidence in their mathematical skills. It would be to the benefit of professionals to
appreciate the fact that their choices can be subjective and susceptible to biases.
5.5.7 Communication
Communication is a crucial factor in information security, because almost all decisions
are ultimately made through a “propose, discuss, justify and accept” type of process.
Paul Dorey (Section 5.4.2) insisted on the importance of aligned prioritisation between
security professionals and business people, which is often absent in organisations. As
elicited in the experiment of Section 3.6, professionals of different roles have significantly
different preferences towards operational time and security measures. So, perception in
information security depends on the position of the decision-maker, i.e. on the decision-
maker’s job role point of view. This might be an understandable and maybe desirable
attribute. However, a survey question on the perceived relative importance of security
versus operational time from the perspective of the various professional roles, reveals a
clear stereotypical and dichotomous perception that professionals have for the priorities
of their colleagues. So, professionals have a biased view about what individuals consider
important in each security role.
Such an inconsistency could imply that perception of information security from the
perspective of various security roles is not communicated amongst professionals, or at
least that professionals have their own stereotypical beliefs. We observe in Figure 5.9
that 118 out of 155 professionals believe that IT security related positions focus on
security; and 125 out of the 155 professionals think that compliance, risk and privacy
related people consider security as more important than operational time. At the same
time, only 38 professionals indicate that security is more important for senior execu-
tives, and even less, namely 33 professionals, would indicate the same for managers.
These numbers are almost symmetrically reversed in Figure 5.10, in which case senior
executives and managers are believed to consider operational time as more important
than security and vice versa for IT- and compliance-related professionals.
Prioritisation, perception and communication were discussed during our interviews.
Paul Dorey mentioned that situations in which, for example, IT professionals are called
to protect systems and processes without really knowing which of these assets constitute
a priority for the organisation, are very common. David Brewer (Section 5.4.1) also
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pointed out the need for security professionals to communicate their message in a story-
like scenario to their business counterparts, so that security investment suggestions can
be evaluated in a common context.
Based on the observed differences in preferences and perception, we can safely state
that priorities and objectives of the involved parties need to be shared for achieving
more effective investment in information security.
5.5.8 De-biasing Decisions
Perhaps the most important message of this research is gaining a better understanding
about how to de-bias the decision-making process. Such a goal cannot necessarily be
achieved with explicit procedures and policies, but might be of a more elaborate na-
ture. As was pointed out during the interviews, just pondering on the observed biases
can be a first step in the objectification of decisions. For example, involved parties
in the decision-making process could be made aware of the choice inconsistencies that
professionals reveal (Section 3.3) or their significantly diversified risk attitude across
framing scenarios (Section 4.3.3). Role-dependent preferences, budget allocation, the
view of information security as a necessary cost or as a business enabler, risk aversion,
ambiguity aversion, perception of risk, self-perceived risk attitude, preferences on risk
treatment actions and prioritisation of decision-criteria, are all potential sources of sub-
jectivity and biases in information security decision-making. Involved parties need to
be aware that, for example, job positions shape prioritisation and influence perception
of risk. It is not necessary that a risk owner has the most objective perception of a risk.
Appreciation of the subjectivity of view can be a path to smoothing and normalising
the effects of biases in the risk management processes.
Awareness of the involved parties is highly related with the importance of communi-
cation between, for example, business executives and security professionals, which has
already been highlighted as a recommendation. Techniques for enhancing such commu-
nication are context- and structure-dependent and should be a goal for organisations.
Risk and ambiguity aversion, and in some cases risk taking behaviour, inevitably lead to
over or underspending in security investment. Independently of the underlying sources
of this behaviour, risk neutrality, with respect to expected losses, can serve decision-
makers as a point of reference. Thus, unnecessary spending or pointless risk taking can
be minimised.
Abstraction in Decision-making
Another need expressed by all interviewees is the objectification of decision-making via
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the use of data on previous security breaches, whenever possible. Making decisions on
“abstracted” data can allow for the maximisation of expected value. Findings indicate
the usefulness of abstraction as a means of de-biasing. For example, it might be practical
to consider the option of buying insurance in an abstract way, other things being equal,
when weighting expected benefits against the option of taking security measures on an
asset. The reason is that these options are potentially related to subjective agendas and
views. As, for example, in the case in which professionals prefer to take matters “into
their own hands” by reducing risk, instead of transferring the risk to another party, e.g.
by buying insurance.
However, this research indicates that the abstraction process is not a panacea. For
example, preference of professionals for reduction of losses instead of probability reduc-
tion is only manifested in security scenarios and not in abstract lotteries. This implies
that professionals take the security context into consideration. Namely, they possibly
consider the futility of perfect security and the importance of reactive security and busi-
ness continuity. In this sense, professionals take more factors into consideration than
the abstracted version of the problem provides. Thus, we believe that implementation
and context are inseparable parts of risk management and, consequently, abstraction
can be effective only up to a certain level.
5.5.9 Discussion on Recommendations
Research findings on professionals’ risk perception and interviews with security experts
suggest that the initial step for containing variability of bias-originated decisions is for
the decision-makers to become self-aware of their susceptibility to biases in the first
place. The recommendation of the ISO 27001 standard that “risk perception and risk
attitude of involved parties, should be taken into consideration”can be transformed into
a tangible precaution if the irrationality of the involved parties is, at least, recognised
and accepted as a fact. Ensuring awareness amongst information security professionals
and people from the business part of organisations regarding potentially “irrational”
decisions and biases is a first step for de-biasing investment decisions.
Decision-makers can minimise unnecessary spending or avoid the insecurity of under-
spending if they use maximisation of expected profits as a measure for evaluating
risk-related investment choices. That is, professionals’ experimentally elicited system-
atic risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviour across a variety of risky and ambiguous
circumstances, can be constrained.
It is highlighted in this research that there are significant differences between the various
roles of professionals regarding risk perception, ranking of security controls, prioritisa-
tion of system attributes, even misaligned perception about the risk behaviour of other
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professionals. In that sense, the role-dependent perception of professionals in combi-
nation with insufficient communication during the decision-making process can lead to
a misalignment of priorities and dissonance on how to manage risk. Decision-makers
and managers need to be able to identify these asymmetries in perception in order to
be able to agree on optimal investment levels.
With the exception of a few cost-independent decisions, like e.g. regulatory and legal
requirements, all information security investment decisions are ultimately made with
costs and benefits in mind. Such decisions require a direct communication between
people inside the business and professionals who are closely involved with information
security. In order for this relation to be constructive, both parties need to speak the
“same language” and operate on the same decision context. Thus, a crucial point in
information security is how threats, impact and risk are conveyed to senior and business
management by security professionals.
The aforementioned research findings indicate the need for a close and factual com-
munication, that is based on available data, whenever possible, for bridging the gaps
regarding incentives and perspectives of the involved parties. This communication
needs to be aligned with the business objectives and the information security needs of
the organisation. In order to overcome the diversity of risk perception and the out-of-
balance prioritisation, discussions need to be based, as much as possible, on quantitative
factual evidence.
Framing decisions in different ways can shift behaviour significantly, including how pro-
fessionals perceive risk or how they present security solutions to senior management.
For example, findings indicate that viewing information security as a positive contrib-
utor to the business can increase decision-makers’ risk aversion. This means that an
organisation that views security as a business enabling function, might be willing to
invest more in security. In contrast, security as a necessary cost can hinder willingness
to invest.
Security problems, if examined in isolation, might lead to different decisions due to
framing effects. Research results on framing effects should concern any decision maker
who would like to believe that the security recommendations they propose do not
depend on the way in which questions were asked. Even widespread frameworks, like
the ISO series of standards, encourage customised approaches for risk assessments based
on the needs of each organisation. Moreover, a universal approach to risk management
is not expected to be seen in the near future. These two factors suggest that context
dependency and diversification of investment decisions due to framing effects can be
seen as norm and not as an exception in information security. Providing a descriptive
pluralism for examining these problems under the perspective of various framing options
can minimise these effects. This fact could also mean that targeted interventions in
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risk presentation and risk communication policies can “nudge” decisions in information
security investment towards desirable directions.
In order to restrict the margins that allow for inherent behavioural traits of decision-
makers to be manifested, organisations can define and communicate their business
objectives, and subsequently their information security goals. Such an approach can be
realised as a practical and understandable information security strategy, communicated
as a policy across the organisation. In this context, if investment-related variables are
identified and hidden factors left to the decision-makers’ judgement are limited, ab-
stracting security investment decisions in a quantitative fashion can further strengthen
the security posture and thus, the benefit of the organisation.
5.5.10 Summary
In this Chapter we focused on the most important experimental results and we pre-
sented a supplementary survey for further exploring risk perception of information se-
curity professionals. We discussed potential implications of the research with renowned
security experts and we provided recommendations for minimising the observed be-
havioural biases.
Survey results indicated that prioritisation of decision criteria depends on the profes-
sionals’ role. Professionals were found to consider themselves as being risk-seeking in
general, and more risk-seeking than their colleagues. They also consider other security
professionals as being overall risk-averse. The majority of professionals reported that
their mathematical skills are better than the average person’s. Stereotypical percep-
tions regarding security roles and prioritisation between security and operability were
also traced.
Interviews with security experts highlighted the importance of risk perception and
attitude in information security, and the significance of behavioural research in the field.
Interviewees pointed out the need for clear communication of risk amongst involved
parties and the need to de-bias decision-making by basing it on factual data, avoiding
individual judgement.
We categorised and discussed implications of the research findings, providing an inter-
pretation of the findings’ consequences in real-world environments. Finally, we recom-
mended a number of actions that can be taken by organisations, in order to optimise
information security investment decisions and to minimise risk-related biases of the
decision-makers.
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Conclusion
Information security is a field with inherent risk and uncertainty. Organisations and
policy makers have sought to reduce the impact of these issues; for example, by gather-
ing data on past security breaches or passing new disclosure laws which increase public
knowledge about the distribution of breaches. Despite these efforts to collect informa-
tion, the complexity and uniqueness of information security systems often only allow
organisations to approximate ranges of probabilities and of damages associated with
potential threats and vulnerabilities. Thus, risk management and security investment
are, by nature, characterised by ambiguity and uncertainty. This research examined
how information security professionals make decisions in such an environment and,
specifically, whether security professionals are rational decision-makers who minimise
expected losses.
In our exploration of decision-making in information security investment, we focused
on the individual risk behavioural traits which active professionals and practitioners
exhibit. In a field in which standardisation and best practises flourish, one would expect
that the correctness of information security decisions might be objectively justifiable. It
becomes apparent from the experimental findings that risk attitude, and consequently
investment decisions, are influenced by inherent behavioural traits and by the approach
of risk management taken by an organisation.
Under expected utility theory, which is the standard normative decision-making ap-
proach, a rational decision maker should minimise expected losses or maximise expected
gains. However, behavioural economics has repeatedly demonstrated that most indi-
viduals systematically deviate from expected utility maximisation. We examined three
well-known behavioural anomalies: risk and ambiguity aversion, worst-case aversion,
and other-evaluation. We also examined an additional two industry-specific types of be-
haviour, namely a preference for security over operability and a variety of preferences
related to risk treatment actions. We examined these behaviours using experiments
and surveys which elicit preferences using simple, neutrally-framed lotteries as well as
scenario-specific lotteries . We compared decision-making of professionals to a sample
of university students.
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We conclude the thesis by presenting the key research findings and possible future
research.
6.1 Key Research Findings
Across a variety of lotteries, information security professionals consistently indicated
a willingness to pay to avoid negative outcomes that was closer to the expected losses
than did the sample of students.
Despite their greater ability to assess risk, our findings suggest that security profession-
als still have distinctive behavioural characteristics which deviate from expected utility
theory. In common with the student sample, and with a number of other studies,
the observed behaviour of professionals follows the pattern of risk attitudes described
by Kahneman and Tversky [90]. Security professionals exhibit significant risk aver-
sion when faced with low possibilities of loss or small losses. However, their actions
switched from being risk-averse to being risk-seeking when faced with large probabili-
ties of losses or large losses. In a similar finding, based on the predictions of salience
theory, professionals exhibit a highly distorted perception of probabilities.
Information security professionals also show considerable ambiguity aversion in the
experiments. Their willingness to pay increased significantly, compared to risky lot-
teries, when faced with low- and moderate-probability lotteries which had ambiguous
probabilities and/or outcomes. As with risk, ambiguity is an inherent feature of the
information security environment, which is characterised by unknown or imperfectly
known threats.
Additionally, a significant number of professionals display preference reversal depending
on whether a decision is framed as a choice or as WTP, similarly to the student sample.
Framing risk decisions as losses, gains or individually separated losses is also shown to
diversify risk attitude of professionals significantly. Professionals are more risk-averse
when confronted by gains-related decisions than when they deal with losses. They are
also more risk-averse when potential losses are subtracted form individual budgets in
comparison to when losses apply on a single budget, with regards to risk transfer.
Professionals are willing to pay more than the expected value of lotteries in order to
reduce probabilities and losses of these lotteries comparatively to paying for securing
a zero loss. Thus, professionals reveal a preference for paying to modify risk rather
than paying to eliminate risk completely, which is the equivalent of risk transfer in risk
management terminology.
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When presented with information security threat scenarios professionals reveal an incli-
nation for reducing losses instead of minimising the probabilities that generated these
losses. So, professionals have distinct preferences for treating risk, even if the expected
value of the alternatives is the same.
Finally, we examined security professionals’ preferences between operability and secu-
rity. Preferences across individuals are heterogeneous and we also find that preferences
between security and operability are correlated with professional role.
Survey findings indicate biased, stereotypical expectations amongst professionals re-
garding the priorities that professionals in other positions exhibit. Prioritisation of a
variety of decision criteria in information security measures is also found to be diver-
sified across security positions. In our surveys, the majority of professionals report
themselves as being more risk seeking than their colleagues. These findings reveal
the existence of biased perceptions and misaligned prioritisation in the security work
environment.
Taking this evidence as a whole, we would not characterise security professionals as
fully rational decision-makers. This implies that calculations involved in risk assessment
methodologies and perceptions of risk are dependent on the decision-maker’s subjective
perceptions. This is potentially an aspect of risk management and decision-making in
information security investment that needs to be strengthened.
6.2 Future Research
There are several research questions that emerge from this study and could be further
examined. For example, the extent to which ambiguity aversion is probability- or
outcome-dependent was outside the scope of our study, so more research could shed
light into this area. Also, we did not examine which type of problem-framing (WTP or
choice) tends to lead to better decisions (i.e. closer to expected value maximisation),
so more research might be needed on framing effects in information security.
The effect that the culture of an organisation can have on risk perception and security
awareness could also be explored further. Good information security practice can only
be achieved by a combination of security-aware professionals, management and em-
ployees. Having people involved in security processes shapes their stance towards risk.
Threats should also be communicated appropriately in order to achieve the desired
level of employee-commitment.
Having established the existence of professionals’ biases related to risk perception and
risk attitude, it is worth considering the potential effects of the actual security envi-
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ronment. For this reason, we plan to target our future research on the examination of
risk behaviour in real-world security contexts. For example, in situations of pressure
and urgency people might “bend the rules” to complete daily tasks. As a result, se-
curity procedures are often bypassed for the sake of “getting the job done”. Such an
attitude inevitably creates more risk. The types of security controls, including techni-
cal, operational or administrative controls, which can assist in making security policies
acceptable, and thus enforceable, are yet to be examined.
At a different level, the relationship between management and security professionals
could be further studied in the specific context and structure of organisations. It is
the senior management and business parts of the organisation that take actions for
treating risk. However, thresholds of risk acceptability can be flexible and risk can be
underweighted due to a narrow focus on business operations only. Specifying which
types of risk communication methods between security and business professionals can
be deployed in order to base decisions on concrete variables, would be of great value.
Some further behavioural patterns might be interesting to explore. The “follow the
crowd” behaviour of security professionals, by which security programs adopt trending
technologies due to peer benchmarking, has already been mentioned. Such a phe-
nomenon potentially affects the security industry as a whole, since it maintains or
re-enforces trends in products and practices at the expense of other possibly more op-
timal solutions. Gaining insight into the processes and motivations that cause this or
similar behaviours would be highly beneficial for managing information security risk.
Finally, risk management approaches can be investigated through the prism of various
industries, by taking into consideration the characteristics of each sector. Designing
industry-specific methodologies for assessing and treating risk might provide organisa-
tions with more flexible tools for enhancing the process of managing risk.
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Appendices
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
A.1.1 Experiment Design
A.1.2 H1 Instrument
There are four types of experiment questions on willingness to pay to avoid a lottery,
one for each lottery type. The actual values of pi and xi are shown in the second and
third column of Table A.1:
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid
playing a lottery in which there is a p% probability of losing $50 and losing
nothing otherwise?”.
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid
playing a lottery in which there is a probability between p1% and p2% of losing
$50?”.
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid
playing a lottery in which there is a p% probability of losing an amount between
$x1 and $x2 and losing nothing otherwise?”.
“What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid
playing a lottery in which there is a probability between p1% and p2 of losing an
amount between $x1 and $x2 and losing nothing otherwise?”.
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Table A.1: H1 Instrument
# Prob. Outcomes WTP EV Exp. Outcome Outcome
(p%) (x in $) µ Interval Range
H11 5 -50 0 to 100 -2.5 -2.5 0
H12 0-10 -50 0 to 100 -2.5 [-5, 0] 5
H13 5 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -2.5 [-4, -1] 3
H14 0-10 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -2.5 [-8, 0] 8
H15 15 -50 0 to 100 -7.5 -7.5 0
H16 0-30 -50 0 to 100 -7.5 [-7.5, 0] 7.5
H17 15 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -7.5 [-12, -3] 9
H18 0-30 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -7.5 [-24, 0] 18
H19 50 -50 0 to 100 -25 -25 0
H110 35-65 -50 0 to 100 -25 [-32.5,-17.5] 15
H111 50 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -25 [-40, -10] 30
H112 35-65 -80 to -20 0 to 100 -25 [-52, -7] 45
A.1.3 Lottery Comparisons
Hypothesis 2 Question 1 (H21)
Lottery A (Lottery 9) Lottery B (Lottery 10)
a probability of 85% of losing 45 a probability of 85% of losing 50
a probability of 8% of losing 220 a probability of 8% of losing 170
a probability of 3.5% of losing 300 a probability of 3.5% of losing 300
a probability of 2.5% of losing 450 a probability of 2.5% of losing 400
a probability of 1% of losing 900 a probability of 1% of losing 1000
µ = -86.6, V ar = 14406.2 µ = -86.6, V ar = 14087.4
Hypothesis 2 Question 2 (H22)
Lottery A (Lottery 10) Lottery B (Lottery 11)
a probability of 85% of losing 50 a probability of 85% of losing 45
a probability of 8% of losing 170 a probability of 8% of losing 250
a probability of 3.5% of losing 300 a probability of 3.5% of losing 350
a probability of 2.5% of losing 400 a probability of 2.5% of losing 450
a probability of 1% of losing 1000 a probability of 1% of losing 800
µ = -86.6, V ar = 14087.4 µ = -89.75, V ar = 14416.2
Hypothesis 2 Question 3 (H23)
Lottery A (Lottery 8) Lottery B (Lottery 6)
a probability of 15% of losing nothing a probability of 15% of losing nothing
a probability of 30% of losing 200 a probability of 30% of losing 166.66
a probability of 30% of losing 300 a probability of 30% of losing 300
a probability of 20% of losing 450 a probability of 20% of losing 450
a probability of 5% of losing 700 a probability of 5% of losing 900
µ = -275, Var = 28375 µ = -274.998, Var = 40708.8
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Hypothesis 2 Question 4 (H24)
Lottery A (Lottery 6) Lottery B (Lottery 7)
a probability of 15% of losing nothing a probability of 15% of losing nothing
a probability of 30% of losing 166.66 a probability of 30% of losing 183.33
a probability of 30% of losing 300 a probability of 30% of losing 300
a probability of 20% of losing 450 a probability of 20% of losing 450
a probability of 5% of losing 900 a probability of 5% of losing 800
µ = -274.998, Var = 40708.8 µ = -274.999, Var = 33958.5
Hypothesis 2 Question 5 (H25)
Lottery A (Lottery 4) Lottery B (Lottery 12)
a probability of 85% of 50 a probability of 85% of 46
a probability of 8% of losing 150 a probability of 8% of losing 180
a probability of 3.5% of losing 300 a probability of 3.5% of losing 350
a probability of 2.5% of losing 450 a probability of 2.5% of losing 480
a probability of 1% of losing 1000 a probability of 1% of losing 900
µ = -86.25, Var = 14698.4 µ = -86.75, Var = 15012.5
A.1.4 H2 Willingness-to-pay Lotteries
Hypothesis 2 Question 6 (H26)
Lottery 9: How much are you willing to pay in order
to avoid playing a lottery in which there is:
a probability of 85% of losing 45
a probability of 8% of losing 220
a probability of 3.5% of losing 300
a probability of 2.5% of losing 450
a probability of 1% of losing 900
µ = -86.6, Var = 14406.2
Hypothesis 2 Question 7 (H27)
Lottery 10: How much are you willing to pay in order
to avoid playing a lottery in which there is:
a probability of 85% of losing 50
a probability of 8% of losing 170
a probability of 3.5% of losing 300
a probability of 2.5% of losing 400
a probability of 1% of losing 1000
µ = -86.6, Var = 14087.2
Hypothesis 2 Question 8 (H28)
Lottery 11: How much are you willing to pay in order
to avoid playing a lottery in which there is:
a probability of 85% of losing 45
a probability of 8% of losing 250
a probability of 3.5% of losing 350
a probability of 2.5% of losing 450
a probability of 1% of losing 800
µ = -89.75, Var = 14416.2
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A.1.4.1 Consent Form
Experiment 1: Consent Form
Thank you for taking part in this experiment and survey! Your participation is very
helpful for my cross-disciplinary PhD research in the Information Security Group and
Economics Department at Royal Holloway University of London!
Konstantinos
Procedure:
You will be asked to complete a number of short lottery-type experiments and a survey
with Information Security related questions and demographics. Duration is no more
than about 15 minutes.
Benefits and Scope of this Study:
First of all, your participation will allow me to collect valuable data for my PhD
research! By completing all questions you earn a symbolic participation fee of $3.
Additionally, you are given an amount of $10 to ‘play’ in the lotteries. After completing
the survey, one of the lotteries will be randomly selected and played for you. All
lotteries are over losses and the resulting loss will be proportionally reduced from your
$10 and the remainder will be your additional payment. So, your potential maximum
payment is $13. An email will be sent to your designated email address with your
payment in the form of an Amazon gift certificate. Please, note that for the payment
to be processed all answers will be validated to avoid ‘random’ replies.
Confidentiality:
No identification of the participants is collected or maintained during or after the
completion of the experiments and the survey and all data are fully anonymised. An
email address is requested at the end of the survey only for the purpose of sending your
payment. All data will be protected and kept completely confidential. No data hard
copies will be kept at any point of the research.
Usage of the findings:
The research findings will be used for academic purposes only. For example, they might
be presented in academic conferences, and be published in research journals in the field
of Information Security and Economics. Research findings will be made available to all
participants upon request after data collection and data analysis.
Contact information:
In case of any concern or question, please contact Konstantinos at konstanti-
nos.mersinas.2011@live.rhul.ac.uk or call directly at +44.. . By beginning the survey
you acknowledge that you have read this form and agree to participate in this research.
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A.1.5 Survey Questions
Question: “Are you related with the profession or practice of Information Secu-
rity in any way?” Yes / No
Question: “How many years of experience do you have in Information Security
related tasks?”
Question: “How willing are you to take risks in general?” 0 to 10
0: Not willing at all 10: Very willing
Question: “Your job title most closely resembles:”
 Senior executive role (e.g. CEO, CIO, CISO, CSO etc.)
 Managerial role (e.g. Project Manager, IT Director, Security Manager
etc.)
 IT & Security (e.g. Security Officer, System Administrator, Cyber Security
Information Analyst etc.)
 Compliance, Risk or Privacy role (e.g. Governance, Risk and Compliance
Consultant, Information Security Consultant, Auditor etc.)
 Other: please specify
Question: “Does your job position allow you to make independent Information
Security related decisions?” Yes / No
Question: “How worried are you that a severe/important security incident might
materialise in your company / organisation, despite the existing protective mea-
sures?” 0 to 10
0: Not worried at all 10: Very worried
Question: “How worried are you about new unidentified information security
threats?” 0 to 10
0: Not worried at all 10: Very worried
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Question: “Have you experienced any important security incident in the past?”
Yes / No
Question: “How closely related do you think investment in Information Security
is to business objectives?” 0 to 10
0: Not related at all 10: Very much related
Question: “How much do you think companies / organisations focus on business
operations and as a result underestimate or neglect security?” 0 to 10
0: Not worried at all 10: Very worried
Question: “Where / to whom does your Chief Information Security Officer (CISO
or CSO) or equivalent senior executive report?”
Question: “What is the size of your company?”
Question: “What is your gender?”
Question: “What is your age?”
Question: “What is your educational level?”
Question: “What is your marital status?”
Question: “What is the number of dependents in your family?”
Question: “What is your approximate annual income in British pounds?”
Question: “Which country do you live in?”
168
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
Question: “What is your nationality?”
Question: “What is your mother tongue?”
A.1.6 Experiment 1 Indicative Screenshots
Figure A.1: The “other-evaluation and behaviour” hypothesis statement is randomly
presented to half of the participants.
Figure A.2: The first task that is presented to participants involves five comparisons
between lotteries. The first comparison is presented below.
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Figure A.3: In the next task, participants are asked to state their willingness to pay in
order to avoid three lotteries of the following form.
Figure A.4: Relative importance between security and operations is tested by a series
of questions with the following design.
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Figure A.5: Subsequent questions are dynamically formed by the choices of participants.
Figure A.6: Similarly to a previous section, the following questions elicit willingness to
pay in order to avoid lotteries.
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Figure A.7: This screenshot shows an example of willingness to pay stated by a partic-
ipant (presentation of this part is randomised between: risky lotteries being presented
first and being followed by ambiguous lotteries, or vice versa).
Figure A.8: The next section contains the mechanism for measuring relative loss aver-
sion in either security or operations, based on previous choices of the participant.
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Figure A.9: The final section comprises the survey and demographic questions.
Figure A.10: Each participant is informed about the payment procedure.
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Figure A.11: The final payment is presented to the participant.
174
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
A.1.7 Qualtrics Javascript Code
1 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.addOnload(function ()
2 {
3 var maxpayment = 10;
4 var participationfee = 3;
5 var y2 = maxpayment;
6
7 function LinearMap(x, x1, x2, y1, y2)
8 {
9
10 var map = ((y2-y1)/(x2-x1))*(x-x1)+y1;
11 return Math.round(map *100) /100;
12 }
13
14 function DelayFunction ()
15 {
16 setTimeout(load ,3000); // 3000 milliseconds
17 return;
18 }
19
20 var n=27; //the number of entries in the Array
21
22 var AnswerPayment = new Array(n);
23 for (var i = 0; i < n; i++)
24 {
25 AnswerPayment[i] = new Array (5);
26 }
27 // each entry x has:
28 // in position [][0] the answer VALUE
29 // in position [][1] the corresponding additional PAYMENT for that Answer
30 // in position [][2] the question TEXT is stored
31 // in position [][3] the random OUTCOME of the lottery is stored
32 // in position [][4] the normalised LOSSES
33
34 // ASSIGNING ANSWERED VALUES TO AnswerPayment ARRAY , FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 (16 Slots
: from 0 to 15)
35 // Alternative way: AnswerPayment [0][0] = "${q:// QID2/ChoiceNumericEntryValue
/1}";
36 AnswerPayment [0][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer1}";
37 AnswerPayment [1][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer2}";
38 AnswerPayment [2][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer3}";
39 AnswerPayment [3][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer4}";
40 AnswerPayment [4][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer5}";
41 AnswerPayment [5][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer6}";
42 AnswerPayment [6][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer7}";
43 AnswerPayment [7][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer8}";
44 AnswerPayment [8][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer9}";
45 AnswerPayment [9][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer10}";
46 AnswerPayment [10][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer11}";
47 AnswerPayment [11][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer12}";
48 AnswerPayment [12][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer13}";
49 AnswerPayment [13][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer14}";
50 AnswerPayment [14][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer15}";
51 AnswerPayment [15][0] = "${e:// Field/H1Answer16}";
52
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53 // ASSIGNING PAYMENTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 1 //note: I store the OUTPUT losses as a
POSITIVE number. Then I calculate: OUTCOME -
54
55 Investment(WTP) = LOSSES
56 // explanation of losses: if [][1] is NEGATIVE it means that the lottery outcome
was 0 and the participant only has to pay his INVESTMENT
57
58 // if [][1] is POSITIVE it means that the lottery produced some LOSS and the
participant actually MINIMISED the LOSS by his investment , so he only lost
the positive amount instead of losing more
59
60 var num = Math.random ();
61 var ambig0to10 = Math.random ()*0.1;
62 var ambig0to30 = Math.random ()*0.3;
63 var ambig35to65 = Math.random () *0.3+0.35;
64 var ambig75to100 = Math.random () *0.25+0.75;
65 var ambig20to80 = Math.floor((Math.random ()*0.6) *100+20);
66
67 // document.write("num = ", num);
68 // document.write("<br >");
69 // document.write(" ambig0to10 = ", ambig0to10);
70 // document.write("<br >");
71 // document.write(" ambig0to30 = ", ambig0to30);
72 // document.write("<br >");
73 // document.write(" ambig35to65 = ", ambig35to65);
74 // document.write("<br >");
75 // document.write(" ambig75to100 = ", ambig75to100);
76 // document.write("<br >");
77 // document.write(" ambig20to80 outcome = ", ambig20to80);
78 // document.write("<br >");
79 // document.write("<br >");
80
81 // Question H1 1
82 if (num <= 0.05) {AnswerPayment [0][3] = 2.5;} else {AnswerPayment [0][3] = 0;}
83 AnswerPayment [0][1] = AnswerPayment [0][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [0][0]); //
outcome minus WTP
84 AnswerPayment [0][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [0][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
85
86 // document.write(" lottery 1 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [0][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [0][0] , " and your losses are: ",
87
88 AnswerPayment [0][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [0][4]);
89 // document.write("<br >");
90
91 // Question H1 2
92 if (num <= ambig0to10) {AnswerPayment [1][3] = 50;} else {AnswerPayment [1][3] =
0;}
93 AnswerPayment [1][1] = AnswerPayment [1][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [1][0]);
94 AnswerPayment [1][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [1][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
95
96 // document.write(" lottery 2 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [1][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [1][0] , " and your losses are: ",
97
98 AnswerPayment [1][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [1][4]);
99 // document.write("<br >");
100
101 // Question H1 3
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102 if (num <= 0.05) {AnswerPayment [2][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment [2][3]
= 0;}
103 AnswerPayment [2][1] = AnswerPayment [2][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [2][0]);
104 AnswerPayment [2][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [2][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
105
106 // document.write(" lottery 3 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [2][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [2][0] , " and your losses are: ",
107
108 AnswerPayment [2][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [2][4]);
109 // document.write("<br >");
110
111 // Question H1 4
112 if (num <= ambig0to10) {AnswerPayment [3][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment
[3][3] = 0;}
113 AnswerPayment [3][1] = AnswerPayment [3][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [3][0]);
114 AnswerPayment [3][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [3][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
115
116 // document.write(" lottery 4 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [3][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [3][0] , " and your losses are: ",
117
118 AnswerPayment [3][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [3][4]);
119 // document.write("<br >");
120
121 // Question H1 5
122 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [4][3] = 7.5;} else {AnswerPayment [4][3] = 0;}
123 AnswerPayment [4][1] = AnswerPayment [4][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [4][0]);
124 AnswerPayment [4][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [4][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
125
126 // document.write(" lottery 5 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [4][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [4][0] , " and your losses are: ",
127
128 AnswerPayment [4][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [4][4]);
129 // document.write("<br >");
130
131 // Question H1 6
132 if (num <= ambig0to30) {AnswerPayment [5][3] = 50;} else {AnswerPayment [5][3] =
0;}
133 AnswerPayment [5][1] = AnswerPayment [5][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [5][0]);
134 AnswerPayment [5][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [5][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
135
136 // document.write(" lottery 6 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [5][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [5][0] , " and your losses are: ",
137
138 AnswerPayment [5][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [5][4]);
139 // document.write("<br >");
140
141 // Question H1 7
142 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [6][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment [6][3]
= 0;}
143 AnswerPayment [6][1] = AnswerPayment [6][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [6][0]);
144 AnswerPayment [6][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [6][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
145
146 // document.write(" lottery 7 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [6][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [6][0] , " and your losses are: ",
147
148 AnswerPayment [6][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [6][4]);
149 // document.write("<br >");
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150
151 // Question H1 8
152 if (num <= ambig0to30) {AnswerPayment [7][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment
[7][3] = 0;}
153 AnswerPayment [7][1] = AnswerPayment [7][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [7][0]);
154 AnswerPayment [7][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [7][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
155
156 // document.write(" lottery 8 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [7][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [7][0] , " and your losses are: ",
157
158 AnswerPayment [7][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [7][4]);
159 // document.write("<br >");
160
161 // Question H1 9
162 if (num <= 0.5) {AnswerPayment [8][3] = 25;} else {AnswerPayment [8][3] = 0;}
163 AnswerPayment [8][1] = AnswerPayment [8][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [8][0]);
164 AnswerPayment [8][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [8][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
165
166 // document.write(" lottery 9 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [8][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [8][0] , " and your losses are: ",
167
168 AnswerPayment [8][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [8][4]);
169 // document.write("<br >");
170
171 // Question H1 10
172 if (num <= ambig35to65) {AnswerPayment [9][3] = 50;} else {AnswerPayment [9][3] =
0;}
173 AnswerPayment [9][1] = AnswerPayment [9][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [9][0]);
174 AnswerPayment [9][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [9][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
175
176 // document.write(" lottery 10 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [9][3] , " answer was ",
AnswerPayment [9][0] , " and your losses are: ",
177
178 AnswerPayment [9][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [9][4]);
179 // document.write("<br >");
180
181 // Question H1 11
182 if (num <= 0.5) {AnswerPayment [10][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment [10][3]
= 0;}
183 AnswerPayment [10][1] = AnswerPayment [10][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [10][0]);
184 AnswerPayment [10][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [10][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
185
186 // document.write(" lottery 11 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [10][3] , " answer was
", AnswerPayment [10][0] , " and your losses are:
187
188 ", AnswerPayment [10][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [10][4])
;
189 // document.write("<br>");
190
191 // Question H1 12
192 if (num <= ambig35to65) {AnswerPayment [11][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {
AnswerPayment [11][3] = 0;}
193 AnswerPayment [11][1] = AnswerPayment [11][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [3][0]);
194 AnswerPayment [11][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [11][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
195
196 // document.write("lottery 12 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [11][3] , " answer was "
, AnswerPayment [11][0] , " and your losses are:
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197
198 ", AnswerPayment [11][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [11][4])
;
199 // document.write("<br>");
200
201 // Question H1 13
202 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [12][3] = 50;} else {AnswerPayment [12][3] = 0;}
203 AnswerPayment [12][1] = AnswerPayment [12][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [12][0]); //
outcome minus WTP
204 AnswerPayment [12][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [12][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
205
206 // document.write("lottery 13 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [12][3] , " answer was "
, AnswerPayment [12][0] , " and your losses are:
207
208 ", AnswerPayment [12][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [12][4])
;
209 // document.write("<br>");
210
211 // Question H1 14
212 if (num <= ambig75to100) {AnswerPayment [13][3] = 50;} else {AnswerPayment [13][3]
= 0;}
213 AnswerPayment [13][1] = AnswerPayment [13][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [13][0]);
214 AnswerPayment [13][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [13][1] , 0, 50, 0, maxpayment);
215
216 // document.write("lottery 14 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [13][3] , " answer was "
, AnswerPayment [13][0] , " and your losses are:
217
218 ", AnswerPayment [13][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [13][4])
;
219 // document.write("<br>");
220
221 // Question H1 15
222 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [14][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {AnswerPayment
[14][3] = 0;}
223 AnswerPayment [14][1] = AnswerPayment [14][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [14][0]);
224 AnswerPayment [14][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [14][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
225
226 // document.write("lottery 15 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [14][3] , " answer was "
, AnswerPayment [14][0] , " and your losses are:
227
228 ", AnswerPayment [14][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [14][4])
;
229 // document.write("<br>");
230
231 // Question H1 16
232 if (num <= ambig75to100) {AnswerPayment [15][3] = ambig20to80 ;} else {
AnswerPayment [15][3] = 0;}
233 AnswerPayment [15][1] = AnswerPayment [15][3] - Number(AnswerPayment [15][0]);
234 AnswerPayment [15][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [15][1] , 0, 80, 0, maxpayment);
235
236 // document.write("lottery 16 outcome is: ", AnswerPayment [15][3] , " answer was "
, AnswerPayment [15][0] , " and your losses are:
237
238 ", AnswerPayment [15][1] , " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [15][4])
;
239 // document.write("<br>");
240
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241 // STORING Question Text for HYPOTHESIS 1
242 AnswerPayment [0][2] = "${q://QID2/QuestionText }";
243 AnswerPayment [1][2] = "${q:// QID3/QuestionText}";
244 AnswerPayment [2][2] = "${q:// QID5/QuestionText}";
245 AnswerPayment [3][2] = "${q:// QID6/QuestionText}";
246 AnswerPayment [4][2] = "${q:// QID7/QuestionText}";
247 AnswerPayment [5][2] = "${q:// QID8/QuestionText}";
248 AnswerPayment [6][2] = "${q:// QID9/QuestionText}";
249 AnswerPayment [7][2] = "${q:// QID10/QuestionText}";
250 AnswerPayment [8][2] = "${q:// QID11/QuestionText}";
251 AnswerPayment [9][2] = "${q:// QID12/QuestionText}";
252 AnswerPayment [10][2] = "${q:// QID13/QuestionText}";
253 AnswerPayment [11][2] = "${q:// QID14/QuestionText}";
254 AnswerPayment [12][2] = "${q:// QID15/QuestionText}";
255 AnswerPayment [13][2] = "${q:// QID16/QuestionText}";
256 AnswerPayment [14][2] = "${q:// QID17/QuestionText}";
257 AnswerPayment [15][2] = "${q:// QID18/QuestionText}";
258
259 // STORING Question Text for HYPOTHESIS 2
260 AnswerPayment [16][2] = "${q:// QID20/QuestionText}";
261 AnswerPayment [17][2] = "${q:// QID25/QuestionText}";
262 AnswerPayment [18][2] = "${q:// QID179/QuestionText}";
263 AnswerPayment [19][2] = "${q:// QID28/QuestionText}";
264 AnswerPayment [20][2] = "${q:// QID41/QuestionText}";
265
266 AnswerPayment [21][2] = "${q:// QID42/QuestionText}";
267 AnswerPayment [22][2] = "${q:// QID180/QuestionText}";
268 AnswerPayment [23][2] = "${q:// QID173/QuestionText}";
269 AnswerPayment [24][2] = "${q:// QID256/QuestionText}";
270
271 AnswerPayment [25][2] = "omitted";
272 AnswerPayment [26][2] = "omitted";
273
274 // ASSIGNING ANSWERED VALUES TO AnswerPayment ARRAY , FOR HYPOTHESIS 2 (9 Slots:
from 16 to 24)
275 AnswerPayment [16][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer1}";
276 AnswerPayment [17][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer2}";
277 AnswerPayment [18][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer3}";
278 AnswerPayment [19][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer4}";
279 AnswerPayment [20][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer5}";
280
281 AnswerPayment [21][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer6}";
282 AnswerPayment [22][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer7}";
283 AnswerPayment [23][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer8}";
284 AnswerPayment [24][0] = "${e:// Field/H2Answer9}";
285
286 AnswerPayment [25][0] = "omitted";
287 AnswerPayment [26][0] = "omitted";
288
289
290 // ASSIGNING PAYMENTS FOR HYPOTHESIS 2
291
292 // Question H2 1
293 if (String(AnswerPayment [16][0]) === "A") // Lottery 9
294 {
295 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 45;}
296 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 220;}
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297 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 300;}
298 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 450;}
299 else {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 900;}
300
301 AnswerPayment [16][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [16][3] , 0, 1000, 0, maxpayment);
302 }
303 else //if (String(AnswerPayment [24][0]) === "B";) // Lottery 10
304 {
305 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 50;}
306 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 150;}
307 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 300;}
308 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 450;}
309 else {AnswerPayment [16][3] = 1000;}
310
311 AnswerPayment [16][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [16][3] , 0, 1000, 0, maxpayment);
312 }
313 AnswerPayment [16][1] = maxpayment - AnswerPayment [16][4]; // maximum additional
payment minus random outcome
314
315 // document.write("You prefered lottery ", AnswerPayment [16][0] ," the random
outcome of lottery H2 10 is: -", AnswerPayment [16]
316
317 [3], " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [16][4] , " and your
additional payment is GBP", AnswerPayment [16][1]);
318 // document.write("<br >");
319
320
321 // Question H2 2
322 if (String(AnswerPayment [17][0]) === "A") // Lottery 10
323 {
324 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 50;}
325 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 170;}
326 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 300;}
327 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 400;}
328 else {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 1000;}
329
330 AnswerPayment [17][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [17][3] , 0, 1000, 0, maxpayment);
331 }
332 else //if (String(AnswerPayment [17][0]) === "B";) // Lottery 11
333 {
334 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 45;}
335 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 250;}
336 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 350;}
337 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 450;}
338 else {AnswerPayment [17][3] = 800;}
339
340 AnswerPayment [17][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [17][3] , 0, 1000, 0, maxpayment);
341 }
342 AnswerPayment [17][1] = maxpayment - AnswerPayment [17][4];
343
344 // document.write("You prefered lottery ", AnswerPayment [17][0] ," the random
outcome of lottery H2 10 is: -", AnswerPayment [17]
345
346 [3], " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [17][4] , " and your
additional payment is GBP", AnswerPayment [17][1]);
347 // document.write("<br >");
348
181
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
349
350 // Question H2 3
351 if (String(AnswerPayment [18][0]) === "A") // Lottery 8
352 {
353 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 0;}
354 else if (num > 0.15 && num <=0.45) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 200;}
355 else if (num > 0.45 && num <=0.75) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 300;}
356 else if (num > 0.75 && num <=0.95) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 450;}
357 else {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 700;}
358
359 AnswerPayment [18][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [18][3] , 0, 700, 0, maxpayment);
360 }
361 else //if (String(AnswerPayment [18][0]) === "B";) // Lottery 6
362 {
363 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 0;}
364 else if (num > 0.15 && num <=0.45) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 166.66;}
365 else if (num > 0.45 && num <=0.75) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 300;}
366 else if (num > 0.75 && num <=0.95) {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 450;}
367 else {AnswerPayment [18][3] = 900;}
368
369 AnswerPayment [18][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [18][3] , 0, 900, 0, maxpayment);
370 }
371 AnswerPayment [18][1] = maxpayment - AnswerPayment [18][4];
372
373 // document.write("You prefered lottery ", AnswerPayment [18][0] ," the random
outcome of lottery H2 10 is: -", AnswerPayment [18]
374
375 [3], " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [18][4] , " and your
additional payment is GBP", AnswerPayment [18][1]);
376 // document.write("<br >");
377
378
379 // Question H2 4
380 if (String(AnswerPayment [19][0]) === "A") // Lottery 6
381 {
382 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 0;}
383 else if (num > 0.15 && num <=0.45) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 166.66;}
384 else if (num > 0.45 && num <=0.75) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 300;}
385 else if (num > 0.75 && num <=0.95) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 450;}
386 else {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 900;}
387
388 AnswerPayment [19][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [19][3] , 0, 900, 0, maxpayment);
389 }
390 else //if (String(AnswerPayment [19][0]) === "B";) // Lottery 7
391 {
392 if (num <= 0.15) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 0;}
393 else if (num > 0.15 && num <=0.45) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 183.33;}
394 else if (num > 0.45 && num <=0.75) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 300;}
395 else if (num > 0.75 && num <=0.95) {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 450;}
396 else {AnswerPayment [19][3] = 800;}
397
398 AnswerPayment [19][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [19][3] , 0, 800, 0, maxpayment);
399 }
400 AnswerPayment [19][1] = maxpayment - AnswerPayment [19][4];
401
402 // document.write("You prefered lottery ", AnswerPayment [19][0] ," the random
outcome of lottery H2 10 is: -", AnswerPayment [19]
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403
404 [3], " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [19][4] , " and your
additional payment is GBP", AnswerPayment [19][1]);
405 // document.write("<br >");
406
407
408 // Question H2 5
409 if (String(AnswerPayment [20][0]) === "A") // Lottery 4
410 {
411 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 50;}
412 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 150;}
413 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 300;}
414 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 450;}
415 else {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 1000;}
416
417 AnswerPayment [20][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [20][3] , 0, 1000, 0, maxpayment);
418 }
419 else //if (String(AnswerPayment [20][0]) === "B";) Lottery 10_old
420 {
421 if (num <= 0.85) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 46;}
422 else if (num > 0.85 && num <=0.93) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 180;}
423 else if (num > 0.93 && num <=0.965) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 350;}
424 else if (num > 0.965 && num <=0.99) {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 480;}
425 else {AnswerPayment [20][3] = 900;}
426
427 AnswerPayment [20][4] = LinearMap(AnswerPayment [20][3] , 0, 800, 0, maxpayment);
428 }
429 AnswerPayment [20][1] = maxpayment - AnswerPayment [20][4];
430
431 // document.write("You prefered lottery ", AnswerPayment [20][0] ," the random
outcome of lottery H2 10 is: -", AnswerPayment [20]
432
433 [3], " and the linear mapping is GBP", AnswerPayment [20][4] , " and your
additional payment is GBP", AnswerPayment [20][1]);
434 // document.write("<br >");
435
436
437
438 var TotalDuration = "${e:// Field/Q_TotalDuration}"; //is an integer indicating
seconds
439 var TotalDuration_min = Math.round(( TotalDuration /60) *10) /10;
440
441 var RandomNumber = 16 + Math.floor((Math.random ()*5)); //old approach: n=23 is
for the first 23 questions , but now I choose
442
443 between H2 1 and H2 5
444
445 var FinalPayment = maxpayment - Math.abs(Number(AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][4]))
;
446
447 if (FinalPayment >=0 && FinalPayment <= maxpayment)
448 {
449 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’YourPayment ’,Math.round(FinalPayment
*100) /100);
450 }
451 else //if (Payment <0)
452 {
183
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
453 var zero = 0;
454 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’YourPayment ’,zero);
455 }
456 var FeeAndAdditionalPayment = participationfee + FinalPayment;
457 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’YourFeeAndAdditionalPayment ’,
FeeAndAdditionalPayment);
458
459 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’ChosenQuestion ’,RandomNumber +1);
460 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’MaximumPayment ’,maxpayment);
461 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’YourParticipationFee ’,participationfee);
462 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’YourTotalDuration ’,TotalDuration_min);
463
464 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’ChosenQuestionAnswer ’,AnswerPayment[
RandomNumber ][0]);
465 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’ChosenQuestionLosses ’,AnswerPayment[
RandomNumber ][4]);
466 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’ChosenQuestionText ’,AnswerPayment[
RandomNumber ][2]);
467 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’ChosenQuestionOutcome ’,AnswerPayment[
RandomNumber ][3]);
468
469 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’enum’,num);
470 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’eambig0to10 ’,ambig0to10);
471 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’eambig0to30 ’,ambig0to30);
472 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’eambig35to65 ’,ambig35to65);
473 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’eambig75to100 ’,ambig75to100);
474 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’eambig20to80 ’,ambig20to80);
475
476 // document.write(" RandomNumber +1: ", RandomNumber +1);
477 // document.write("<br >");
478 // document.write("from randomness: ", num);
479 // document.write("<br >");
480 // document.write(" AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][0]: ", AnswerPayment[RandomNumber
][0]);
481 // document.write("<br >");
482 // document.write(" AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][1]: ", AnswerPayment[RandomNumber
][1]);
483 // document.write("<br >");
484 // document.write(" AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][2]: ", AnswerPayment[RandomNumber
][2]);
485 // document.write("<br >");
486 // document.write(" AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][2]: ", AnswerPayment[RandomNumber
][2]);
487 // document.write("<br >");
488 // document.write(" AnswerPayment[RandomNumber ][2]: ", AnswerPayment[RandomNumber
][2]);
489 // document.write("<br >");
490
491
492 this.hideNextButton ();
493 this.showNextButton.delay (3);
494 });
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A.1.8 Experiment Analysis
A.1.9 Data Cleaning
Data analysis was conducted using SPSS version 21 [1] and data cleaning consisted of
the following actions:
1. There were two datasets collected for the purposes of this experiment. The
first dataset was collected between 21/05 and 11/06/2014 and it was targeted
at alumni and MSc students at Royal Holloway. The majority of the partici-
pants are information security professionals. The second sample was collected
on 26/08/2014 and was targeted at the student database of the Laboratory for
Decision Making and Economic Research at Royal Holloway, University of Lon-
don. The majority of this sample consisted of individuals that are not related to
information security. Datasets were combined.
2. A filter was implemented by the use of the willingness to pay (WTP) questions
of Table A.1. Half questions of the table have a maximum monetary loss of 50
USD and the other half a maximum loss of 80 USD. Replies with values greater
than fifty and eighty dollars respectively, have been excluded from the analysis
of the corresponding lotteries. Only a few cases were excluded from the analysis
by using this filter, by being considered invalid; in all these cases, there were
consecutive willingness to pay choices to avoid lotteries that were larger than the
maximum potential loss.
3. All missing cases were excluded. These were caused either by subjects that
aborted the experiments half-way or subjects that happened to be online when
the experiment became inactive.
The final valid number of cases was N1 = 59 for professionals, N2 = 58 for students,
and N = 117 for the merged dataset.
An additional validity check was conducted on the significance of the variable mother
tongue, to see whether non-native English speakers had any issues with understanding
instructions or questions. No language effect was found in the data.
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A.1.10 Outliers
For testing whether there is a significant number of outliers in the sample, we used the
following method. The z-scores were computed for all WTP questions of variables H1i
and H2j. Then the cumulative percentage of cases that had a standard deviation that
was larger in absolute value than 1.96 was computed. If this percentage constituted
more than 0.05 of the total cases, then there would be more outliers in the distribution
of the given variable than we would expect in a normal distribution. It was however
important that this analysis was conducted separately for professionals and students,
so that we can exclude the possibility of having the sample type act as a moderator; for
this reason the merged dataset was split into two. We should state that no outliers were
excluded by this methodology, the purpose of which was to examine their distribution.
The analysis revealed six out of the fifteen variables (H11, H12, H13, H14, H17 and
H28) with outlier percentages more than the expected. However, at closer examination
we observed that this deviation was caused by one or two large values in the whole
sample. Moreover, the aforementioned variables either had only one or no extreme
values (|z| > 3.29) and the majority of potential outliers was in the range of |z| ∈
(1.96, 2.58) or |z| ∈ (2.58, 3.29). Therefore, the existence and distribution of outliers
can be considered roughly within the expected ranges of a normal distribution. This
means that existence of outliers was at the edge of being considered significant, and the
following statistical tests on the data could be conducted without considering additional
“without-outlier” analyses.
It is also worth noting that the deviation from normality by outlier values was mainly
observed in the lotteries with low expected value where higher WTP values could occur
more easily.
Table A.2 contains the percentages of the values that are potential outliers for all
outcome variables, split into students and professionals. Cumulative percent denotes
the exact portion of data cases that have z-scores, such that |z| > 1.96. Valid percent
is the portion of cases in the range 1.96 < |z| < 2.58. So, a difference between valid and
cumulative percentage implies the existence of more extreme outliers, i.e. with z-scores
|z| > 2.58.
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Table A.2: Potential Outliers (|z| > 1.96) for the z-scores of all outcome variables
Students Professionals
Variable Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
H11 1.7 6.9 3.4 6.8
H12 8.6 10.3 3.4 5.1
H13 1.7 5.2 5.6 7.4
H14 5.2 6.9 1.7 3.4
H15 3.4 6.9 1.7 6.8
H16 1.7 5.2 3.7 3.7
H17 3.4 5.2 1.7 3.4
H18 1.7 5.2 1.7 3.4
H19 5.2 5.2 5.1 6.8
H110 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.1
H111 1.7 3.4 5.1 6.8
H112 1.7 3.4 1.7 3.4
H26 1.7 3.4 3.4 6.8
H27 3.4 6.9 3.4 5.1
H28 1.7 6.9 3.4 5.1
A.1.11 Controlling for Order Effects
Before measuring the actual attitudes on risky and ambiguous lotteries, we examined
data for potential order effects. In order to control for potential order effects in the
series of H1i instrument variables, two conditions were created in the experiment, one
presenting the risky lotteries first and then progressing to the ambiguous lotteries and
another condition with the opposite order.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of these two conditions. The first group was
named Risk-to-Ambiguity group, was marked with a dummy variable RISK FIRST =
1, and presented questions H11, H15, H19, H13, H17, H111 first. The second group,
the Ambiguity-to-Risk one, consisted of lottery-questions H14, H18, H112, H12, H16,
H110, followed by the lotteries of the first group. Since there are two conditions with
different subjects, analysis on these two groups was conducted by the non-parametric
Mann-Whitney test, and the sample was split into professionals and students, using
a filter variable that asks participants whether they are related to the information
security profession.
Both professionals and students samples were found free of any order effect between
risk and ambiguity, as there was no statistically significant difference between the two
condition groups (Table A.3).
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Table A.3: Mann-Whitney U Test for Order Effects
Students Professionals
N=58 N=59
H11 Test Statistic 377 294
Sig. (2-tailed) .499 .219
H12 Test Statistic 336 259
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 .064
H13 Test Statistic 432.5 369
Sig. (2-tailed) .845 .313
H14 Test Statistic 423.5 341
Sig. (2-tailed) .956 .150
H15 Test Statistic 398 383.5
Sig. (2-tailed) .731 .430
H16 Test Statistic 387.5 342
Sig. (2-tailed) .611 .156
H17 Test Statistic 506 405.5
Sig. (2-tailed) .177 .653
H18 Test Statistic 439.5 375.5
Sig. (2-tailed) .761 .364
H19 Test Statistic 481 381.5
Sig. (2-tailed) .336 .406
H110 Test Statistic 468.5 466
Sig. (2-tailed) .448 .637
H111 Test Statistic 452.5 379.5
Sig. (2-tailed) .611 .398
H112 Test Statistic 497 401
Sig. (2-tailed) .230 .605
Is distribution of H1i the same across categories of
“Risky questions presented before Ambiguity questions”?
Null hypothesis is retained for all variables, for both samples.
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LotteryA = 880, -166.66, -300, -450, -900<<
LotteryB = 880, -183.33, -300, -450, -800<<
P = 880.15, 0.30, 0.30, 0.20, 0.05<<
Θ = 0.1
Σ@x_, y_D := HAbs@x - yDL  HAbs@xD + Abs@yD + ΘL
H* calculate a table with all Σ's  N@D is for decimal numbers *L
s = Table@ N@Σ@ LotteryA@@1, iDD, LotteryB@@1, jDD DD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
H* calculate a table with all plain outcome differences *L
DΥ = Table@LotteryA@@1, iDD - LotteryB@@1, jDD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
Print@"********** This is the list of
all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities: "D
s2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@s, 81, 25<DD
DΥ2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@DΥ, 81, 25<DD
Pm = Flatten@List@P, 88P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD<<DD
Print@"The most salient pair is : Σ = ", Max@sDD
Print@"********** This is the ordering of the
salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:"D
s2ordered = Ordering@s2D
k = Range@25, 1, -1D
H* with various ∆s ---
can find ∆ which is switching point of preference between Lottery A and B *L
Print@"Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a
range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L "D
S2 = Table@Total@ Table@ Pm@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * DΥ2@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * d^k@@iDD,
8i, 25, 1, -1< D D , 8d, 0, 1, 0.01<D
ListPlot@S2, DataRange ® 80, 1<, Filling ® Axis, AspectRatio ® 1  1,
AxesOrigin ® 80, 0<, AxesLabel ® 8∆, "Sum H9L"<,
LabelStyle ® Directive@Black, LargeDD
880, -166.66, -300, -450, -900<<
880, -183.33, -300, -450, -800<<
880.15, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05<<
0.1
880., 0.999455, 0.999667, 0.999778, 0.999875<,
80.9994, 0.0476163, 0.285671, 0.459401, 0.655116<,
80.999667, 0.241338, 0., 0.199973, 0.454504<,
80.999778, 0.420994, 0.199973, 0., 0.279978<,
80.999889, 0.661483, 0.499958, 0.333309, 0.0588201<<
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A.1.12 Mathematica Code
The following calculations were used in Experiment 1 and were conducted with Math-
ematica version 9.0 [2].
A.1.12.1 Salience Calculations of L6 VS L7 with Graph
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880, 183.33, 300, 450, 800<,
8-166.66, 16.67, 133.34, 283.34, 633.34<, 8-300, -116.67, 0, 150, 500<,
8-450, -266.67, -150, 0, 350<, 8-900, -716.67, -600, -450, -100<<
********** This is the list of all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities:
80., 0.999455, 0.999667, 0.999778, 0.999875, 0.9994,
0.0476163, 0.285671, 0.459401, 0.655116, 0.999667, 0.241338,
0., 0.199973, 0.454504, 0.999778, 0.420994, 0.199973, 0.,
0.279978, 0.999889, 0.661483, 0.499958, 0.333309, 0.0588201<
80, 183.33, 300, 450, 800, -166.66, 16.67, 133.34, 283.34, 633.34, -300, -116.67,
0, 150, 500, -450, -266.67, -150, 0, 350, -900, -716.67, -600, -450, -100<
80.15, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3,
0.2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05<
The most salient pair is : Σ = 0.999889
********** This is the ordering of
the salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:
81, 13, 19, 7, 25, 14, 18, 12, 20, 8,
24, 17, 15, 9, 23, 10, 22, 6, 2, 3, 11, 4, 16, 5, 21<
825, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16,
15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1<
Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for
a range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., -0.446089, -0.884706, -1.31636, -1.74154, -2.16071, -2.57434, -2.98285,
-3.38666, -3.78619, -4.18181, -4.57389, -4.96281, -5.3489, -5.7325, -6.11392,
-6.49346, -6.87142, -7.24807, -7.62367, -7.99848, -8.37272, -8.74661,
-9.12035, -9.49413, -9.86812, -10.2425, -10.6173, -10.9928, -11.3689,
-11.7459, -12.1237, -12.5023, -12.8818, -13.2622, -13.6434, -14.0253,
-14.4078, -14.7909, -15.1744, -15.558, -15.9415, -16.3248, -16.7075,
-17.0892, -17.4697, -17.8484, -18.2251, -18.5991, -18.9699, -19.3371,
-19.6998, -20.0576, -20.4096, -20.755, -21.0931, -21.423, -21.7437, -22.0542,
-22.3535, -22.6404, -22.9138, -23.1724, -23.4148, -23.6397, -23.8455,
-24.0308, -24.1939, -24.3332, -24.4468, -24.5329, -24.5896, -24.6148,
-24.6067, -24.5629, -24.4814, -24.3599, -24.1962, -23.9881, -23.7333,
-23.4295, -23.0747, -22.6667, -22.2036, -21.6835, -21.1051, -20.4668,
-19.7679, -19.0078, -18.1863, -17.3041, -16.3622, -15.3626, -14.308,
-13.2021, -12.0496, -10.8562, -9.62881, -8.37554, -7.10564, -5.8295<
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LotteryA = 88-50, -170, -300, -400, -1000<<
LotteryB = 88-45, -250, -350, -450, -800<<
P = 880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
Θ = 0.1
Σ@x_, y_D := HAbs@x - yDL  HAbs@xD + Abs@yD + ΘL
H* calculate a table with all Σ's  N@D is for decimal numbers *L
s = Table@ N@Σ@ LotteryA@@1, iDD, LotteryB@@1, jDD DD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
H* calculate a table with all plain outcome differences *L
DΥ = Table@LotteryA@@1, iDD - LotteryB@@1, jDD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
Print@"********** This is the list of
all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities: "D
s2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@s, 81, 25<DD
DΥ2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@DΥ, 81, 25<DD
Pm = Flatten@List@P, 88P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD<<DD
Print@"The most salient pair is : Σ = ", Max@sDD
Print@"********** This is the ordering of the
salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:"D
s2ordered = Ordering@s2D
k = Range@25, 1, -1D
H* with various ∆s ---
can find ∆ which is switching point of preference between Lottery A and B *L
Print@"Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a
range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L "D
S2 = Table@Total@ Table@ Pm@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * DΥ2@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * d^k@@iDD,
8i, 25, 1, -1< D D , 8d, 0, 1, 0.01<D
ListPlot@S2, DataRange ® 80, 1<, Filling ® Axis, AspectRatio ® 1  1,
AxesLabel ® 8∆, "Sum H9L"<, LabelStyle ® Directive@Black, LargeDD
88-50, -170, -300, -400, -1000<<
88-45, -250, -350, -450, -800<<
880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
0.1
880.0525762, 0.666445, 0.749813, 0.79984, 0.882249<,
80.581125, 0.190431, 0.346087, 0.45154, 0.649418<,
80.738916, 0.0908926, 0.0769112, 0.199973, 0.454504<,
80.797574, 0.230734, 0.0666578, 0.0588166, 0.333306<,
80.913788, 0.599952, 0.481446, 0.379284, 0.111105<<
88-5, 200, 300, 400, 750<, 8-125, 80, 180, 280, 630<, 8-255, -50, 50, 150, 500<,
8-355, -150, -50, 50, 400<, 8-955, -750, -650, -550, -200<<
********** This is the list of all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities:
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A.1.12.2 Salience Calculations of L10 VS L11 with Graph
192
80.0525762, 0.666445, 0.749813, 0.79984, 0.882249, 0.581125,
0.190431, 0.346087, 0.45154, 0.649418, 0.738916, 0.0908926,
0.0769112, 0.199973, 0.454504, 0.797574, 0.230734, 0.0666578,
0.0588166, 0.333306, 0.913788, 0.599952, 0.481446, 0.379284, 0.111105<
8-5, 200, 300, 400, 750, -125, 80, 180, 280, 630, -255, -50, 50,
150, 500, -355, -150, -50, 50, 400, -955, -750, -650, -550, -200<
80.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.08, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.035, 0.035,
0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01<
The most salient pair is : Σ = 0.913788
********** This is the ordering of
the salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:
81, 19, 18, 13, 12, 25, 7, 14, 17, 20,
8, 24, 9, 15, 23, 6, 22, 10, 2, 11, 3, 16, 4, 5, 21<
825, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16,
15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1<
Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for
a range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., -0.0947401, -0.187921, -0.279487, -0.369382, -0.457552, -0.543947,
-0.628516, -0.711211, -0.791984, -0.87079, -0.947583, -1.02232, -1.09496,
-1.16545, -1.23377, -1.29986, -1.36369, -1.42521, -1.4844, -1.5412,
-1.59557, -1.64749, -1.6969, -1.74377, -1.78806, -1.82972, -1.86871,
-1.90498, -1.93848, -1.96918, -1.99701, -2.02193, -2.04388, -2.0628,
-2.07863, -2.09131, -2.10076, -2.10692, -2.10971, -2.10906, -2.10487,
-2.09706, -2.08553, -2.0702, -2.05095, -2.02767, -2.00026, -1.9686,
-1.93256, -1.89201, -1.84681, -1.79683, -1.74193, -1.68194, -1.61672,
-1.5461, -1.46991, -1.38799, -1.30015, -1.2062, -1.10596, -0.999228,
-0.885789, -0.765429, -0.637918, -0.503012, -0.360453, -0.209959,
-0.0512282, 0.116074, 0.292315, 0.477909, 0.673318, 0.879071, 1.09577,
1.3241, 1.56488, 1.81901, 2.08757, 2.3718, 2.67315, 2.99328, 3.33412,
3.69789, 4.08713, 4.50475, 4.95406, 5.4388, 5.96313, 6.5317, 7.14962,
7.82243, 8.55605, 9.35671, 10.2308, 11.1845, 12.224, 13.3542, 14.579, 15.9<
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Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a range
of ∆'s from 0 to 1 Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., -0.0947401, -0.187921, -0.279487, -0.369382, -0.457552, -0.543947,
-0.628516, -0.711211, -0.791984, -0.87079, -0.947583, -1.02232, -1.09496,
-1.16545, -1.23377, -1.29986, -1.36369, -1.42521, -1.4844, -1.5412,
-1.59557, -1.64749, -1.6969, -1.74377, -1.78806, -1.82972, -1.86871,
-1.90498, -1.93848, -1.96918, -1.99701, -2.02193, -2.04388, -2.0628,
-2.07863, -2.09131, -2.10076, -2.10692, -2.10971, -2.10906, -2.10487,
-2.09706, -2.08553, -2.0702, -2.05095, -2.02767, -2.00026, -1.9686,
-1.93256, -1.89201, -1.84681, -1.79683, -1.74193, -1.68194, -1.61672,
-1.5461, -1.46991, -1.38799, -1.30015, -1.2062, -1.10596, -0.999228,
-0.885789, -0.765429, -0.637918, -0.503012, -0.360453, -0.209959,
-0.0512282, 0.116074, 0.292315, 0.477909, 0.673318, 0.879071, 1.09577,
1.3241, 1.56488, 1.81901, 2.08757, 2.3718, 2.67315, 2.99328, 3.33412,
3.69789, 4.08713, 4.50475, 4.95406, 5.4388, 5.96313, 6.5317, 7.14962,
7.82243, 8.55605, 9.35671, 10.2308, 11.1845, 12.224, 13.3542, 14.579, 15.9<
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LotteryA = 880, -200, -300, -450, -700<<
LotteryB = 880, -166.66, -300, -450, -900<<
P = 880.15, 0.30, 0.30, 0.20, 0.05<<
Θ = 0.1
Σ@x_, y_D := HAbs@x - yDL  HAbs@xD + Abs@yD + ΘL
H* calculate a table with all Σ's  N@D is for decimal numbers *L
s = Table@ N@Σ@ LotteryA@@1, iDD, LotteryB@@1, jDD DD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
H* calculate a table with all plain outcome differences *L
DΥ = Table@LotteryA@@1, iDD - LotteryB@@1, jDD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
Print@"********** This is the list of
all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities: "D
s2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@s, 81, 25<DD
DΥ2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@DΥ, 81, 25<DD
Pm = Flatten@List@P, 88P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD<<DD
Print@"The most salient pair is : Σ = ", Max@sDD
Print@"********** This is the ordering of the
salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:"D
s2ordered = Ordering@s2D
k = Range@25, 1, -1D
H* with various ∆s ---
can find ∆ which is switching point of preference between Lottery A and B *L
Print@"Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a
range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L "D
S2 = Table@Total@ Table@ Pm@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * DΥ2@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * d^k@@iDD,
8i, 25, 1, -1< D D , 8d, 0, 1, 0.01<D
ListPlot@S2, DataRange ® 80, 1<, Filling ® Axis, AspectRatio ® 1  1,
AxesLabel ® 8∆, "Sum H9L"<, LabelStyle ® Directive@Black, LargeDD
880, -200, -300, -450, -700<<
880, -166.66, -300, -450, -900<<
880.15, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05<<
0.1
880., 0.9994, 0.999667, 0.999778, 0.999889<,
80.9995, 0.0909041, 0.19996, 0.384556, 0.636306<,
80.999667, 0.285671, 0., 0.199973, 0.499958<,
80.999778, 0.459401, 0.199973, 0., 0.333309<,
80.999857, 0.615326, 0.39996, 0.217372, 0.124992<<
880, 166.66, 300, 450, 900<,
8-200, -33.34, 100, 250, 700<, 8-300, -133.34, 0, 150, 600<,
8-450, -283.34, -150, 0, 450<, 8-700, -533.34, -400, -250, 200<<
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********** This is the list of all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities:
80., 0.9994, 0.999667, 0.999778, 0.999889, 0.9995, 0.0909041, 0.19996, 0.384556,
0.636306, 0.999667, 0.285671, 0., 0.199973, 0.499958, 0.999778, 0.459401,
0.199973, 0., 0.333309, 0.999857, 0.615326, 0.39996, 0.217372, 0.124992<
80, 166.66, 300, 450, 900, -200, -33.34, 100, 250, 700, -300, -133.34, 0,
150, 600, -450, -283.34, -150, 0, 450, -700, -533.34, -400, -250, 200<
80.15, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3, 0.2, 0.05, 0.3, 0.3, 0.3,
0.2, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05<
The most salient pair is : Σ = 0.999889
********** This is the ordering of
the salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:
81, 13, 19, 7, 25, 8, 14, 18, 24, 12,
20, 9, 23, 17, 15, 22, 10, 2, 6, 3, 11, 4, 16, 21, 5<
825, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16,
15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1<
Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for
a range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., 0.446411, 0.885294, 1.31614, 1.73846, 2.15179, 2.55566, 2.94965, 3.33333,
3.70631, 4.06818, 4.41859, 4.75715, 5.08353, 5.3974, 5.69841, 5.98628,
6.26068, 6.52135, 6.76799, 7.00034, 7.21814, 7.42115, 7.60913, 7.78185,
7.93911, 8.08069, 8.20641, 8.31608, 8.40954, 8.48662, 8.54719, 8.5911,
8.61824, 8.62852, 8.62183, 8.59812, 8.55732, 8.49941, 8.42436, 8.33219,
8.22293, 8.09663, 7.95337, 7.79326, 7.61645, 7.42309, 7.21341, 6.98764,
6.74606, 6.489, 6.21682, 5.92993, 5.62879, 5.31392, 4.98588, 4.64529,
4.29283, 3.92924, 3.55533, 3.17196, 2.78008, 2.38069, 1.97488, 1.56379,
1.14866, 0.730808, 0.311614, -0.107445, -0.52481, -0.93883, -1.34776,
-1.74976, -2.14288, -2.52503, -2.89402, -3.24748, -3.58288, -3.89747,
-4.18823, -4.45187, -4.68469, -4.88253, -5.04067, -5.15363, -5.2151,
-5.21759, -5.15229, -5.00866, -4.77406, -4.43326, -3.96785, -3.35552,
-2.56921, -1.57608, -0.336257, 1.19859, 3.08703, 5.39992, 8.22285, 11.659<
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LotteryA = 88-45, -220, -300, -450, -900<<
LotteryB = 88-50, -170, -300, -400, -1000<<
P = 880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
Θ = 0.1
Σ@x_, y_D := HAbs@x - yDL  HAbs@xD + Abs@yD + ΘL
H* calculate a table with all Σ's  N@D is for decimal numbers *L
s = Table@ N@Σ@ LotteryA@@1, iDD, LotteryB@@1, jDD DD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
H* calculate a table with all plain outcome differences *L
DΥ = Table@LotteryA@@1, iDD - LotteryB@@1, jDD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
Print@"********** This is the list of
all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities: "D
s2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@s, 81, 25<DD
DΥ2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@DΥ, 81, 25<DD
Pm = Flatten@List@P, 88P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD<<DD
Print@"The most salient pair is : Σ = ", Max@sDD
Print@"********** This is the ordering of the
salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:"D
s2ordered = Ordering@s2D
k = Range@25, 1, -1D
H* with various ∆s ---
can find ∆ which is switching point of preference between Lottery A and B *L
Print@"Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a
range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L "D
S2 = Table@Total@ Table@ Pm@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * DΥ2@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * d^k@@iDD,
8i, 25, 1, -1< D D , 8d, 0, 1, 0.01<D
ListPlot@S2, DataRange ® 80, 1<, Filling ® Axis, AspectRatio ® 1  1,
AxesLabel ® 8∆, "Sum H9L"<, LabelStyle ® Directive@Black, LargeDD
88-45, -220, -300, -450, -900<<
88-50, -170, -300, -400, -1000<<
880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
0.1
880.0525762, 0.581125, 0.738916, 0.797574, 0.913788<,
80.629397, 0.128172, 0.153817, 0.290276, 0.639292<,
80.714082, 0.276537, 0., 0.142837, 0.53842<,
80.79984, 0.45154, 0.199973, 0.0588166, 0.379284<,
80.894643, 0.682179, 0.499958, 0.384586, 0.0526288<<
885, 125, 255, 355, 955<, 8-170, -50, 80, 180, 780<, 8-250, -130, 0, 100, 700<,
8-400, -280, -150, -50, 550<, 8-850, -730, -600, -500, 100<<
********** This is the list of all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities:
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80.0525762, 0.581125, 0.738916, 0.797574, 0.913788, 0.629397, 0.128172, 0.153817,
0.290276, 0.639292, 0.714082, 0.276537, 0., 0.142837, 0.53842, 0.79984, 0.45154,
0.199973, 0.0588166, 0.379284, 0.894643, 0.682179, 0.499958, 0.384586, 0.0526288<
85, 125, 255, 355, 955, -170, -50, 80, 180, 780, -250, -130, 0,
100, 700, -400, -280, -150, -50, 550, -850, -730, -600, -500, 100<
80.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.08, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.035, 0.035,
0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01<
The most salient pair is : Σ = 0.913788
********** This is the ordering of
the salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:
813, 1, 25, 19, 7, 14, 8, 18, 12, 9, 20,
24, 17, 23, 15, 2, 6, 10, 22, 11, 3, 4, 16, 21, 5<
825, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16,
15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1<
Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for
a range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., 0.0946401, 0.187521, 0.278587, 0.367784, 0.455058, 0.540362, 0.623647,
0.70487, 0.78399, 0.860967, 0.935766, 1.00835, 1.0787, 1.14678, 1.21256,
1.27603, 1.33716, 1.39595, 1.45237, 1.50642, 1.55808, 1.60737, 1.65426,
1.69876, 1.74088, 1.78062, 1.81798, 1.85297, 1.88561, 1.91591, 1.94388,
1.96953, 1.99289, 2.01396, 2.03277, 2.04934, 2.06368, 2.07581, 2.08576,
2.09353, 2.09914, 2.10262, 2.10397, 2.1032, 2.10033, 2.09536, 2.08829,
2.07913, 2.06787, 2.0545, 2.03901, 2.02138, 2.00157, 1.97956, 1.95531,
1.92876, 1.89985, 1.86851, 1.83466, 1.7982, 1.75901, 1.71697, 1.67193,
1.62372, 1.57215, 1.51699, 1.45802, 1.39493, 1.32744, 1.25518, 1.17775,
1.09472, 1.00559, 0.909808, 0.80675, 0.695731, 0.575987, 0.446673,
0.306856, 0.155512, -0.00847786, -0.18633, -0.379357, -0.588962, -0.81663,
-1.06391, -1.33239, -1.62365, -1.93924, -2.28057, -2.64881, -3.04479,
-3.46883, -3.92047, -4.39823, -4.89924, -5.41877, -5.94964, -6.48152, -7.<
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LotteryA = 88-50, -150, -300, -450, -1000<<
LotteryB = 88-46, -180, -350, -480, -900<<
P = 880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
Θ = 0.1
Σ@x_, y_D := HAbs@x - yDL  HAbs@xD + Abs@yD + ΘL
H* calculate a table with all Σ's  N@D is for decimal numbers *L
s = Table@ N@Σ@ LotteryA@@1, iDD, LotteryB@@1, jDD DD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
H* calculate a table with all plain outcome differences *L
DΥ = Table@LotteryA@@1, iDD - LotteryB@@1, jDD, 8i, 1, 5<, 8j, 1, 5<D
Print@"********** This is the list of
all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities: "D
s2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@s, 81, 25<DD
DΥ2 = Flatten@ArrayReshape@DΥ, 81, 25<DD
Pm = Flatten@List@P, 88P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 2DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 3DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 4DD, P@@1, 5DD<<,
88P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD, P@@1, 5DD<<DD
Print@"The most salient pair is : Σ = ", Max@sDD
Print@"********** This is the ordering of the
salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:"D
s2ordered = Ordering@s2D
k = Range@25, 1, -1D
H* with various ∆s ---
can find ∆ which is switching point of preference between Lottery A and B *L
Print@"Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for a
range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L "D
S2 = Table@Total@ Table@ Pm@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * DΥ2@@s2ordered@@iDDDD * d^k@@iDD,
8i, 25, 1, -1< D D , 8d, 0, 1, 0.01<D
ListPlot@S2, DataRange ® 80, 1<, Filling ® Axis, AspectRatio ® 1  1,
AxesLabel ® 8∆, "Sum H9L"<, LabelStyle ® Directive@Black, LargeDD
88-50, -150, -300, -450, -1000<<
88-46, -180, -350, -480, -900<<
880.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01<<
0.1
880.0416233, 0.564972, 0.749813, 0.811168, 0.894643<,
80.530342, 0.0908816, 0.39992, 0.523726, 0.714218<,
80.733892, 0.249948, 0.0769112, 0.23074, 0.499958<,
80.814352, 0.428503, 0.124984, 0.0322546, 0.333309<,
80.911959, 0.694856, 0.481446, 0.351328, 0.0526288<<
88-4, 130, 300, 430, 850<, 8-104, 30, 200, 330, 750<, 8-254, -120, 50, 180, 600<,
8-404, -270, -100, 30, 450<, 8-954, -820, -650, -520, -100<<
********** This is the list of all H1L saliences, H2L DΥ s and H3L probabilities:
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80.0416233, 0.564972, 0.749813, 0.811168, 0.894643, 0.530342,
0.0908816, 0.39992, 0.523726, 0.714218, 0.733892, 0.249948,
0.0769112, 0.23074, 0.499958, 0.814352, 0.428503, 0.124984, 0.0322546,
0.333309, 0.911959, 0.694856, 0.481446, 0.351328, 0.0526288<
8-4, 130, 300, 430, 850, -104, 30, 200, 330, 750, -254, -120, 50,
180, 600, -404, -270, -100, 30, 450, -954, -820, -650, -520, -100<
80.85, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.08, 0.08, 0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.035, 0.035,
0.035, 0.025, 0.01, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.025, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01<
The most salient pair is : Σ = 0.911959
********** This is the ordering of
the salience elements of table s2 Hsmallest to largestL:
819, 1, 25, 13, 7, 18, 14, 12, 20, 24,
8, 17, 23, 15, 9, 6, 2, 22, 10, 11, 3, 4, 16, 5, 21<
825, 24, 23, 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17, 16,
15, 14, 13, 12, 11, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1<
Calculations for A=L10 and B=L11 for
a range of ∆'s Hpositive values imply that L10 > L11L
80., -0.09456, -0.187479, -0.278814, -0.368618, -0.456942, -0.543835, -0.62934,
-0.713499, -0.79635, -0.877928, -0.958265, -1.03739, -1.11532, -1.19208,
-1.26769, -1.34216, -1.41549, -1.4877, -1.55878, -1.62873, -1.69754,
-1.76521, -1.8317, -1.89702, -1.96112, -2.02398, -2.08558, -2.14586,
-2.20479, -2.26232, -2.3184, -2.37297, -2.42597, -2.47734, -2.52701,
-2.57489, -2.62091, -2.66499, -2.70703, -2.74693, -2.7846, -2.81993,
-2.85279, -2.88308, -2.91067, -2.93543, -2.9572, -2.97587, -2.99125,
-3.00321, -3.01156, -3.01614, -3.01675, -3.0132, -3.00529, -2.9928,
-2.97551, -2.95317, -2.92554, -2.89236, -2.85335, -2.80821, -2.75666,
-2.69835, -2.63295, -2.56011, -2.47945, -2.39057, -2.29305, -2.18645,
-2.07032, -1.94415, -1.80744, -1.65963, -1.50017, -1.32845, -1.14383,
-0.945663, -0.733245, -0.505853, -0.262732, -0.00309432, 0.27387,
0.568994, 0.883128, 1.21712, 1.57183, 1.94806, 2.3466, 2.76812, 3.2132,
3.6822, 4.17526, 4.69216, 5.23221, 5.79409, 6.37571, 6.97387, 7.58406, 8.2<
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A.1.13 SPSS Syntax Code
The following code includes data cleaning and analysis in SPSS version 21 [1].
1 ı¨z˙ USE All.
2 ***************************** DATA CLEANING ************************************.
3 RECODE S1 (2=0) (1=1).
4 RECODE YourTotalDuration (CONVERT) INTO DURATION.
5 ***** Survey *****
6 ** fixing coding of AGE **.
7 COMPUTE S18=S18 1 + 18.
8 ** recode Number of Dependents: 7 is 0 **.
9 RECODE S22 1 (7=0).
10 VARIABLE LABELS S22 1 'Family dep.'.
11 ** recodde Income to exclude 'prefer not to answer' from Scatterplots **.
12 RECODE S17 1 (12=SYSMIS) INTO S17.
13 ** change LABELS (for fit in Scatterplots) **.
14 VARIABLE LABELS S5 1 'Risk'.
15 VARIABLE LABELS S18 'Age'.
16 VARIABLE LABELS S21 'Marital Status'.
17 VARIABLE LABELS S19 'Gender'.
18 VARIABLE LABELS S20 1 'Education'.
19 VARIABLE LABELS S2 1 'Yrs of Exp'.
20 VARIABLE LABELS S3 1 'Current Job'.
21 VARIABLE LABELS S4 'Incident Exp'.
22 VARIABLE LABELS S8 1 'Sec−Ops @work'.
23 VARIABLE LABELS S9 1 'Sec−bus @work'.
24 VARIABLE LABELS S10 1 'Sec−bus general'.
25 VARIABLE LABELS S11 1 'Sacr Sec4Speed'.
26 VARIABLE LABELS S12 'Job Title'.
27 VARIABLE LABELS S13 'Indep. Decisions'.
28 VARIABLE LABELS S14 'More CIA'.
29 VARIABLE LABELS S15 'Who makes decisions'.
30 VARIABLE LABELS S17 1 'Income'.
31 ** create PROFESSIONAL var from STUDENT var for MODERATION in Regressions **.
32 RECODE STUDENT (0=1) (1=0) INTO PROFESSIONAL.
33
34 ***** HYPOTHESIS 3 (H3) ***** Fill in empty fields of H3 and create the variable=H3Group for the Non−
Parametric tests.
35 RECODE H3 (MISSING=2).
36 RECODE H3 (1=1) (2=2) INTO H3Group.
37 VARIABLE LABELS H3Group 'Was H3 presented?'.
38 VALUE LABELS H3Group
39 1 'H3'
40 2 'no H3'.
41
42 RECODE H5 1A 9 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
43 RECODE H5 1A 8 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
44 RECODE H5 1A 7 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
45 RECODE H5 1A 6 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
46 RECODE H5 1A 5 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
47 RECODE H5 1A 4 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
48 RECODE H5 1A 3 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
49 RECODE H5 1A 2 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
50 RECODE H5 1A 1 10 1 1 (MISSING=0).
51
52 RECODE H5 1B 10 9 1 1 (MISSING=0).
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53 RECODE H5 1B 10 8 1 1 (MISSING=0).
54 RECODE H5 1B 10 7 1 1 (MISSING=0).
55 RECODE H5 1B 10 6 1 1 (MISSING=0).
56 RECODE H5 1B 10 5 1 1 (MISSING=0).
57 RECODE H5 1B 10 4 1 1 (MISSING=0).
58 RECODE H5 1B 10 3 1 1 (MISSING=0).
59 RECODE H5 1B 10 2 1 1 (MISSING=0).
60 RECODE H5 1B 10 1 1 1 (MISSING=0).
61
62 ***** How to create a single FLAG−variable = RISK FIRST (0 or 1) from RiskToAmbiguity variable for the Non−
Parametric tests:.
63 RECODE RiskToAmbiguity (CONVERT) INTO RISK FIRST.
64 RECODE RISK FIRST (1=1) (MISSING=0).
65 VARIABLE LABELS RISK FIRST 'Was Risk presented first in H1?'.
66 VALUE LABELS RISK FIRST
67 1 'Risk to Ambiguity'
68 0 'Ambiguity to Risk'.
69 EXECUTE.
70 *Consolidate all H1 data (RISK FIRST or not) into one set of 12 vars.
71 DO IF (RISK FIRST = 1).
72 COMPUTE H1 1 = H1 1 1.
73 COMPUTE H1 2 = H1 2 1.
74 COMPUTE H1 3 = H1 3 1.
75 COMPUTE H1 4 = H1 4 1.
76 COMPUTE H1 5 = H1 5 1.
77 COMPUTE H1 6 = H1 6 1.
78 COMPUTE H1 7 = H1 7 1.
79 COMPUTE H1 8 = H1 8 1.
80 COMPUTE H1 9 = H1 9 1.
81 COMPUTE H1 10 = H1 10 1.
82 COMPUTE H1 11 = H1 11 1.
83 COMPUTE H1 12 = H1 12 1.
84 ELSE IF (RISK FIRST = 0).
85 COMPUTE H1 1 = H1 1ar 1.
86 COMPUTE H1 2 = H1 2ar 1.
87 COMPUTE H1 3 = H1 3ar 1.
88 COMPUTE H1 4 = H1 4ar 1.
89 COMPUTE H1 5 = H1 5ar 1.
90 COMPUTE H1 6 = H1 6ar 1.
91 COMPUTE H1 7 = H1 7ar 1.
92 COMPUTE H1 8 = H1 8ar 1.
93 COMPUTE H1 9 = H1 9ar 1.
94 COMPUTE H1 10 = H1 10ar 1.
95 COMPUTE H1 11 = H1 11ar 1.
96 COMPUTE H1 12 = H1 12ar 1.
97 END IF.
98 VARIABLE LEVEL H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 (SCALE).
99
100 ***** H1 i and H2 6,7,8: New variables with the distance from the Expected Values (Risk Aversion).
101 * First I define the Expected Values for the H1 i series.
102 COMPUTE EV H1 1to4 = 2.5.
103 COMPUTE EV H1 5to8 = 7.5.
104 COMPUTE EV H1 9to12 = 25.
105 * And the distances for the H2 series WTP questions (H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1).
106 COMPUTE EV H2 6 = 86.6.
107 COMPUTE EV H2 7 = 86.6.
108 COMPUTE EV H2 8 = 89.75.
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109 * Then I calculate the distance of each variable from the Expected Value (so that I can compare the distances).
110 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 1 = H1 1 − EV H1 1to4.
111 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 2 = H1 2 − EV H1 1to4.
112 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 3 = H1 3 − EV H1 1to4.
113 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 4 = H1 4 − EV H1 1to4.
114 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 5 = H1 5 − EV H1 5to8.
115 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 6 = H1 6 − EV H1 5to8.
116 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 7 = H1 7 − EV H1 5to8.
117 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 8 = H1 8 − EV H1 5to8.
118 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 9 = H1 9 − EV H1 9to12.
119 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 10 = H1 10 − EV H1 9to12.
120 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 11 = H1 11 − EV H1 9to12.
121 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 12 = H1 12 − EV H1 9to12.
122 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 6 = H2 6 1 − EV H2 6.
123 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 7 = H2 7 1 − EV H2 7.
124 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 8 = H2 8 1 − EV H2 8.
125 * Then I calculate the distance as a percentage of each Expected Value (so that I can compare the distances
across all risky lotteries, across all ambiguous etc.).
126 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 1ratio = RiskAversionH1 1/EV H1 1to4.
127 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 2ratio = RiskAversionH1 2/EV H1 1to4.
128 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 3ratio = RiskAversionH1 3/EV H1 1to4.
129 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 4ratio = RiskAversionH1 4/EV H1 1to4.
130 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 5ratio = RiskAversionH1 5/EV H1 5to8.
131 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 6ratio = RiskAversionH1 6/EV H1 5to8.
132 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 7ratio = RiskAversionH1 7/EV H1 5to8.
133 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 8ratio = RiskAversionH1 8/EV H1 5to8.
134 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 9ratio = RiskAversionH1 9/EV H1 9to12.
135 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 10ratio = RiskAversionH1 10/EV H1 9to12.
136 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 11ratio = RiskAversionH1 11/EV H1 9to12.
137 COMPUTE RiskAversionH1 12ratio = RiskAversionH1 12/EV H1 9to12.
138 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 6ratio = RiskAversionH2 6/EV H2 6.
139 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 7ratio = RiskAversionH2 7/EV H2 7.
140 COMPUTE RiskAversionH2 8ratio = RiskAversionH2 8/EV H2 8.
141
142 *** Finding the Switching Point for Hypothesis 4.
143 DO IF (H5 1 1 1=1).
144 DO IF (H5 1A 9 10 1 1=2).
145 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=9.
146 END IF.
147 DO IF (H5 1A 8 10 1 1=2).
148 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=8.
149 END IF.
150 DO IF (H5 1A 7 10 1 1=2).
151 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=7.
152 END IF.
153 DO IF (H5 1A 6 10 1 1=2).
154 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=6.
155 END IF.
156 DO IF (H5 1A 5 10 1 1=2).
157 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=5.
158 END IF.
159 DO IF (H5 1A 4 10 1 1=2).
160 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=4.
161 END IF.
162 DO IF (H5 1A 3 10 1 1=2).
163 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=3.
164 END IF.
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165 DO IF (H5 1A 2 10 1 1=2).
166 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=2.
167 END IF.
168 DO IF (H5 1A 1 10 1 1=2).
169 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=1.
170 ELSE IF (H5 1A 1 10 1 1=1).
171 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC=0.
172 END IF.
173 ELSE IF (H5 1 1 1=2).
174 DO IF (H5 1B 10 9 1 1=2).
175 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=9.
176 END IF.
177 DO IF (H5 1B 10 8 1 1=2).
178 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=8.
179 END IF.
180 DO IF (H5 1B 10 7 1 1=2).
181 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=7.
182 END IF.
183 DO IF (H5 1B 10 6 1 1=2).
184 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=6.
185 END IF.
186 DO IF (H5 1B 10 5 1 1=2).
187 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=5.
188 END IF.
189 DO IF (H5 1B 10 4 1 1=2).
190 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=4.
191 END IF.
192 DO IF (H5 1B 10 3 1 1=2).
193 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=3.
194 END IF.
195 DO IF (H5 1B 10 2 1 1=2).
196 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=2.
197 END IF.
198 DO IF (H5 1B 10 1 1 1=2).
199 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=1.
200 ELSE IF (H5 1B 10 1 1 1=1).
201 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS=0.
202 END IF.
203 END IF.
204
205 *Specifying the relative loss aversion only for the series H5 2x, for Hypothesis 4.
206 DO IF (H5 1 1 1=1).
207 DO IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 9 10 1 1=3).
208 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
209 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 8 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 8 10 1 1=3)).
210 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
211 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 7 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 7 10 1 1=3)).
212 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
213 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 6 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 6 10 1 1=3)).
214 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
215 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 5 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 5 10 1 1=3)).
216 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
217 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 4 10 1 1=3)).
218 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
219 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
220 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=6.
221 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
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222 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=7.
223 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
224 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=8.
225 ELSE IF (H5 2A 9 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
226 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=9.
227 END IF.
228
229 DO IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 8 10 1 1=3).
230 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
231 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 7 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 7 10 1 1=3)).
232 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
233 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 6 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 6 10 1 1=3)).
234 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
235 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 5 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 5 10 1 1=3)).
236 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
237 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 4 10 1 1=3)).
238 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
239 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
240 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
241 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
242 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=6.
243 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
244 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=7.
245 ELSE IF (H5 2A 8 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
246 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=8.
247 END IF.
248
249 DO IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 7 10 1 1=3).
250 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
251 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 6 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 6 10 1 1=3)).
252 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
253 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 5 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 5 10 1 1=3)).
254 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
255 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 4 10 1 1=3)).
256 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
257 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
258 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
259 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
260 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
261 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
262 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=6.
263 ELSE IF (H5 2A 7 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
264 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=7.
265 END IF.
266
267 DO IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 6 10 1 1=3).
268 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
269 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 5 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 5 10 1 1=3)).
270 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
271 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 4 10 1 1=3)).
272 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
273 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
274 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
275 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
276 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
277 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
278 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
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279 ELSE IF (H5 2A 6 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
280 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=6.
281 END IF.
282
283 DO IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 5 10 1 1=3).
284 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
285 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 4 10 1 1=3)).
286 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
287 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
288 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
289 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
290 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
291 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
292 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
293 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
294 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
295 END IF.
296
297 DO IF (H5 2A 4 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 4 10 1 1=3).
298 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
299 ELSE IF (H5 2A 4 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 3 10 1 1=3)).
300 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
301 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
302 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
303 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
304 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=4.
305 ELSE IF (H5 2A 5 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
306 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=5.
307 END IF.
308
309 DO IF (H5 2A 3 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 3 10 1 1=3).
310 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
311 ELSE IF (H5 2A 3 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 2 10 1 1=3)).
312 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
313 ELSE IF (H5 2A 3 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
314 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
315 ELSE IF (H5 2A 3 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
316 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=3.
317 END IF.
318
319 DO IF (H5 2A 2 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 2 10 1 1=3).
320 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
321 ELSE IF (H5 2A 2 10 1 1=1 AND (H5 3A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 3A 1 10 1 1=3)).
322 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
323 ELSE IF (H5 2A 2 10 1 1=1 AND H5 3A 1 10 1 1=1).
324 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=2.
325 END IF.
326
327 DO IF (H5 2A 1 10 1 1=2 OR H5 2A 1 10 1 1=3).
328 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=0.
329 ELSE IF (H5 2A 1 10 1 1=1).
330 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC=1.
331 END IF.
332
333 ELSE IF (H5 1 1 1=2).
334 DO IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 9 1 1=3).
335 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
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336 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 8 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 8 1 1=3)).
337 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
338 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 7 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 7 1 1=3)).
339 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
340 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 6 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 6 1 1=3)).
341 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
342 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 5 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 5 1 1=3)).
343 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
344 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 4 1 1=3)).
345 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=5.
346 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
347 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=6.
348 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
349 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=7.
350 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
351 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=8.
352 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 9 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
353 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=9.
354 END IF.
355
356 DO IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 8 1 1=3).
357 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
358 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 7 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 7 1 1=3)).
359 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
360 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 6 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 6 1 1=3)).
361 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
362 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 5 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 5 1 1=3)).
363 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
364 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 4 1 1=3)).
365 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
366 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
367 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=5.
368 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
369 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=6.
370 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
371 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=7.
372 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 8 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
373 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=8.
374 END IF.
375
376 DO IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 7 1 1=3).
377 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
378 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 6 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 6 1 1=3)).
379 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
380 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 5 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 5 1 1=3)).
381 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
382 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 4 1 1=3)).
383 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
384 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
385 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
386 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
387 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=5.
388 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
389 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=6.
390 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 7 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
391 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=7.
392 END IF.
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393
394 DO IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 6 1 1=3).
395 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
396 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 5 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 5 1 1=3)).
397 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
398 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 4 1 1=3)).
399 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
400 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
401 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
402 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
403 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
404 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
405 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=5.
406 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 6 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
407 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=6.
408 END IF.
409
410 DO IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 5 1 1=3).
411 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
412 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 4 1 1=3)).
413 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
414 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
415 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
416 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
417 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
418 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
419 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
420 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 5 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
421 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=5.
422 END IF.
423
424 DO IF (H5 2B 10 4 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 4 1 1=3).
425 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
426 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 4 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 3 1 1=3)).
427 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
428 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 4 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
429 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
430 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 4 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
431 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
432 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 4 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
433 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=4.
434 END IF.
435
436 DO IF (H5 2B 10 3 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 3 1 1=3).
437 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
438 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 3 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 2 1 1=3)).
439 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
440 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 3 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
441 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
442 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 3 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
443 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=3.
444 END IF.
445
446 DO IF (H5 2B 10 2 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 2 1 1=3).
447 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
448 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 2 1 1=1 AND (H5 3B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 3B 10 1 1 1=3)).
449 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
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450 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 2 1 1=1 AND H5 3B 10 1 1 1=1).
451 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=2.
452 END IF.
453
454 DO IF (H5 2B 10 1 1 1=2 OR H5 2B 10 1 1 1=3).
455 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=0.
456 ELSE IF (H5 2B 10 1 1 1=1).
457 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS=1.
458 END IF.
459
460 END IF.
461
462 ***** Use SWITCHPOINTs and LOSS AVs for NP tests by H3 Group *****.
463 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT SEC NUM = SWITCHPOINT SEC.
464 RECODE SWITCHPOINT SEC NUM (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
465 COMPUTE SWITCHPOINT OPS NUM = SWITCHPOINT OPS.
466 RECODE SWITCHPOINT OPS NUM (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
467
468 COMPUTE LOSS AV SEC NUM = LOSS AV SEC.
469 RECODE LOSS AV SEC NUM (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
470 COMPUTE LOSS AV OPS NUM = LOSS AV OPS.
471 RECODE LOSS AV OPS NUM ( SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
472
473 **** New variables for checking H2: if Lottery comparisons of H2 1 to 5 are consistent with WTP for H2 6 to 8.
474 **** coding: 0 means consistency, 1 means contradiction.
475 ** Examine L9 and L10.
476 DO IF (H2 1 = 1 AND H2 6 1 > H2 7 1).
477 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L9 = 1.
478 ELSE IF (H2 1 = 1 AND H2 6 1 <= H2 7 1).
479 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L9 = 0.
480 ELSE IF (H2 1 = 2 AND H2 6 1 < H2 7 1).
481 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L10vsL9 = 1.
482 ELSE IF (H2 1 = 2 AND H2 6 1 >= H2 7 1).
483 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L10vsL9 = 0.
484 END IF.
485 ** Examine L10 and L11.
486 DO IF (H2 2 = 1 AND H2 7 1 > H2 8 1).
487 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L10vsL11 = 1.
488 ELSE IF (H2 2 = 1 AND H2 7 1 <= H2 8 1).
489 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L10vsL11 = 0.
490 ELSE IF (H2 2 = 2 AND H2 7 1 < H2 8 1).
491 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L11 = 1.
492 ELSE IF (H2 2 = 2 AND H2 7 1 >= H2 8 1).
493 COMPUTE CONSISTENCY L11 = 0.
494 END IF.
495
496 **** also for cleaned data ****.
497 VARIABLE LEVEL S4 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 1 S17 1 S19 S20 1 S21 1 (NOMINAL).
498
499 DO IF (S25 8 TEXT = 'english' OR S25 8 TEXT = 'English' OR S25 8 TEXT = 'ENGLISH').
500 COMPUTE S25 = 1.
501 ELSE.
502 COMPUTE S25 = 0.
503 END IF.
504
505 RECODE S17 1 (1=1) (2=1) (3=2) (4=2) (5=3) (6=3) (7=4) (8=4) (9=5) (10=5) (11=5) (12=SYSMIS)
506 (SYSMIS=SYSMIS) INTO S17.
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507 VARIABLE LABELS S17 'Annual Salary'.
508 VARIABLE LABELS H2 6 1 'H2 6'.
509 VARIABLE LABELS H2 7 1 'H2 7'.
510 VARIABLE LABELS H2 8 1 'H2 8'.
511 EXECUTE.
512
513 RECODE S3 1 (1=0) (16=1) (2=2) (3=3) (4=4) (5=5) (6=6) (7=7) (8=8) (9=9) (10=10) (11=11)
(12=12) (13=13) (14=14) (15=15).
514
515 ***************************** FILTER (If DUMMY=0, include case) ******************************.
516 COMPUTE DUMMY=99.
517 DO IF H1 1>50 OR H1 2>50 OR H1 3>80 OR H1 4>80 OR H1 5>50 OR H1 6>50 OR H1 7>80 OR H1 8
>80 OR H1 9>50 OR H1 10>50 OR H1 11>80 OR H1 12>80 OR H2Answer1 = '' OR MISSING(H1 1
).
518 COMPUTE DUMMY = 0.
519 ELSE.
520 COMPUTE DUMMY = 1.
521 END IF.
522 VARIABLE LEVEL DUMMY (NOMINAL).
523 FILTER BY DUMMY.
524
525 ***************************** Various Checks **********************************.
526 ******* YourTotalDuration & S1 *********.
527 FREQUENCIES S1
528 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
529
530 ****************************** H1 and H2 WTP−lotteries **************************************.
531 COMPUTE TimeH1A 3RND = RND(TimeH1A 3).
532 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 1 BY TimeH1A 3RND
533 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
534 /COMPARE GROUPS
535 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
536 /CINTERVAL 95
537 /MISSING LISTWISE
538 /NOTOTAL.
539 COMPUTE TimeH1A 3arRND = RND(TimeH1Aar 3).
540 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1ar 1 BY TimeH1A 3arRND
541 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
542 /COMPARE GROUPS
543 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
544 /CINTERVAL 95
545 /MISSING LISTWISE
546 /NOTOTAL.
547
548 * Following Dr Mendosa, I do a Descriptive Statistics > Explore analysis with Steam&Leaf plot and Boxplots.
549 * There are initial conclusions on the Skewness and the Kurtosis (leptokurtosis or platukurtosis) of the
distribution.
550 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12
551 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
552 /COMPARE GROUPS
553 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
554 /CINTERVAL 95
555 /MISSING LISTWISE
556 /NOTOTAL.
557 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 in the same Graphic (option: Data are Separate Variables). .
558 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12
559 /COMPARE VARIABLE
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560 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
561 /STATISTICS=NONE
562 /NOTOTAL
563 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
564 *Computes the z−values for the specified values AND SAVES them in new variables (starting with zVAR).
565 DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12
566 /SAVE
567 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
568 *Descriptives for all variables of H1*.
569 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12
570 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
571 /COMPARE GROUPS
572 /MESTIMATORS HUBER(1.339) ANDREW(1.34) HAMPEL(1.7,3.4,8.5) TUKEY(4.685)
573 /PERCENTILES(5,10,25,50,75,90,95) HAVERAGE
574 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME
575 /CINTERVAL 95
576 /MISSING LISTWISE
577 /NOTOTAL.
578
579 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 in the same Graphic (option: Data are Separate Variables).
580 *Also used to define the limits for variable DUMMY.
581 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1
582 /COMPARE VARIABLE
583 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
584 /STATISTICS=NONE
585 /NOTOTAL
586 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
587
588 *********************************** Order Effect ******************************************* .
589 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 i in the same Graphic by RISK FIRST.
590 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 BY
RISK FIRST
591 /COMPARE VARIABLE
592 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
593 /STATISTICS=NONE
594 /NOTOTAL
595 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
596 *This is to compare the first 6 variables of RtoA and AtoR for Risk & Ambiguity Aversion − as there is no
Order Effect.
597 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 1 H1 5 1 H1 9 1 H1 3 1 H1 7 1 H1 11 1
598 /COMPARE VARIABLE
599 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
600 /STATISTICS=NONE
601 /NOTOTAL
602 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
603 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 4ar 1 H1 8ar 1 H1 12ar 1 H1 2ar 1 H1 6ar 1 H1 10ar 1
604 /COMPARE VARIABLE
605 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
606 /STATISTICS=NONE
607 /NOTOTAL
608 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
609 *This is just additional information*.
610 *H1 10 and H1 12 from AtoR and RtoA look identical (there was no NP−test difference)*.
611 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 12ar 1 H1 10ar 1 H1 12 1 H1 10 1
612 /COMPARE VARIABLE
613 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
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614 /STATISTICS=NONE
615 /NOTOTAL
616 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
617 *H1 9 and H1 11 from AtoR and RtoA look identical (there was no NP−test difference)*.
618 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 9ar 1 H1 11ar 1 H1 9 1 H1 11 1
619 /COMPARE VARIABLE
620 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
621 /STATISTICS=NONE
622 /NOTOTAL
623 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
624
625 *Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples: H1 answers with Independent Variable = RISK FIRST.
626 *Run the test with all cases.
627 NPTESTS
628 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12) GROUP (
RISK FIRST) MANN WHITNEY
629 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
630 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
631 *Additionally, I do an Outlier analysis to see if the outliers are the same subjects, and whether they should be
excluded from the Mann−Whitney.
632 *The analysis is on the significant results of Mann−Whitney by RISK FIRST.
633 *Result: subjects 6 and 21 are outliers in all 3 Variables. The Total Duration of the subjects is 24 and 30 mins,
so does not imply fast completion.
634 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 4
635 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
636 /COMPARE GROUPS
637 /MESTIMATORS HUBER(1.339) ANDREW(1.34) HAMPEL(1.7,3.4,8.5) TUKEY(4.685)
638 /PERCENTILES(5,10,25,50,75,90,95) HAVERAGE
639 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME
640 /CINTERVAL 95
641 /MISSING LISTWISE
642 /NOTOTAL.
643
644 ************** HYPOTHESIS 1 − RISK and AMBIGUITY AVERSION *********************.
645 ********************************* A) Between Subjects ***********************************.
646 ********************************************************************************************.
647 GRAPH
648 /LINE(SIMPLE)=VALUE(RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4).
649 GRAPH
650 /LINE(SIMPLE)=VALUE(RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8).
651 GRAPH
652 /LINE(SIMPLE)=VALUE(RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12).
653
654 *for all H1 i H2 j, deviations form mean, either 0 or lower by 25.
655 T−TEST
656 /TESTVAL=0
657 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
658 /VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4
659 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
660 T−TEST
661 /TESTVAL=0
662 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
663 /VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8
664 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
665 T−TEST
666 /TESTVAL=0
667 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
212
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
668 /VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12
669 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
670 T−TEST
671 /TESTVAL=0
672 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
673 /VARIABLES=RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8
674 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
675 * For checking outliers: .
676 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4
RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8 RiskAversionH1 9
RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12
677 /COMPARE VARIABLE
678 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
679 /STATISTICS=NONE
680 /NOTOTAL
681 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
682 * For deleting the outliers:. .
683 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12
684 /COMPARE VARIABLE
685 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
686 /STATISTICS=NONE
687 /NOTOTAL
688 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
689 EXAMINE VARIABLES= RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8
690 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
691 /STATISTICS=NONE
692 /NOTOTAL
693 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
694 * another way: Detecting OUTLIERS from z−scores: if cum. % of Std. Deviation > 1.96 is about 5%, then we
are fine! *.
695 * H1 1 *.
696 DESCRIPTIVES
697 VARIABLES=H1 1/SAVE.
698 COMPUTE zH1 1=abs(zH1 1).
699 RECODE zH1 1 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
700 VALUE LABELS zH1 1
701 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
702 FREQUENCIES
703 VARIABLES=zH1 1
704 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
705 * H1 2 *.
706 DESCRIPTIVES
707 VARIABLES=H1 2/SAVE.
708 COMPUTE zH1 2=abs(zH1 2).
709 RECODE zH1 2 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
710 VALUE LABELS zH1 2
711 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
712 FREQUENCIES
713 VARIABLES=zH1 2
714 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
715 * H1 3 *.
716 DESCRIPTIVES
717 VARIABLES=H1 3/SAVE.
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718 COMPUTE zH1 3=abs(zH1 3).
719 RECODE zH1 3 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
720 VALUE LABELS zH1 3
721 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
722 FREQUENCIES
723 VARIABLES=zH1 3
724 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
725 * H1 4 *.
726 DESCRIPTIVES
727 VARIABLES=H1 4/SAVE.
728 COMPUTE zH1 4=abs(zH1 4).
729 RECODE zH1 4 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
730 VALUE LABELS zH1 4
731 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
732 FREQUENCIES
733 VARIABLES=zH1 4
734 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
735 * H1 5 *.
736 DESCRIPTIVES
737 VARIABLES=H1 5/SAVE.
738 COMPUTE zH1 5=abs(zH1 5).
739 RECODE zH1 5 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
740 VALUE LABELS zH1 5
741 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
742 FREQUENCIES
743 VARIABLES=zH1 5
744 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
745 * H1 6 *.
746 DESCRIPTIVES
747 VARIABLES=H1 6/SAVE.
748 COMPUTE zH1 6=abs(zH1 6).
749 RECODE zH1 6 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
750 VALUE LABELS zH1 6
751 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
752 FREQUENCIES
753 VARIABLES=zH1 6
754 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
755 * H1 7 *.
756 DESCRIPTIVES
757 VARIABLES=H1 7/SAVE.
758 COMPUTE zH1 7=abs(zH1 7).
759 RECODE zH1 7 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
760 VALUE LABELS zH1 7
761 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
762 FREQUENCIES
763 VARIABLES=zH1 7
764 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
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765 * H1 8 *.
766 DESCRIPTIVES
767 VARIABLES=H1 8/SAVE.
768 COMPUTE zH1 8=abs(zH1 8).
769 RECODE zH1 8 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
770 VALUE LABELS zH1 8
771 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
772 FREQUENCIES
773 VARIABLES=zH1 8
774 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
775 * H1 9 *.
776 DESCRIPTIVES
777 VARIABLES=H1 9/SAVE.
778 COMPUTE zH1 8=abs(zH1 9).
779 RECODE zH1 9 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
780 VALUE LABELS zH1 9
781 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
782 FREQUENCIES
783 VARIABLES=zH1 9
784 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
785 * H1 10 *.
786 DESCRIPTIVES
787 VARIABLES=H1 10/SAVE.
788 COMPUTE zH1 10=abs(zH1 10).
789 RECODE zH1 10 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
790 VALUE LABELS zH1 10
791 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
792 FREQUENCIES
793 VARIABLES=zH1 10
794 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
795 * H1 11 *.
796 DESCRIPTIVES
797 VARIABLES=H1 11/SAVE.
798 COMPUTE zH1 11=abs(zH1 11).
799 RECODE zH1 11 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
800 VALUE LABELS zH1 11
801 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
802 FREQUENCIES
803 VARIABLES=zH1 11
804 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
805 * H1 12 *.
806 DESCRIPTIVES
807 VARIABLES=H1 12/SAVE.
808 COMPUTE zH1 12=abs(zH1 12).
809 RECODE zH1 12 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
810 VALUE LABELS zH1 12
811 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
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812 FREQUENCIES
813 VARIABLES=zH1 12
814 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
815 * H2 6 1 *.
816 DESCRIPTIVES
817 VARIABLES=H2 6 1/SAVE.
818 COMPUTE zH2 6 1=abs(zH2 6 1).
819 RECODE zH2 6 1 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
820 VALUE LABELS zH2 6 1
821 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
822 FREQUENCIES
823 VARIABLES=zH2 6 1
824 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
825 * H2 7 1 *.
826 DESCRIPTIVES
827 VARIABLES=H2 7 1/SAVE.
828 COMPUTE zH2 7 1=abs(zH2 7 1).
829 RECODE zH2 7 1 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
830 VALUE LABELS zH2 7 1
831 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
832 FREQUENCIES
833 VARIABLES=zH2 7 1
834 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
835 * H2 8 1 *.
836 DESCRIPTIVES
837 VARIABLES=H2 8 1/SAVE.
838 COMPUTE zH2 8 1=abs(zH2 8 1).
839 RECODE zH2 8 1 (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 =
4).
840 VALUE LABELS zH2 8 1
841 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (z>1.96)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (z>2.58)' 1 'Extreme Outliers (z>3.29)
'.
842 FREQUENCIES
843 VARIABLES=zH2 8 1
844 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
845
846 *********************************** B) Within Subjects **********************************.
847 ******************************************************************************************.
848 ***1st Categorisation by the same Expected Value.***
849 **Nonparametric Tests: Related Samples, many conditions.
850 **Group A.
851 NPTESTS
852 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4)
853 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
854 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
855 *FRIEDMAN.
856 NPAR TESTS
857 /FRIEDMAN=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4
858 /STATISTICS QUARTILES
859 /MISSING LISTWISE.
860 NPAR TESTS
861 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 2
862 RiskAversionH1 3 WITH RiskAversionH1 2 RiskAversionH1 3 RiskAversionH1 4 RiskAversionH1 3
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863 RiskAversionH1 4 RiskAversionH1 4 (PAIRED)
864 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
865 **Group B.
866 NPTESTS
867 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8)
868 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
869 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
870 NPAR TESTS
871 /FRIEDMAN=RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8
872 /MISSING LISTWISE.
873 NPAR TESTS
874 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 6
875 RiskAversionH1 7 WITH RiskAversionH1 6 RiskAversionH1 7 RiskAversionH1 8 RiskAversionH1 7
876 RiskAversionH1 8 RiskAversionH1 8 (PAIRED)
877 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
878 **Group C.
879 NPTESTS
880 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12)
881 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
882 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
883 NPAR TESTS
884 /FRIEDMAN=RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12
885 /MISSING LISTWISE.
886 NPAR TESTS
887 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 10
888 RiskAversionH1 11 WITH RiskAversionH1 10 RiskAversionH1 11 RiskAversionH1 12 RiskAversionH1 11
889 RiskAversionH1 12 RiskAversionH1 12 (PAIRED)
890 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
891 **Group D.
892 NPTESTS
893 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8)
894 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
895 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
896 NPAR TESTS
897 /FRIEDMAN=RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8
898 /MISSING LISTWISE.
899 NPAR TESTS
900 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 WITH RiskAversionH2 7
901 RiskAversionH2 8 RiskAversionH2 8 (PAIRED)
902 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
903
904 ***2nd Categorisation by the lottery nature: risky, ambig in probs, ambig in outcomes, ambig in probs and
outcomes***.
905 **Nonparametric Tests: Related Samples, many conditions.
906 **Group E.
907 *actual risk aversion values (only Group E).
908 NPTESTS
909 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 9)
910 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
911 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
912 NPAR TESTS
913 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 5 WITH
914 RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 9 RiskAversionH1 9 (PAIRED)
915 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
916 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 1 RiskAversionH1 5 RiskAversionH1 9
917 /COMPARE VARIABLE
918 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
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919 /STATISTICS=NONE
920 /NOTOTAL
921 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
922 *ratios (only Group E).
923 NPTESTS
924 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 1ratio RiskAversionH1 5ratio RiskAversionH1 9ratio)
925 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
926 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
927 NPAR TESTS
928 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 1ratio RiskAversionH1 1ratio RiskAversionH1 5ratio WITH
929 RiskAversionH1 5ratio RiskAversionH1 9ratio RiskAversionH1 9ratio (PAIRED)
930 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
931 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 1ratio RiskAversionH1 5ratio RiskAversionH1 9ratio
932 /COMPARE VARIABLE
933 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
934 /STATISTICS=NONE
935 /NOTOTAL
936 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
937 **Group F.
938 NPTESTS
939 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 2ratio RiskAversionH1 6ratio RiskAversionH1 10ratio)
940 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
941 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
942 NPAR TESTS
943 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 2ratio RiskAversionH1 2ratio RiskAversionH1 6ratio WITH
944 RiskAversionH1 6ratio RiskAversionH1 10ratio RiskAversionH1 10ratio (PAIRED)
945 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
946 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 2ratio RiskAversionH1 6ratio RiskAversionH1 10ratio
947 /COMPARE VARIABLE
948 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
949 /STATISTICS=NONE
950 /NOTOTAL
951 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
952 **Group G.
953 NPTESTS
954 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 3ratio RiskAversionH1 7ratio RiskAversionH1 11ratio)
955 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
956 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
957 NPAR TESTS
958 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 3ratio RiskAversionH1 3ratio RiskAversionH1 7ratio WITH
959 RiskAversionH1 7ratio RiskAversionH1 11ratio RiskAversionH1 11ratio (PAIRED)
960 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
961 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 3ratio RiskAversionH1 7ratio RiskAversionH1 11ratio
962 /COMPARE VARIABLE
963 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
964 /STATISTICS=NONE
965 /NOTOTAL
966 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
967 **Group H.
968 NPTESTS
969 /RELATED TEST(RiskAversionH1 4ratio RiskAversionH1 8ratio RiskAversionH1 12ratio)
970 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
971 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.8.
972 NPAR TESTS
973 /WILCOXON=RiskAversionH1 4ratio RiskAversionH1 4ratio RiskAversionH1 8ratio WITH
974 RiskAversionH1 8ratio RiskAversionH1 12ratio RiskAversionH1 12ratio (PAIRED)
975 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
218
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
976 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH1 4ratio RiskAversionH1 8ratio RiskAversionH1 12ratio
977 /COMPARE VARIABLE
978 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
979 /STATISTICS=NONE
980 /NOTOTAL
981 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
982
983 GRAPH
984 /BAR(SIMPLE)=MEAN(RiskAversionH1 1) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 2) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 3) MEAN(
RiskAversionH1 4) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 5) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 6) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 7)
MEAN(RiskAversionH1 8)
985 MEAN(RiskAversionH1 9) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 10) MEAN(RiskAversionH1 11) MEAN(
RiskAversionH1 12) MEAN(RiskAversionH2 6) MEAN(RiskAversionH2 7) MEAN(RiskAversionH2 8)
986 /MISSING=LISTWISE
987 /INTERVAL CI(95.0).
988 GRAPH
989 /BAR(SIMPLE)=MEAN(RiskAversionH2 6) MEAN(RiskAversionH2 7) MEAN(RiskAversionH2 8)
990 /MISSING=LISTWISE
991 /INTERVAL CI(95.0).
992 *bonferoni correction.
993
994 **************************** H2 ************************************************.
995 *********************************************************************************.
996 **** 1) Lottery comparisons ****.
997 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
998 /COMPARE VARIABLE
999 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1000 /STATISTICS=NONE
1001 /NOTOTAL
1002 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1003 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8
1004 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1005 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1006 /STATISTICS=NONE
1007 /NOTOTAL
1008 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1009 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH2 6ratio RiskAversionH2 7ratio RiskAversionH2 8ratio
1010 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1011 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1012 /STATISTICS=NONE
1013 /NOTOTAL
1014 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1015
1016 MEANS TABLES=RiskAversionH2 6 RiskAversionH2 7 RiskAversionH2 8
1017 /CELLS MEAN COUNT STDDEV.
1018
1019 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=H2 1 H2 2 H2 3 H2 4 H2 5
1020 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1021 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1022 /HISTOGRAM
1023 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1024 ** WTP for Lottery 9 and 10 BY Comparison Lottery9 OR 10 **.
1025 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H2 6 1 H2 7 1 BY H2 1
1026 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1027 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1028 /STATISTICS=NONE
1029 /NOTOTAL
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1030 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1031 ** WTP for Lottery 10 and 11 BY Comparison Lottery10 OR 11 **.
1032 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H2 7 1 H2 8 1 BY H2 2
1033 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1034 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1035 /STATISTICS=NONE
1036 /NOTOTAL
1037 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1038 *Risk Aversion for each of the 3 WTP questions: .
1039 GRAPH
1040 /LINE(SIMPLE)=VALUE(RiskAversionH2 6 1 RiskAversionH2 7 1 RiskAversionH2 8 1).
1041 EXAMINE VARIABLES=RiskAversionH2 6 1 RiskAversionH2 7 1 RiskAversionH2 8 1
1042 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1043 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1044 /STATISTICS=NONE
1045 /NOTOTAL
1046 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1047 *chi−2 for Lottery comparisons, amongst PROS and STUDENTS.
1048 CROSSTABS
1049 /TABLES=H2 1 H2 2 H2 3 H2 4 H2 5 BY S1
1050 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1051 /STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
1052 /CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED
1053 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1054
1055 **** 2) Preferred lotteries and stated WTP ****.
1056 FREQUENCIES CONSISTENCY L9 CONSISTENCY L10vsL9 CONSISTENCY L10vsL11
CONSISTENCY L11
1057 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1058 *chi−2 for INCONSISTENCY in Lottery Comparisons and WTP, amongst PROS and STUDENTS.
1059 CROSSTABS
1060 /TABLES=CONSISTENCY L9 CONSISTENCY L10vsL9 CONSISTENCY L10vsL11 CONSISTENCY L11 BY S1
1061 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1062 /STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
1063 /CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED
1064 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1065 * within−subjects for Lottery Comparison H2 1 to 5 by some ordinal (continuous) characteristic)*.
1066 NPTESTS
1067 /RELATED TEST(EV H2 6 EV H2 7 EV H2 8)
1068 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1069 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1070 NPAR TESTS
1071 /WILCOXON=EV H2 6 EV H2 6 EV H2 7 WITH
1072 EV H2 7 EV H2 8 EV H2 8 (PAIRED)
1073 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
1074 EXAMINE VARIABLES=EV H2 6 EV H2 7 EV H2 8
1075 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1076 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1077 /STATISTICS=NONE
1078 /NOTOTAL
1079 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1080
1081 ******************************** H3 *************************************************.
1082 ***** (1) Hypothesis 3 and Willingness−To−Pay ***********************************.
1083 *Boxplot of all H1 i and the three WTP Questions of H2, by H3Group − allows to compare the 2 Groups (H3
and no H3).
1084 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 BY H3Group
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1085 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1086 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1087 /STATISTICS=NONE
1088 /NOTOTAL
1089 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1090 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1 BY H3Group
1091 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1092 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1093 /STATISTICS=NONE
1094 /NOTOTAL
1095 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1096 *Boxplot of all H1i, by two axes: H3Group and RISK FIRST − allows to (visually) compare the 4 Groups.
1097 *Q: how to find significance? i.e. how to do Mann−whitney for 2 Ind Vars: H3Group AND RISK FIRST?.
1098 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 BY H3Group
1099 /COMPARE VARIABLE
1100 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
1101 /STATISTICS=NONE
1102 /NOTOTAL
1103 /PANEL ROWVAR=RISK FIRST ROWOP=CROSS
1104 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1105 *An additional Boxplot −only for case H1 1− (Descriptives>Explore) to see how H1 1 Outliers are FACTORed
by H3Group.
1106 *Comment: this is an initial Visual aid, before the Mann−Whitney is run, but it can be used for other vars.
1107 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1 BY H3Group
1108 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
1109 /COMPARE GROUPS
1110 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
1111 /CINTERVAL 95
1112 /MISSING LISTWISE
1113 /NOTOTAL.
1114 *Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples: H1 answers need to be consolidated first − ok! Now, they shold
not be Categorical.
1115 NPTESTS
1116 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1117 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1118 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1119
1120 ***** (2) Hypothesis 3 and Lottery Comparison **********************************.
1121 *Stem and Leaf & Bars for Lottery Comparisons: H2 1 to H2 5 by factor H3.
1122 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H2 1 H2 2 H2 3 H2 4 H2 5 BY H3Group
1123 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
1124 /COMPARE GROUPS
1125 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
1126 /CINTERVAL 95
1127 /MISSING LISTWISE
1128 /NOTOTAL.
1129 *Nonparametric Tests: H2 1 to H2 5, by H3Group.
1130 NPTESTS
1131 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H2 1 H2 2 H2 3 H2 4 H2 5) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1132 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1133 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1134
1135 ***** (3) Hypothesis 3 and Security VS Operability preferences ******************.
1136 *** (a) Simple preference between Security and Operability.
1137 NPTESTS
1138 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H5 1 1 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
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1139 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1140 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1141 *** (b) Switching point of utility.
1142 *GRAPH
1143 */HISTOGRAM=SWITCHPOINT SEC.
1144 *GRAPH
1145 */HISTOGRAM= SWITCHPOINT OPS.
1146 NPTESTS
1147 /INDEPENDENT TEST (SWITCHPOINT SEC NUM SWITCHPOINT OPS NUM) GROUP (H3Group)
MANN WHITNEY
1148 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1149 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1150 *** (c) Relative Loss Aversion between Security and Operability.
1151 NPTESTS
1152 /INDEPENDENT TEST (LOSS AV SEC NUM LOSS AV OPS NUM) GROUP (H3Group)
MANN WHITNEY
1153 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1154 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1155
1156 ***** (4) Hypothesis 3 and Survey Responses *****
1157 * H3 and Personal Risk Taking *.
1158 NPTESTS
1159 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S5 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1160 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1161 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1162 * H3 and Worry about security incident in working environment *.
1163 NPTESTS
1164 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S6 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1165 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1166 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1167 * H3 and Worry about unknown threats *.
1168 NPTESTS
1169 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S7 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1170 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1171 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1172 * H3 and Trade−off between Security and Operations today *.
1173 NPTESTS
1174 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S8 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1175 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1176 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1177 * H3 and Trade−off between Security and Operations in working envoronment *.
1178 NPTESTS
1179 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S9 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1180 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1181 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1182 * H3 and Worry Information Security clossness to business objectives *.
1183 NPTESTS
1184 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S10 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1185 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1186 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1187 * H3 and How willing they are to sacrifice Operations for Security *.
1188 NPTESTS
1189 /INDEPENDENT TEST (S11 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1190 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1191 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1192 *initial Mann−Whitney test with all valid values of IˆU˚1 1.
1193 NPTESTS
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1194 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1195 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1196 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95..
1197 * IˆU˚1 1 Skewness and Kurtosis Boxplot.
1198 EXAMINE VARIABLES=H1 1
1199 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
1200 /COMPARE GROUPS
1201 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
1202 /CINTERVAL 95
1203 /MISSING LISTWISE
1204 /NOTOTAL.
1205 *Mann−Whitney test IˆU˚1 1 EXCLUDING the OUTLIERS.
1206 NPTESTS
1207 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1) GROUP (H3Group) MANN WHITNEY
1208 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1209 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1210 **** *****.
1211 DATASET DISPLAY.
1212
1213 *************************** H4 ******************************************.
1214 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=H5 1 1 1 SWITCHPOINT SEC SWITCHPOINT OPS LOSS AV SEC
LOSS AV OPS
1215 /HISTOGRAM
1216 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1217 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=SWITCHPOINT SEC SWITCHPOINT OPS
1218 /FORMAT=DVALUE
1219 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1220
1221 ***************************** SURVEY **************************************.
1222 **** A) Descriptive Statistics **********************************************.
1223 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=S1 S2 1 S3 1 S4 S5 1 S6 1 S7 1 S8 1 S9 1 S10 1 S11 1 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 1
S17 1 S18 1 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S23 8 TEXT S24 8 TEXT S25 8 TEXT
1224 /HISTOGRAM
1225 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1226 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=S5 1
1227 /HISTOGRAM
1228 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1229 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=S18
1230 /HISTOGRAM
1231 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1232 GRAPH
1233 /PIE=COUNT BY S22 1.
1234 GRAPH
1235 /PIE=COUNT BY S25 8 TEXT.
1236 GRAPH
1237 /PIE=COUNT BY S4.
1238
1239 **** B) Spearman correlations *************************************************.
1240 ** Spearman: Quant with Quant variables **.
1241 NONPAR CORR
1242 /VARIABLES=S2 1 S3 1 S5 1 S6 1 S7 1 S8 1 S9 1 S10 1 S11 1 S18 1 S22 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5
H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1243 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
1244 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1245 * Risk taking correlations with WTP *.
1246 NONPAR CORR
1247 /VARIABLES=S5 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1
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H2 8 1
1248 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
1249 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1250 GRAPH
1251 /SCATTERPLOT(BIVAR)=H1 9 WITH S5 1
1252 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1253
1254 * Unidentified Threats correlations with WTP *.
1255 NONPAR CORR
1256 /VARIABLES=S7 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1
H2 8 1
1257 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
1258 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1259 GRAPH
1260 /SCATTERPLOT(BIVAR)=H1 9 WITH S7 1
1261 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1262
1263 * Years of Sec Experience correlations with WTP *.
1264 NONPAR CORR
1265 /VARIABLES=S2 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1
H2 8 1
1266 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
1267 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
1268 GRAPH
1269 /SCATTERPLOT(BIVAR)=H1 9 WITH S7 1
1270 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1271
1272 **** C) Mann−Whitney: Quant with binary Qual variables **.
1273 * Have experienced an incident? S4 * *I have included: Yes=1, No=2, n/a=3, so this test has to move to K−W*.
1274 *NPTESTS
1275 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S4) MANN WHITNEY
1276 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1277 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1278 * Independent decision−making S13 *.
1279 NPTESTS
1280 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S13) MANN WHITNEY
1281 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1282 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1283 * More CIA at work needed S14 *.
1284 NPTESTS
1285 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S14) MANN WHITNEY
1286 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1287 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1288 * Gender S19*.
1289 NPTESTS
1290 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S19) MANN WHITNEY
1291 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1292 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1293 * Mother tongue S25 *.
1294 NPTESTS
1295 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S25) MANN WHITNEY
1296 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
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1297 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1298 * Student or Professional S1 *.
1299 NPTESTS
1300 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S1) MANN WHITNEY
1301 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1302 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1303
1304 ** D) Kruskal−Wallis: Quant with many−categories Qual variables **.
1305 * Have experienced an incident? S4 *.
1306 NPTESTS
1307 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S4) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1308 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1309 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1310 * Job title (categories=5) S12 *.
1311 NPTESTS
1312 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S12) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1313 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1314 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1315 * Who makes decision in the company? (categories=5) S15 1 *.
1316 NPTESTS
1317 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S15) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1318 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1319 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1320 * Number of employees (categories=6) S16 1 *.
1321 NPTESTS
1322 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S16) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1323 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1324 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1325 * Annual salary (categories=5) S17 1 *.
1326 NPTESTS
1327 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S17) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1328 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1329 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1330 * Educational level (categories=4) S20 1*.
1331 NPTESTS
1332 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1
H2 7 1 H2 8 1) GROUP (S20 1)
1333 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1334 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1335 *new (Legacy).
1336 NPAR TESTS
1337 /K−W=H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 H2 7 H2 8 BY S20(1
4)
1338 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES QUARTILES
1339 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
1340 *new (Nonparametric Tests: Independent Samples). − Significant [no split data].
1341 NPTESTS
1342 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6
H2 7 H2 8)
1343 GROUP (S20) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1344 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
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1345 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1346 * Marital status (categories=7).
1347 NPTESTS
1348 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6
H2 7 H2 8) GROUP (S21) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1349 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1350 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1351 * SwitchingPoints & Loss Aversion BY Job Title status (categories=5) [None is Sig. if I do not use the missing
=99 coding and system missing=system missing].
1352 NPTESTS
1353 /INDEPENDENT TEST (SWITCHPOINT SEC NUM SWITCHPOINT OPS NUM LOSS AV SEC NUM
LOSS AV OPS NUM) GROUP (S12) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1354 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1355 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1356 * More CIA (1=Yes, 2=No, 3=n\2).
1357 NPTESTS
1358 /INDEPENDENT TEST (H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6
H2 7 H2 8) GROUP (S14) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
1359 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
1360 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
1361
1362 **** E) Chi−square (Pearson): Qual with Qual [the first Sig. is the one] ****.
1363 * Sec VS OPS BY Past Incident*.
1364 CROSSTABS
1365 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S4
1366 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1367 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1368 /CELLS=COUNT
1369 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1370 CROSSTABS
1371 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S4
1372 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1373 /STATISTICS=CHISQ PHI
1374 /CELLS=COUNT EXPECTED
1375 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1376 * Sec VS OPS BY Job Title [SIG.]*.
1377 CROSSTABS
1378 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S12
1379 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1380 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1381 /CELLS=COUNT
1382 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1383 * Sec VS OPS BY Educational Level *.
1384 CROSSTABS
1385 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S20 1
1386 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1387 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1388 /CELLS=COUNT
1389 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1390 * Sec VS OPS BY Annual Salary *.
1391 CROSSTABS
1392 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S17
1393 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1394 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1395 /CELLS=COUNT
1396 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1397 * Sec VS OPS BY Marital Status *.
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1398 CROSSTABS
1399 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S21 1
1400 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1401 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1402 /CELLS=COUNT
1403 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1404 * Sec VS OPS BY Independent decisions *.
1405 CROSSTABS
1406 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S13
1407 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1408 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1409 /CELLS=COUNT
1410 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1411 * Sec VS OPS BY More CIA *.
1412 CROSSTABS
1413 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S14
1414 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1415 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1416 /CELLS=COUNT
1417 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1418 * Sec VS OPS BY Language *.
1419 CROSSTABS
1420 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S25
1421 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1422 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1423 /CELLS=COUNT
1424 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1425 * Sec VS OPS BY Who makes decisions*.
1426 CROSSTABS
1427 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S15
1428 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1429 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1430 /CELLS=COUNT
1431 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1432 * Sec VS OPS BY # of employees *.
1433 CROSSTABS
1434 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S16 1
1435 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
1436 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
1437 /CELLS=COUNT
1438 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
1439
1440 **** F) Multiple Regressions ****.
1441 **** Multiple Regression Analysis ************************************************.
1442 * SCATTERPLOTS for linearitty requirement − first column: x=predictor & y=WTP*.
1443 * For the clearly exogenous vars, I use only AGE and (NUMBER OF) FAMILY DEPENDENTS *.
1444 * For GENERAL RISK *.
1445 * For Professional−related vars, I use YRS OF EXPERIENCE, YEARS IN CURRENT JOB, ... *.
1446
1447 * AGE against WTP *.
1448 GRAPH
1449 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S18 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1450 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1451 GRAPH
1452 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S18 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1453 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1454 * (NUMBER OF) FAMILY DEPENDENTS against WTP *.
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1455 GRAPH
1456 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S22 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1457 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1458 GRAPH
1459 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S22 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1460 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1461 * GENERAL RISK against WTP *.
1462 GRAPH
1463 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S5 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1464 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1465 GRAPH
1466 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S5 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1467 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1468 * YEARS OF EXPERIENCE against WTP *.
1469 GRAPH
1470 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S2 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1471 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1472 GRAPH
1473 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S2 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1474 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1475 * YEARS IN CURRENT JOB against WTP *.
1476 GRAPH
1477 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S3 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1478 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1479 GRAPH
1480 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S3 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1481 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1482 * SEC−OPS TODAY against WTP *.
1483 GRAPH
1484 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S8 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1485 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1486 GRAPH
1487 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S8 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1488 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1489 * SEC CLOSE TO BUSINESS OBJECTIVES AT WORK against WTP *.
1490 GRAPH
1491 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S9 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1492 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1493 GRAPH
1494 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S9 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1495 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1496 * SEC CLOSE TO BUSINESS OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL against WTP *.
1497 GRAPH
1498 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S10 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1499 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1500 GRAPH
1501 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S10 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1502 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1503 * WILLINGNESS TO SACRIFICE SEC FOR SPEED against WTP *.
1504 GRAPH
1505 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S11 1 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1506 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1507 GRAPH
1508 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S11 1 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1509 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1510 * INCOME against WTP *.
1511 GRAPH
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1512 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S17 H1 1 H1 2 H1 3 H1 4 H1 5 H1 6 H1 7 H1 8
1513 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1514 GRAPH
1515 /SCATTERPLOT(MATRIX)=S17 H1 9 H1 10 H1 11 H1 12 H2 6 1 H2 7 1 H2 8 1
1516 /MISSING=LISTWISE.
1517
1518 * BASIC REGRESSORS: clearly exogenous variables* (did not include Country & Nationality).
1519 * H1 1 *.
1520 REGRESSION
1521 /MISSING LISTWISE
1522 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
1523 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1524 /NOORIGIN
1525 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1526 /METHOD=BACKWARD S18 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25 PROFESSIONAL.
1527 REGRESSION
1528 /MISSING LISTWISE
1529 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
1530 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1531 /NOORIGIN
1532 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1533 /METHOD=ENTER Single Cohabiting Married Remarried Divorced Widowed Separated.
1534 REGRESSION
1535 /MISSING LISTWISE
1536 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
1537 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1538 /NOORIGIN
1539 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1540 /METHOD=ENTER Other SeniorExecutive ManagerialRole ITandSecurity ComplianceRisk.
1541
1542 REGRESSION
1543 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1544 /MISSING LISTWISE
1545 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1546 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1547 /NOORIGIN
1548 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1549 /METHOD=BACKWARD S18 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25 PROFESSIONAL
1550 /RESIDUALS DURBIN
1551 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3).
1552 * the same with Zres x2 & all partial plots .
1553 REGRESSION
1554 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1555 /MISSING LISTWISE
1556 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) BCOV R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1557 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1558 /NOORIGIN
1559 /DEPENDENT H1 7
1560 /METHOD=BACKWARD S18 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25
1561 /PARTIALPLOT ALL
1562 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
1563 /RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
1564 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3).
1565 * with SAVE DIAGNOSTICS *.
1566 REGRESSION
1567 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1568 /MISSING LISTWISE
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1569 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1570 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1571 /NOORIGIN
1572 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1573 /METHOD=ENTER S18 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25 S4
1574 /PARTIALPLOT ALL
1575 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
1576 /RESIDUALS DURBIN HISTOGRAM(ZRESID) NORMPROB(ZRESID)
1577 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3)
1578 /SAVE PRED ZPRED ADJPRED MAHAL COOK LEVER ZRESID DRESID SDRESID SDBETA SDFIT
COVRATIO.
1579 * with bootstrap*.
1580 BOOTSTRAP
1581 /SAMPLING METHOD=SIMPLE
1582 /VARIABLES TARGET=H1 1 INPUT= S19 S18 1 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25
1583 /CRITERIA CILEVEL=95 CITYPE=BCA NSAMPLES=1000
1584 /MISSING USERMISSING=EXCLUDE.
1585 REGRESSION
1586 /MISSING LISTWISE
1587 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
1588 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1589 /NOORIGIN
1590 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1591 /METHOD=ENTER S19 S18 1 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25.
1592 * The same with Marital Status (S21 1) transformed into different variables *.
1593 REGRESSION
1594 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1595 /MISSING LISTWISE
1596 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1597 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1598 /NOORIGIN
1599 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1600 /METHOD=BACKWARD S18 S19 S20 1 S22 1 S25 Cohabiting Married Remarried Separated Divorced
Widowed
1601 /SCATTERPLOT=(*ZRESID ,*ZPRED)
1602 /RESIDUALS DURBIN
1603 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3).
1604 * job title*.
1605 REGRESSION
1606 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1607 /MISSING LISTWISE
1608 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1609 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1610 /NOORIGIN
1611 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1612 /METHOD=BACKWARD S12
1613 /RESIDUALS DURBIN
1614 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3).
1615 * Basic regressors (+) RISK S5 1*.
1616 REGRESSION
1617 /DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR SIG N
1618 /MISSING LISTWISE
1619 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
1620 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1621 /NOORIGIN
1622 /DEPENDENT H1 8
1623 /METHOD=BACKWARD S18 S19 S20 1 S21 1 S22 1 S25 S1 S5 1
230
A.1 Appendix: Experiment 1
1624 /RESIDUALS DURBIN
1625 /CASEWISE PLOT(ZRESID) OUTLIERS(3).
1626 * MODERATION EFFECTS: use PROFESSIONAL var as a moderator*.
1627 REGRESSION
1628 /MISSING LISTWISE
1629 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS CI(95) R ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE
1630 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
1631 /NOORIGIN
1632 /DEPENDENT H1 1
1633 /METHOD=ENTER S19
1634 /METHOD=ENTER S18
1635 /SAVE PRED COOK LEVER SRESID SDRESID.
1636
1637 * Chart Builder − remember to remove SPLIT by S1 !.
1638 GGRAPH
1639 /GRAPHDATASET NAME=”graphdataset” VARIABLES=MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 1, 95) MEANCI(
RiskAversionH1 2,
1640 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 3, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 4, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 5, 95)
1641 MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 6, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 7, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 8, 95)
1642 MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 9, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 10, 95) MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 11, 95)
1643 MEANCI(RiskAversionH1 12, 95) S1 MISSING=LISTWISE REPORTMISSING=NO
1644 TRANSFORM=VARSTOCASES(SUMMARY=”#SUMMARY” INDEX=”#INDEX” LOW=”#LOW” HIGH=”#
HIGH”)
1645 /GRAPHSPEC SOURCE=INLINE.
1646 BEGIN GPL
1647 SOURCE: s=userSource(id(”graphdataset”))
1648 DATA: SUMMARY=col(source(s), name(”#SUMMARY”))
1649 DATA: INDEX=col(source(s), name(”#INDEX”), unit.category())
1650 DATA: S1=col(source(s), name(”S1”), unit.category())
1651 DATA: LOW=col(source(s), name(”#LOW”))
1652 DATA: HIGH=col(source(s), name(”#HIGH”))
1653 COORD: rect(dim(1,2), cluster(3,0))
1654 GUIDE: axis(dim(2), label(”Mean”))
1655 GUIDE: legend(aesthetic(aesthetic.color.interior), label(”Are you (or have you been) related ”,
1656 ”to the profession or practice of Information Security in any way?”))
1657 GUIDE: text.footnote(label(”Error Bars: 95% CI”))
1658 SCALE: cat(dim(3), include(”0”, ”1”, ”2”, ”3”, ”4”, ”5”, ”6”, ”7”, ”8”, ”9”, ”10”, ”11”))
1659 SCALE: linear(dim(2), include(0))
1660 SCALE: cat(aesthetic(aesthetic.color.interior), include(”1”, ”2”))
1661 SCALE: cat(dim(1), include(”1”, ”2”))
1662 ELEMENT: interval(position(S1*SUMMARY*INDEX), color.interior(S1), shape.interior(shape.square))
1663 ELEMENT: interval(position(region.spread.range(S1*(LOW+HIGH)*INDEX)), shape.interior(shape.ibeam))
1664 END GPL.
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A.1.14 Linear Models Regression Specifications
Experiment 1: Specifications
We conducted a number of regressions with bootstrapping on all survey variables,
by the following specifications. In the initial three regression models the dependent
variable is willingness to pay (WTP), i.e. the series H1i and variables H26, 7 and 8.
Specification 1: explores potential differences between the population of professionals
and the students sample. The predictors used in the model are the clearly exogenous
variables.
Dependent variable: all variables of Table A.1 (H1 Instrument) and variables H26, 7
and 8.
Predictors: age, gender, education, marital status, number of dependents in family,
country, nationality, language.
Sample: professionals and students.
Specification 2: is the same as Specification 1, having only the additional variable of
general risk (‘How willing are you to take risks in general?).
Specification 3: aims to explore potential differences amongst the population of
professionals. The predictors used in the model are related to information security.
Dependent variable: all variables of Table A.1 (H1 Instrument) along with variables
H26, 7 and 8.
Predictors: years of experience, years in current job position, experience of security
incident, security-operations tradeoff today, closeness of security to business objectives
today, closeness of security to business objectives in job environment, willingness
to sacrifice security for speed of operations, job title, need for more confidentiality,
integrity and availability measures in job environment, person who makes security
decisions at work, salary, power to make independent security decisions at work.
Sample: professionals.
Specification 4: is different from the first three specifications. In this case, we consid-
ered WTP as fixed preference and we explored the influence of the expressed ‘worry’ of
the subjects on WTP.
Dependent variable: worry about security incidents at work and worry about new
unidentified security threats.
Predictors: age, gender, education, marital status, number of dependents in family, lan-
guage.
Sample: professionals and students.
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A.1.15 Definitions
Experiment 1: Definitions
Hxy: A lottery with index y, that is mainly related to hypothesis x.
H11 to H112: Two-outcome lotteries with negative or zero outcomes; partic-
ipants stated their willingness to pay to avoid these lotteries.
H21 to H25: Variables that describe comparisons of pairs of Li lotteries.
H26 to H28: Five-outcome lotteries with large losses; participants stated
their willingness to pay to avoid these lotteries.
Li: Various five-outcome lotteries used in lottery comparisons.
Group A: Lotteries H11 to H14 with expected value µ = −2.5.
Group B : Lotteries H15 to H18 with expected value µ = −7.5.
Group C : Lotteries H19 to H112 with expected value µ = −25.
Scenario1: Experiment question in which participants chose between en-
hancement of either security or operability.
Scenario2: Experiment mechanism in which participants chose between:
A) remaining in the current system state, B) enhancement and
reduction of security and operability (based on previous an-
swers) and C) indifference between A and B.
SWITCHPOINT SEC: Variable that denotes a switching point of en-
hancing security by x% and operability by 10%,
after which, operability enhancement became
more attractive to the subject.
SWITCHPOINT OPS: Variable that denotes a switching point of en-
hancing operability by x% and security by 10%,
after which, security enhancement became more
attractive to the subject.
LOSS AV SEC: Variable that measures the difference between
SWITCHPOINT SEC and elicited preferences
of Scenario 2.
LOSS AV OPS: Variable that measures the difference between
SWITCHPOINT OPS and elicited preferences
of Scenario 2.
RiskAversionHx y : Variable that measures the difference between
participants’ WTP and the expected value of
lottery Hxy.
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A.2 Appendix: Experiment 2
A.2.1 Experiment Design
A.2.1.1 All Experiment and Survey Lotteries
Group A
GroupA L1 Lottery1: There is a 5% probability of losing $10 and a 95% probability of
losing $0. Your current amount is $30.
GroupA L1A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 5% to 2.5%?
GroupA L1B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupA L1C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid playing the lottery completely?
GroupA L2 Lottery2: There is a 15% probability of losing $10 and an 85% probability
of losing $0. Your current amount is $30.
GroupA L2A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 15% to 7.5%?
GroupA L2B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupA L2C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid playing the lottery completely?
GroupA L3 Lottery3: There is a 50% probability of losing $10 and a 50% probability
of losing $0. Your current amount is $30.
GroupA L3A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 50% to 25%?
GroupA L3B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupA L3C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid playing the lottery completely?
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GroupB
GroupB L1 Lottery1: There is a 95% probability of gaining $10 and a 5% probability
of gaining $0. Your current amount is $0.
GroupB L1A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase probability of gaining from 95% to 97.5%?
GroupB L1B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase the potential outcome of gaining nothing to gaining $5?
GroupB L1C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid the lottery risk and gain $10 for sure?
GroupB L2 Lottery2: There is an 85% probability of gaining $10 and a 15% probability
of gaining $0. Your current amount is $0.
GroupB L2A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase probability of gaining from 85% to 92.5%?
GroupB L2B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase the potential outcome of gaining nothing to gaining $5?
GroupB L2C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid the lottery risk and gain $10 for sure?
GroupB L3 Lottery3: There is a 50% probability of gaining $10 and a 50% probability
of gaining $0. Your current amount is $0.
GroupB L3A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase probability of gaining from 50% to 75%?
GroupB L3B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to increase the potential outcome of gaining nothing to gaining $5?
GroupB L3C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to avoid the lottery risk and gain $10 for sure?
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Group C
GroupC L1 You are given $10 to play Lottery1: There is a 5% probability of losing $10
and a 95% probability of losing $0.
GroupC L1A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 5% to 2.5%?
GroupC L1B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupC L1C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to completely avoid the risk of losing $10?
GroupC L2 You are given $10 to play Lottery2: There is a 15% probability of losing
$10 and an 85% probability of losing $0.
GroupC L2A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 15% to 7.5%?
GroupC L2B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupC L2C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to completely avoid the risk of losing $10?
GroupC L3 You are given $10 to play Lottery3: There is a 50% probability of losing
$10 and a 50% probability of losing $0.
GroupC L3A Situation 1: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce probability of loss from 50% to 25%?
GroupC L3B Situation 2: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to reduce potential loss from $10 to $5?
GroupC L3C Situation 3: What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in
order to completely avoid the risk of losing $10?
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Payment Lottery:
All lotteries beneath have non-negative potential outcomes. Which of the following
lotteries do you prefer to play?
A) There is a 50% probability of gaining 0$ and a 50% probability of gaining $10.
B) There is a 50% probability of gaining 2$ and a 50% probability of gaining $8.
C) There is a 50% probability of gaining 4$ and a 50% probability of gaining $6.
Common-for-all-participants Lotteries:
L1 There is a 5% probability of losing $50 and a 95% probability of losing $0.
L1A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 5% to 2.5%?
L1B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential loss from $50 to $25?
L1C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid playing
the lottery completely?
L2 There is a 15% probability of losing $50 and an 85% probability of losing $0.
L2A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 15% to7.5%?
L2B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential loss from $50 to $25?
L2C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid playing
the lottery completely?
L3 There is a 50% probability of losing $50 and a 50% probability of losing $0.
L3A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 50% to 25%?
L3B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential loss from $50 to $25?
L3C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid playing
the lottery completely?
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Common-for-all-participants Survey-Lotteries:
SL1 You need to protect an asset that is worth $ 75,000. There is a 5% probability
that a (confidentiality/integrity/availability) threat will materialise.
SL1A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 5% to 2.5%?
SL1B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential asset loss from $75,000 to $37,500?
SL1C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid the
risk completely?
SL2 You need to protect an asset that is worth $ 75,000. There is a 15% probability
that a (confidentiality/integrity/availability) threat will materialise.
SL2A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 15% to 7.5%?
SL2B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential asset loss from $75,000 to $37,500?
SL2C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid the
risk completely?
SL3 You need to protect an asset that is worth $ 75,000. There is a 50% probability
that a (confidentiality/integrity/availability) threat will materialise.
SL3A What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
probability of loss from 50% to 25%?
SL3B What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to reduce
potential asset loss from $75,000 to $37,500?
SL3C What is the maximum amount that you are willing to pay in order to avoid the
risk completely?
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A.2.1.2 Consent Form
Experiment 2: Consent Form
Thank you for taking part in this experiment and survey!
Your participation is very helpful for my cross-disciplinary PhD research in the
Information Security Group and Economics Department at Royal Holloway University
of London.
Konstantinos
Procedure:
You will be asked to make decisions about lotteries and fill out a survey with informa-
tion security related questions and demographics. Duration is no more than about 20
minutes.
Benefits and Scope of this Study:
By completing this questionnaire, you have the opportunity to win up to $10.
At the end of the experiment, one of the lotteries in the questionnaire will be ’executed’
by the computer. Your payment will be based on your choices in this lottery and the
random draw of the computer. An email will be sent to your designated email address
with your payment in the form of an Amazon gift certificate.
Please, note that for the payment to be processed, it is necessary that you do not just
answer randomly and instead make all your decisions carefully.
Your participation will allow us to collect valuable data for our research.
Confidentiality:
No identification of the participants is collected or maintained during or after the
completion of the experiment and the survey and all data are fully anonymised. An
email address is requested at the end of the survey only for the purpose of sending your
payment. All data will be protected and kept completely confidential.
Usage of the findings:
The research findings will be used for academic purposes only. For example, they might
be presented in academic conferences, and be published in research journals in the field
of Information Security and Economics. Research findings will be made available to all
participants upon request after data collection and data analysis.
Contact information:
In case of any concern or question, please contact Konstantinos at:
konstantinos.mersinas.2011@rhul.ac.uk or call directly at +44... .
By beginning the survey you acknowledge that you have read this form and agree to
participate in this research.
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A.2.1.3 Survey Questions
Question: “Are you related with the profession or practice of Information Secu-
rity in any way?”
Question: ‘What is your gender?’
Question: ‘What is your age?’
Question: “What is your educational level?”
Question: “What is your marital status?”
Question: “What is the number of dependants in your family?”
Question: “What is your approximate annual income in US dollars?”
Question: “Approximately how many employees work in your company / organ-
isation?”
Question: “How willing are you to take risks in general?”
Question: “Your job title most closely resembles:”
 Senior executive role (e.g. CEO, CIO, CISO, CSO etc.)
 Managerial role (e.g. Project Manager, IT Director, Security Manager
etc.)
 IT & Security (e.g. Security Officer, System Administrator, Information
Analyst etc.)
 Compliance, Risk or Privacy role (e.g. Consultant, Auditor etc.)
 Other: please specify
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Question: “How many years of experience do you have in Information Security
related tasks?”
Question: “How long have you held your current job position for?”
Question: “An information security incident is made up of one or more unwanted
or unexpected information security events that could compromise security and
weaken or impair business operations.
An information security event implies that the security of a system, service, or
network has been breached, indicating that a security policy has been violated
or a safeguard has failed.
Have you experienced any critical or worth-mentioning information security in-
cidents?”
Question: “Do you feel that your company / organisation needs to take more
actions for protecting confidentiality, integrity or availability?”
Question: “Do you feel that your job position allows you to make independent
security related decisions?”
Question: “How worried are you about new unidentified information security
threats?”
Question: “Is English your mother tongue?”
Question: “Which Amazon website do you prefer for your gift certificate pay-
ment?
(payment amount will be converted from US Dollars to the corresponding cur-
rency if needed)”
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Question: “Please, enter your email address:
(this is to be used only for sending you an Amazon gift certificate code)”
Note: Likert-scale questions presented participants with a bar, valued from 1 to 10,
e.g. “0: Not worried at all 10: Very worried”.
A.2.2 Experiment 2 Indicative Screenshots
Figure A.12: In the beginning of the experiment participants are randomly placed into
one of the three treatment groups (here we have the “Losses frame group”).
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Figure A.13: Indicative lotteries that participants have to make risk decisions on.
Figure A.14: Participants are presented with the lottery that will produce their pay-
ment, without knowing it.
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Figure A.15: Instructions given for the second part of the experiment.
Figure A.16: WTP for probability reduction.
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Figure A.17: WTP for loss reduction.
Figure A.18: WTP for avoiding the lottery completely.
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Figure A.19: Instructions for the final part of the experiment.
Figure A.20: WTP for probability reduction in a scenario.
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Figure A.21: WTP for loss reduction in a scenario.
Figure A.22: WTP for avoiding the lottery completely in a scenario.
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Figure A.23: Information given regarding the payment method.
Figure A.24: An indicative payment message.
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Figure A.25: Demographics and survey.
Figure A.26: End message.
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A.2.2.1 Experiment Flow
Figure A.27: Experiment Flow (Qualtrics Software [3]).
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A.2.3 Definitions
Experiment 2: Definitions
Lij : lottery i = 1, 2 or 3 and subquestion j = A,B or C.
Subquestion A refers to reduction of probability, B to
reduction of outcome and C corresponds to risk elimi-
nation.
SLij : the same as above, for survey lotteries.
LiC half , SLiC half : halved WTP values for eliminating risk (not playing the
lottery) lotteries, i = 1, 2 or 3.
Groups: these are the three conditions that randomly assign par-
ticipants to the framing of (A) gains, (B) losses and (C)
mixed gains and losses.
Groupk Lij : lottery i = 1, 2 or 3, subquestion j = A,B or C for
the framing group k = A,B or C. The unified variable
for the three groups is called Groups Lij and is used
in the analysis in conjunction with a group-indicating
variable.
Delta EV {lottery}: for each lottery, the “delta expected value” is the differ-
ence between the expected value of the original lottery
and the expected value of the proposed modified lottery.
RA {lottery}: for each lottery, the “risk aversion variable” represents
participant’s elicited WTP minus Delta EV lottery.
For example, if WTP > Delta EV for some lottery,
this means that the subject is willing to pay more than
the objective reduction of the expected value between
the original and the modified lottery, and therefore the
subject is risk averse.
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A.2.4 Qualtrics Javascript Code
1 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.addOnload(function ()
2 {
3 var ambig03to10 = Math.random () 0.7+0.3;
4 var ambig03to08 = Math.random () 0.5+0.3;
5 var ambig04to06 = Math.random () 0.2+0.4;
6 var payA = ambig03to1010;
7 var payB = ambig03to0810;
8 var payC = ambig04to0610;
9 var paymentA = Math.round(payA100)100;
10 var paymentB = Math.round(payB100)100;
11 var paymentC = Math.round(payC100)100;
12
13
14 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’Ambig03to10 ’,ambig03to10);
15 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’Ambig03to08 ’,ambig03to08);
16 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’Ambig04to06 ’,ambig04to06);
17 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’PaymentA ’,paymentA);
18 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’PaymentB ’,paymentB);
19 Qualtrics.SurveyEngine.setEmbeddedData(’PaymentC ’,paymentC);
20
21
22 this.hideNextButton ();
23 this.showNextButton.delay (6);
24
25 });
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A.2.5 Experiment Analysis
A.2.6 SPSS Syntax Code
The following code includes data cleaning and analysis in SPSS version 21 [1].
1 ı¨z˙ ***************************** DATASETS **********************************.
2 *** Copy all finalised cases into a new DataSet called 'Exp2 Finalised' ***.
3 DATASET ACTIVATE DataSet1.
4 DATASET COPY Exp2 Finalised.
5 DATASET ACTIVATE Exp2 Finalised.
6 FILTER OFF.
7 USE ALL.
8 SELECT IF (NOT(V10=0)).
9 EXECUTE.
10
11 *** Now, run code on the new DataSet ***.
12 ************************** VARIABLES ******************************.
13 *** Convert all Embedded Data variables (STRINGS) to F Format, with 2 decimals ***.
14 alter type GA L1A GA L1B GA L1C GB L1A GB L1B GB L1C GC L1A GC L1B GC L1C (f2).
15 alter type GA L2A GA L2B GA L2C GB L2A GB L2B GB L2C GC L2A GC L2B GC L2C (f2).
16 alter type GA L3A GA L3B GA L3C GB L3A GB L3B GB L3C GC L3A GC L3B GC L3C (f2).
17 alter type SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C SL3A SL3B SL3C (f2).
18 alter type L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C (f2).
19 VARIABLE LEVEL L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C (SCALE).
20 VARIABLE LEVEL GA L1A GA L1B GA L1C GB L1A GB L1B GB L1C GC L1A GC L1B GC L1C (SCALE).
21 VARIABLE LEVEL GA L2A GA L2B GA L2C GB L2A GB L2B GB L2C GC L2A GC L2B GC L2C (SCALE).
22 VARIABLE LEVEL GA L3A GA L3B GA L3C GB L3A GB L3B GB L3C GC L3A GC L3B GC L3C (SCALE).
23 VARIABLE LEVEL SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C SL3A SL3B SL3C (SCALE).
24 VARIABLE LEVEL Incident Indep English Job Marital Gender Protect (NOMINAL).
25 VARIABLE LEVEL Income Employees Edu Worried PaymentLottery (ORDINAL).
26
27 * Calculate half of the values of WTP for Li, SLi, since they have DOUBLE DeltaEV *.
28 COMPUTE L1C half = L1C / 2.
29 COMPUTE L2C half = L2C / 2.
30 COMPUTE L3C half = L3C / 2.
31 COMPUTE SL1C half = SL1C / 2.
32 COMPUTE SL2C half = SL2C / 2.
33 COMPUTE SL3C half = SL3C / 2.
34
35 RECODE GA Inst (1=1) (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
36 RECODE GB Inst (1=2) (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
37 RECODE GC Inst (1=3) (SYSMIS=SYSMIS).
38
39 *trick: from this point Gj Inst is SCALE for the Groups and the DO IFs.
40 alter type GA Inst (f0).
41 alter type GB Inst (f0).
42 alter type GC Inst (f0).
43
44 DO IF (GA Inst=1).
45 COMPUTE Groups = 1.
46 COMPUTE GroupsAB = 1.
47 COMPUTE GroupsAC = 1.
48 END IF.
49 DO IF (GB Inst = 2).
50 COMPUTE Groups = 2.
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51 COMPUTE GroupsAB = 2.
52 COMPUTE GroupsBC = 2.
53 END IF.
54 DO IF (GC Inst = 3).
55 COMPUTE Groups = 3.
56 COMPUTE GroupsAC = 3.
57 COMPUTE GroupsBC = 3.
58 END IF.
59
60 *Compute a common 'combined' 'variable for all Groups lotteries, of the 3 Groups (note that corresponding
lotteries have the same |DeltaEV| and both − or +).
61 DO IF (GA Inst= 1).
62 COMPUTE Groups L1A = GA L1A.
63 COMPUTE Groups L1B = GA L1B.
64 COMPUTE Groups L1C = GA L1C.
65 COMPUTE Groups L2A = GA L2A.
66 COMPUTE Groups L2B = GA L2B.
67 COMPUTE Groups L2C = GA L2C.
68 COMPUTE Groups L3A = GA L3A.
69 COMPUTE Groups L3B = GA L3B.
70 COMPUTE Groups L3C = GA L3C.
71 END IF.
72 DO IF (GB Inst = 2).
73 COMPUTE Groups L1A = GB L1A.
74 COMPUTE Groups L1B = GB L1B.
75 COMPUTE Groups L1C = GB L1C.
76 COMPUTE Groups L2A = GB L2A.
77 COMPUTE Groups L2B = GB L2B.
78 COMPUTE Groups L2C = GB L2C.
79 COMPUTE Groups L3A = GB L3A.
80 COMPUTE Groups L3B = GB L3B.
81 COMPUTE Groups L3C = GB L3C.
82 END IF.
83 DO IF (GC Inst = 3).
84 COMPUTE Groups L1A = GC L1A.
85 COMPUTE Groups L1B = GC L1B.
86 COMPUTE Groups L1C = GC L1C.
87 COMPUTE Groups L2A = GC L2A.
88 COMPUTE Groups L2B = GC L2B.
89 COMPUTE Groups L2C = GC L2C.
90 COMPUTE Groups L3A = GC L3A.
91 COMPUTE Groups L3B = GC L3B.
92 COMPUTE Groups L3C = GC L3C.
93 END IF.
94
95 *Set all Delta Expected Values for Experiment plain Lotteries − All EV mean |DeltaEV| between original and
modified lottery*.
96 COMPUTE Delta EV L1A = 1.25.
97 COMPUTE Delta EV L1B = 1.25.
98 COMPUTE Delta EV L1C = 2.5.
99 COMPUTE Delta EV L2A = 3.75.
100 COMPUTE Delta EV L2B = 3.75.
101 COMPUTE Delta EV L2C = 7.5.
102 COMPUTE Delta EV L3A = 12.5.
103 COMPUTE Delta EV L3B = 12.5.
104 COMPUTE Delta EV L3C = 25.
105
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106 *Compute all RiskAversin (RA) variables for the One Sample t test*.
107 COMPUTE RA L1A = L1A − Delta EV L1A.
108 COMPUTE RA L1B = L1B − Delta EV L1B.
109 COMPUTE RA L1C = L1C − Delta EV L1C.
110 COMPUTE RA L2A = L1A − Delta EV L2A.
111 COMPUTE RA L2B = L2B − Delta EV L2B.
112 COMPUTE RA L2C = L2C − Delta EV L2C.
113 COMPUTE RA L3A = L3A − Delta EV L3A.
114 COMPUTE RA L3B = L3B − Delta EV L3B.
115 COMPUTE RA L3C = L3C − Delta EV L3C.
116
117 *Set all Delta Expected Values for Survey Lotteries*.
118 COMPUTE Delta EV SL1A = 1875.
119 COMPUTE Delta EV SL1B = 1875.
120 COMPUTE Delta EV SL1C = 3750.
121 COMPUTE Delta EV SL2A = 5625.
122 COMPUTE Delta EV SL2B = 5625.
123 COMPUTE Delta EV SL2C = 11250.
124 COMPUTE Delta EV SL3A = 18750.
125 COMPUTE Delta EV SL3B = 18750.
126 COMPUTE Delta EV SL3C = 37500.
127
128 *Compute all RiskAversin (RA) variables for the One Sample t test*.
129 COMPUTE RA SL1A = SL1A − Delta EV SL1A.
130 COMPUTE RA SL1B = SL1B − Delta EV SL1B.
131 COMPUTE RA SL1C = SL1C − Delta EV SL1C.
132 COMPUTE RA SL2A = SL1A − Delta EV SL2A.
133 COMPUTE RA SL2B = SL2B − Delta EV SL2B.
134 COMPUTE RA SL2C = SL2C − Delta EV SL2C.
135 COMPUTE RA SL3A = SL3A − Delta EV SL3A.
136 COMPUTE RA SL3B = SL3B − Delta EV SL3B.
137 COMPUTE RA SL3C = SL3C − Delta EV SL3C.
138
139 *Set all Expected Values for Groups*.
140 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L1A = 0.25.
141 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L1B = 0.25.
142 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L1C = 0.5.
143 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L2A = 0.75.
144 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L2B = 0.75.
145 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L2C = 1.5.
146 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L3A = 2.5.
147 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L3B = 2.5.
148 COMPUTE Delta EV Groups L3C = 5.
149
150 *Compute all RiskAversin (RA) variables for the One Sample t test*.
151 COMPUTE RA Groups L1A = Groups L1A − Delta EV Groups L1A.
152 COMPUTE RA Groups L1B = Groups L1B − Delta EV Groups L1B.
153 COMPUTE RA Groups L1C = Groups L1C − Delta EV Groups L1C.
154 COMPUTE RA Groups L2A = Groups L1A − Delta EV Groups L2A.
155 COMPUTE RA Groups L2B = Groups L2B − Delta EV Groups L2B.
156 COMPUTE RA Groups L2C = Groups L2C − Delta EV Groups L2C.
157 COMPUTE RA Groups L3A = Groups L3A − Delta EV Groups L3A.
158 COMPUTE RA Groups L3B = Groups L3B − Delta EV Groups L3B.
159 COMPUTE RA Groups L3C = Groups L3C − Delta EV Groups L3C.
160
161 *trick: from this point Gj Inst is NOMINAL − because Group = NOMINAL.
162 VARIABLE LEVEL GA Inst GB Inst GC Inst (NOMINAL).
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163
164 ***************************** FILTER *************************************.
165 COMPUTE ValidCase = InfoSec.
166 alter type ValidCase (f0).
167 VARIABLE LEVEL ValidCase (SCALE).
168 *** Do not consider the CASES that took the experiment more than once − Need to add them manually ***.
169 * 192.193.116. = many times *.
170 * 213.115.30.162 = #33, 6 min *.
171 * 188.221.164.159 = #53, 4 min *.
172 * 134.219.227.24 = twice *.
173 DO IF (V6 = '192.193.116.137' OR V6 = '192.193.116.142' OR V6 = '192.193.116.143' OR V6 = '
213.115.30.162' OR V6 = '188.221.164.159' OR V6 = '134.219.227.24').
174 COMPUTE ValidCase = 0.
175 END IF.
176
177 FILTER BY ValidCase.
178 EXECUTE.
179
180 ***************************** ANALYSIS **********************************.
181
182 ******************* Between Subjects ************************************.
183 ****************************************************************************.
184 **** HYPOTHESIS 3: Differences amongst framing−groups ****.
185
186 ** TEST: non−parametric Kruskal−Wallis: Quant (WTP) with many−categories Qual variable (Group):
created variable Group = 1, 2 or 3 for Groups A, B or C *.
187 ** PURPOSE of test: to show that the 3−samples WERE NOT drawn from identical populations; i.e. there
was DIFFERENCE amongst the 3 Treatment Groups A, B, C *.
188 * Test is on the combined variables Groups Li{A,B,C} across the Groups = 1, 2 or 3; *.
189 * Namely, Lottery 1 Question A=Modify Probability across the 3 Groups; Question B=modify outcome;
Question C=avoid *.
190 ** SPSS (Kruskal−Wallis): Analyse > NonParametric Tests> Independent samples> Custom − K−W **.
191
192 ** Testing ORDER EFFECT that could be observed in the SAME variables presented to all − i.e. whether
the Grouping affected subjects in common variables *.
193 ** PURPOSE of test: to show that 'the 3 treatment Groups A, B, C DID NOT influence the rest
commmon−to−all−participants replies ' *.
194 NPTESTS
195 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B
RA L3C RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B
RA SL3C) GROUP (Groups) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
196 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
197 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
198
199 * GROUP LOTTERIES BY Groups = 1 (A), 2 (B), 3 (C) *.
200 ** FINDING: WTP for Gains−framing (GroupB) much higher than WTP to avoid losses (Groups A and C) *.
201 * => If they see sure gain they invest more OR they fear NOT receiving the gain *.
202 NPTESTS
203 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A RA Groups L2B
RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C) GROUP (Groups)
KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
204 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
205 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
206
207 ** Differences of Groups A (losses−framing) VS GroupB (gains−framing) **.
208 NPTESTS
209 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
256
A.2 Appendix: Experiment 2
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsAB) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
210 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
211 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
212 ** Differences of Groups A (losses−framing) VS GroupC (mixed−framing) **.
213 NPTESTS
214 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsAC) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
215 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
216 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
217 ** Differences of Groups B (gains−framing) VS GroupC (mixed−framing) **.
218 NPTESTS
219 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsBC) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
220 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
221 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
222
223 ** The same tests by MAnn−Whitney, just to reveal teh distribution of the pairs of Groups **.
224 NPTESTS
225 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C)
GROUP (GroupsAB) MANN WHITNEY
226 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
227 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
228 NPTESTS
229 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C)
GROUP (GroupsAC) MANN WHITNEY
230 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
231 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
232 NPTESTS
233 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C)
GROUP (GroupsBC) MANN WHITNEY
234 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
235 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
236
237 ** Differences of Groups A (losses−framing) VS Group B (gains−framing) only for
Subquestion C (avoidance)**.
238 NPTESTS
239 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsAB) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
240 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
241 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
242 ** Differences of Groups A (losses−framing) VS GroupC (mixed−framing) **.
243 NPTESTS
244 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsAC) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
245 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
246 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
247 ** Differences of Groups B (gains−framing) VS GroupC (mixed−framing) **.
248 NPTESTS
249 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3C) GROUP (
GroupsBC) KRUSKAL WALLIS(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
250 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
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251 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
252
253 **** HYPOTHESIS 4: Four−fold pattern of Risk Attitude ****.
254
255 ** TEST: parametric One sample t test *.
256 * PURPOSE of test: whether the sample (all participants) belong to a population of a specific mean; and
whether above (Risk Averse for losses) OR BELOW mean (Risk Seeking for losses).
257
258 * Test is on the combined variables Groups Li{A,B,C} across the Groups = 1, 2 or 3; *.
259 * Namely, Lottery 1 Question A=Modify Probability across the 3 Groups; Question B=modify outcome;
Question C=avoid *.
260 ** SPSS (Kruskal−Wallis): Analyse > NonParametric Tests> Independent samples> Custom − K−W **.
261
262 * EXPERIMENT LOTTERIES *.
263 ** FINDING: there is sig. diff. from mean in almost all lotteries, i.e. all subquestions B, C of L3.. *.
264 * Note: I can use mean & standard deviation of lotteries, with mu0=0 to Calculate the minimum needed
Sample Size *.
265 T−TEST
266 /TESTVAL=0
267 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
268 /VARIABLES=RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
269 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
270
271 T−TEST
272 /TESTVAL=0
273 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
274 /VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C
275 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
276
277 GRAPH
278 /BAR(SIMPLE)=MEAN(RA L1A) MEAN(RA L1B) MEAN(RA L1C) MEAN(RA L2A) MEAN(
RA L2B) MEAN(RA L2C) MEAN(RA L3A) MEAN(RA L3B) MEAN(RA L3C)
279 /MISSING=LISTWISE
280 /INTERVAL CI(95.0).
281
282 * SURVEY LOTTERIES *.
283 ** FINDING: there is sig. diff. from mean in almost all lotteries − all >mean except subquestions B, C of L3
.. *.
284 T−TEST
285 /TESTVAL=0
286 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
287 /VARIABLES=RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C
288 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
289
290 T−TEST
291 /TESTVAL=0
292 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
293 /VARIABLES=SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C SL3A SL3B SL3C
294 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
295
296 GRAPH
297 /BAR(SIMPLE)=MEAN(RA SL1A) MEAN(RA SL1B) MEAN(RA SL1C) MEAN(RA SL2A) MEAN
(RA SL2B) MEAN(RA SL2C) MEAN(RA SL3A) MEAN(RA SL3B) MEAN(RA SL3C)
298 /MISSING=LISTWISE
299 /INTERVAL CI(95.0).
300
301 ** One sample t test for Groups = 3 Groups**.
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302 T−TEST
303 /TESTVAL=0
304 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
305 /VARIABLES=RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A
RA Groups L2B RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C
306 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
307 T−TEST
308 /TESTVAL=0
309 /MISSING=ANALYSIS
310 /VARIABLES=Groups L1A Groups L1B Groups L1C Groups L2A
Groups L2B Groups L2C Groups L3A Groups L3B Groups L3C
311 /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
312
313 ***************************** Within Subjects *********************************.
314 *********************************************************************************.
315 **** HYPOTHESIS 1: differences in WTP amongst risk treatment actions ****.
316 ** PURPOSE of test: examine mean differences between risk treatment actions. Actions are A&B (risk
modification) versus C (risk transfer) *.
317
318 ** TESTS: Nonparametric Tests: Related Samples, many conditions: 1) FRIEDMAN, 2) additional FRIEDMAN
and 3) WILCOXON PAIRWISE **.
319 ** SPSS (FRIEDMAN): Analyse > NonParametric Tests> Related samples: Fields= L2A, L2B, L3C &
Settings= Freidman's 2−way ANOVA by ranks] **.
320 ** SPSS (additional FRIEDMAN): Analyse > NonParametric Tests> Legacy Dialogs > K−Related samples:
set all variables, check Friedman**.
321 *then if there are differences spot them with WILCOXON pairwise tests − Here, Dependent Variable=
WTP, Independent Variable=groups A, B, C *.
322 ** SPSS (WILCOXON): Analyse > NonParametric Tests> Legacy Dialogs > 2−Related samples: set all the
pairs **.
323
324 *Note: the 3 Groups are not intended to measure preferences amongst Risk Treatment actions.
325 *This is why the order of subquestions A (probs), B (outcomes), C (avoidance) is the same! *
326 *therefore, we do not need to examine Risk Treatment actions WITHIN subjects from Groups A, B, C*..
327
328 * EXPERIMENT LOTTERIES *.
329 ** FINDING:
330 *Lottery1* exported files: Friedman L1A−L1B−L1C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman L1A−L1B−L1C half−
TRIANGLE.pdf .
331 NPTESTS
332 /RELATED TEST(L1A L1B L1C half)
333 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
334 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
335 *FRIEDMAN is intended to show whether there are differences initially.
336 NPAR TESTS
337 /FRIEDMAN=L1A L1B L1C half
338 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
339 /MISSING LISTWISE.
340 *or QUARTILES*.
341 NPAR TESTS
342 /WILCOXON=L1A L1B L1C half WITH L1B L1C half L1A (PAIRED)
343 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
344
345 *Lottery2* exported files: Friedman L2A−L2B−L2C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman L2A−L2B−L2C half−
TRIANGLE.pdf .
346 NPTESTS
347 /RELATED TEST(L2A L2B L2C half ) FRIEDMAN(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
348 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
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349 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
350 *additional FRIEDMAN*.
351 NPAR TESTS
352 /FRIEDMAN=L2A L2B L2C half
353 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
354 /MISSING LISTWISE.
355 **WILCOXON pairwise**.
356 NPAR TESTS
357 /WILCOXON=L2A L2B L2C half WITH L2B L2C half L2A (PAIRED)
358 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
359
360 *Lottery3* exported files: Friedman L3A−L3B−L3C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman L3A−L3B−L3C half−
TRIANGLE.pdf .
361 NPTESTS
362 /RELATED TEST(L3A L3B L3C half ) FRIEDMAN(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
363 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
364 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
365 *additional FRIEDMAN*.
366 NPAR TESTS
367 /FRIEDMAN=L3A L3B L3C half
368 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
369 /MISSING LISTWISE.
370 **WILCOXON pairwise**.
371 NPAR TESTS
372 /WILCOXON=L3A L3B L3C half WITH L3B L3C half L3A (PAIRED)
373 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
374
375 * SURVEY LOTTERIES *.
376 ** FINDING: for Survey Lotteries (in contrast to abstract Lotteries) there was sig diff between Probability
and Outcome Reduction (subqs A, B) in the two realistic scenario lotteries, *.
377 * i.e. lotteries SL1 and SL2. In both lotteries WTP for reducing Outcomes > WTP for reducing
Probabilities. This implies a REACTIVE approach to security, e.g. Disaster Recovery plans (not
proactive) *.
378 * meaning that the recent trend [+find references] in security is observed, but also meaning that there is an
INEVITABILITY in avoiding losses, in the first place *.
379 * It is important to mention that since, breaches are not actually invreasing [Ben WEIS2015], it might
indeed be a paradigm shift in InfoSec *.
380 * In SL3 (p=50%) we do not have sig. diff between A and B: a possible explanation is that p=50% is easier
to calculate rather than 5% or 15%.
381 * so maybe calculation eliminated the preference for LOSS Reduction.
382
383 *Survey Lottery1* exported files: Friedman SL1A−SL1B−SL1C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman SL1A−SL1B−
SL1C half−TRIANGLE.pdf .
384 NPTESTS
385 /RELATED TEST(SL1A SL1B SL1C half ) FRIEDMAN(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
386 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
387 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
388 *additional FRIEDMAN*.
389 NPAR TESTS
390 /FRIEDMAN=SL1A SL1B SL1C half
391 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
392 /MISSING LISTWISE.
393 **WILCOXON pairwise**.
394 NPAR TESTS
395 /WILCOXON=SL1A SL1B SL1C half WITH SL1B SL1C half SL1A (PAIRED)
396 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
397
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398 *Survey Lottery2* exported files: Friedman SL2A−SL2B−SL2C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman SL2A−SL2B−
SL2C half−TRIANGLE.pdf .
399 NPTESTS
400 /RELATED TEST(SL2A SL2B SL2C half ) FRIEDMAN(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
401 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
402 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
403 *additional FRIEDMAN*.
404 NPAR TESTS
405 /FRIEDMAN=SL2A SL2B SL2C half
406 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
407 /MISSING LISTWISE.
408 **WILCOXON pairwise**.
409 NPAR TESTS
410 /WILCOXON=SL2A SL2B SL2C half WITH SL2B SL2C half SL2A (PAIRED)
411 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
412
413 *Survey Lottery3* exported files: Friedman SL3A−SL3B−SL3C half−RANKS.pdf Friedman SL3A−SL3B−
SL3C half−TRIANGLE.pdf .
414 NPTESTS
415 /RELATED TEST(SL3A SL3B SL3C half ) FRIEDMAN(COMPARE=PAIRWISE)
416 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
417 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
418 *additional FRIEDMAN*.
419 NPAR TESTS
420 /FRIEDMAN=SL3A SL3B SL3C half
421 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
422 /MISSING LISTWISE.
423 **WILCOXON pairwise**.
424 NPAR TESTS
425 /WILCOXON=SL3A SL3B SL3C half WITH SL3B SL3C half SL3A (PAIRED)
426 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
427
428 **** HYPOTHESIS 2: there is a preference between PROBABILITY and LOSSES reduction ****.
429 ** PURPOSE of test: examine mean differences between risk treatment actions A (MODIFY PROBABILITY)
versus B (MODIFY OUTCOME) for each Lottery SLi, Li, i=1, 2, 3 *.
430 ** TEST: Nonparametric Tests: Related Samples, 2 conditions: WILCOXON PAIRWISE **.
431
432 * EXPERIMENT LOTTERIES *.
433 ** FINDING: .
434 NPAR TESTS
435 /WILCOXON=L1A WITH L1B (PAIRED)
436 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
437 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
438 NPAR TESTS
439 /WILCOXON=L2A WITH L2B (PAIRED)
440 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
441 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
442 NPAR TESTS
443 /WILCOXON=L3A WITH L3B (PAIRED)
444 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
445 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
446
447 * SURVEY LOTTERIES *.
448 ** FINDING: .
449 NPAR TESTS
450 /WILCOXON=SL1A WITH SL1B (PAIRED)
451 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
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452 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
453 * FINDING sig. at SL2B > SL2A => WTP >> for MODIFYY OUTCOME than MODIFY PROBABILITY, i.e.
OUTCOMES were more 'salient' than PROBABILITIES *.more ''.
454 NPAR TESTS
455 /WILCOXON=SL2A WITH SL2B (PAIRED)
456 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
457 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
458 NPAR TESTS
459 /WILCOXON=SL3A WITH SL3B (PAIRED)
460 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
461 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
462
463 * Note: the same test can be used as VALIDITY CHECK for Lotteries of the Groups *.
464 NPAR TESTS
465 /WILCOXON=Groups L1A Groups L1B Groups L1C
466 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
467 NPAR TESTS
468 /WILCOXON=Groups L2A Groups L2B Groups L2C
469 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
470 NPAR TESTS
471 /WILCOXON=Groups L3A Groups L3B Groups L3C
472 /MISSING ANALYSIS.
473
474 ***************************** Survey Data Analysis ***********************************.
475 **** A) Descriptive Statistics ********************************************************.
476 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=InfoSec Risk
477 /HISTOGRAM
478 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
479 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender
480 /HISTOGRAM
481 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
482 GRAPH
483 /PIE=COUNT BY Edu.
484
485 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Cur pos Age Exp
486 /HISTOGRAM
487 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
488 FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Gender
489 /HISTOGRAM
490 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
491
492 **** B) Spearman correlations **************************************************.
493 ** Spearman: Quant with Quant variables **.
494 * FINDING: some negative correlation between Cur Position and WTP in L3j: i.e. the more years in the position
the more risk taking they became .
495 NONPAR CORR
496 /VARIABLES=Risk Age Dependants Worried RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A
RA L3B RA L3C RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B
RA SL3C
497 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
498 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
499 * FINDING: negative correlation between Age and WTP, mostly (4 by 1) for Survey Lotteries! .
500 ** Speraman's Correlation: shows MONOTONIC relationship (both variables need to be ORDINAL,
INTERVAL or RATIO scale) ** (more specialised than Pearson's).
501 NONPAR CORR
502 /VARIABLES=Cur pos Age Exp RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B
RA L3C RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B
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RA SL3C
503 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
504 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
505 ** Pearson's Correlation: shows LINEAR relationship (both variables need to be INTERvAL or RATIO
scale) **.
506 CORRELATIONS
507 /VARIABLES=Cur pos Age Exp RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B
RA L3C RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B
RA SL3C
508 /PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
509 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
510 CORRELATIONS
511 /VARIABLES=Cur pos Age Exp RA SL3C
512 /PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
513 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
514
515 FREQUENCIES Cur pos Age Exp RA SL3C
516 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
517
518 **** C) Mann−Whitney: Quant with binary Qual (Nominal) variables **.
519 * Gender *.
520 NPTESTS
521 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Gender) MANN WHITNEY
522 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
523 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
524 * English *.
525 NPTESTS
526 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
English) MANN WHITNEY
527 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
528 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
529 * Protect *.
530 NPTESTS
531 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Protect) MANN WHITNEY
532 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
533 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
534 * Indep *.
535 NPTESTS
536 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Indep) MANN WHITNEY
537 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
538 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
539 * Incident *.
540 NPTESTS
541 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Incident) MANN WHITNEY
542 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
543 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
544
545 ** D) Kruskal−Wallis: Quant with many−categories Qual variables **.
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546 * Income *.
547 NPTESTS
548 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Income)
549 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
550 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
551 * Employees *.
552 NPTESTS
553 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Employees)
554 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
555 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
556 * Edu *.
557 NPTESTS
558 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Edu)
559 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
560 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
561 * Worried *.
562 NPTESTS
563 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Worried)
564 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
565 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
566 * Marital .
567 NPTESTS
568 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Marital)
569 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
570 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
571 * Job *.
572 NPTESTS
573 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
Job)
574 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
575 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
576 * PaymentLottery *.
577 NPTESTS
578 /INDEPENDENT TEST (RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A RA L2B RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
RA SL1A RA SL1B RA SL1C RA SL2A RA SL2B RA SL2C RA SL3A RA SL3B RA SL3C) GROUP (
PaymentLottery)
579 /MISSING SCOPE=ANALYSIS USERMISSING=EXCLUDE
580 /CRITERIA ALPHA=0.05 CILEVEL=95.
581
582 **** E) Chi−square (Pearson): Qual with Qual [the first Sig. is the one] ****.
583 * Sec VS OPS BY Past Incident*.
584 CROSSTABS
585 /TABLES=Gender BY Job
586 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
587 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
588 /CELLS=COUNT
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589 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
590 * Sec VS OPS BY Job Title [SIG.]*.
591 *CROSSTABS
592 /TABLES=H5 1 1 1 BY S12
593 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
594 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
595 /CELLS=COUNT
596 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
597 * Sec VS OPS BY Educational Level *.
598 CROSSTABS
599 /TABLES=Edu BY Job
600 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
601 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
602 /CELLS=COUNT
603 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
604 * Sec VS OPS BY Annual Salary *.
605 CROSSTABS
606 /TABLES=Marital BY Gender
607 /FORMAT=AVALUE TABLES
608 /STATISTICS=CHISQ
609 /CELLS=COUNT
610 /COUNT ROUND CELL.
611
612 **** F) Multiple Regressions.
613 **** Multiple Regression Analysis *****************************************.
614 ** a FORWARD Regression for each Dependent Variable **.
615 ** findings: IV=Employees, with CONTROL VARS=Exp Age and DV=Li **.
616 REGRESSION
617 /MISSING LISTWISE
618 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
619 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
620 /NOORIGIN
621 /DEPENDENT L1A
622 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
623 REGRESSION
624 /MISSING LISTWISE
625 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
626 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
627 /NOORIGIN
628 /DEPENDENT L1B
629 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
630 REGRESSION
631 /MISSING LISTWISE
632 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
633 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
634 /NOORIGIN
635 /DEPENDENT L1C
636 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
637
638 REGRESSION
639 /MISSING LISTWISE
640 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
641 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
642 /NOORIGIN
643 /DEPENDENT L2A
644 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
645 REGRESSION
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646 /MISSING LISTWISE
647 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
648 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
649 /NOORIGIN
650 /DEPENDENT L2B
651 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
652 REGRESSION
653 /MISSING LISTWISE
654 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
655 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
656 /NOORIGIN
657 /DEPENDENT L2C
658 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
659
660 REGRESSION
661 /MISSING LISTWISE
662 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
663 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
664 /NOORIGIN
665 /DEPENDENT L3A
666 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
667 REGRESSION
668 /MISSING LISTWISE
669 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
670 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
671 /NOORIGIN
672 /DEPENDENT L3B
673 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
674 REGRESSION
675 /MISSING LISTWISE
676 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
677 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
678 /NOORIGIN
679 /DEPENDENT L3C
680 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
681
682 ****** with Survey Lotteries *****.
683 REGRESSION
684 /MISSING LISTWISE
685 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
686 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
687 /NOORIGIN
688 /DEPENDENT SL1A
689 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
690 REGRESSION
691 /MISSING LISTWISE
692 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
693 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
694 /NOORIGIN
695 /DEPENDENT SL1B
696 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
697 REGRESSION
698 /MISSING LISTWISE
699 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
700 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
701 /NOORIGIN
702 /DEPENDENT SL1C
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703 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
704
705 REGRESSION
706 /MISSING LISTWISE
707 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
708 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
709 /NOORIGIN
710 /DEPENDENT SL2A
711 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
712 REGRESSION
713 /MISSING LISTWISE
714 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
715 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
716 /NOORIGIN
717 /DEPENDENT SL2B
718 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
719 REGRESSION
720 /MISSING LISTWISE
721 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
722 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
723 /NOORIGIN
724 /DEPENDENT SL2C
725 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
726
727 REGRESSION
728 /MISSING LISTWISE
729 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
730 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
731 /NOORIGIN
732 /DEPENDENT SL3A
733 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
734 REGRESSION
735 /MISSING LISTWISE
736 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
737 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
738 /NOORIGIN
739 /DEPENDENT SL3B
740 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
741 REGRESSION
742 /MISSING LISTWISE
743 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
744 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
745 /NOORIGIN
746 /DEPENDENT SL3C
747 /METHOD=ENTER Exp Age Cur Pos .
748
749 REGRESSION
750 /MISSING LISTWISE
751 /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
752 /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
753 /NOORIGIN
754 /DEPENDENT RiskAversionH2 6
755 /METHOD=ENTER S4cat S10 1 S13 S19 S22 1.
756
757 * ''How willing are you yo sacrifice Pos for Sec?'' (S11 1)*.
758 NONPAR CORR
759 /VARIABLES=S11 1 SWITCHPOINT SEC LOSS AV SEC SWITCHPOINT OPS LOSS AV OPS
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760 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
761 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
762 * as expected (?) *.
763 NONPAR CORR
764 /VARIABLES=SWITCHPOINT SEC LOSS AV SEC SWITCHPOINT OPS LOSS AV OPS
765 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
766 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
767 *non−parametric.
768 NONPAR CORR
769 /VARIABLES= L3C Risk
770 /PRINT=SPEARMAN TWOTAIL NOSIG
771 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
772
773 ************************** Various Validity checks *******************************.
774 desc var = Groups.
775 desc var = GA Inst GB Inst GC Inst.
776
777 FREQUENCIES InfoSec Groups Q117
778 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
779 EXAMINE VARIABLES= L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C BY English
780 /COMPARE VARIABLE
781 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
782 /STATISTICS=NONE
783 /NOTOTAL
784 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
785 EXAMINE VARIABLES= SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C SL3A SL3B SL3C BY English
786 /COMPARE VARIABLE
787 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
788 /STATISTICS=NONE
789 /NOTOTAL
790 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
791 EXAMINE VARIABLES= RA Groups L1A RA Groups L1B RA Groups L1C RA Groups L2A RA Groups L2B
RA Groups L2C RA Groups L3A RA Groups L3B RA Groups L3C BY English
792 /COMPARE VARIABLE
793 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
794 /STATISTICS=NONE
795 /NOTOTAL
796 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
797
798 * Tests for Normality: Kolmogorov−Smirnov & Sharpio−Wilk *.
799 EXAMINE VARIABLES=SL1A SL1B SL1C
800 /PLOT BOXPLOT NPPLOT
801 /COMPARE GROUPS
802 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
803 /CINTERVAL 95
804 /MISSING LISTWISE
805 /NOTOTAL.
806
807 * I do a Descriptive Statistics > Explore analysis with Steam&Leaf plot and Boxplots.
808 * There are initial conclusions on the Skewness (left or right) and the Kurtosis (leptokurtosis or platycurtosis) of
the distribution.
809 EXAMINE VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C
810 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
811 /COMPARE GROUPS
812 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES
813 /CINTERVAL 95
814 /MISSING LISTWISE
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815 /NOTOTAL.
816 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 in the same Graphic (option: Data are Separate Variables). .
817 EXAMINE VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C
818 /COMPARE VARIABLE
819 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
820 /STATISTICS=NONE
821 /NOTOTAL
822 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
823 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 in the same Graphic (option: Data are Separate Variables). .
824 EXAMINE VARIABLES=SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C SL3A SL3B SL3C
825 /COMPARE VARIABLE
826 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
827 /STATISTICS=NONE
828 /NOTOTAL
829 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
830
831 ****** Normality test for parametric one−sample t−test − for APPENDIX ******.
832 *Computes the z−values for the specified values AND SAVES them in new variables (starting with zVAR) −.
833 DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C
SL3A SL3B SL3C
834 /SAVE
835 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV MIN MAX.
836 *Descriptives for all variables of all lotteries*.
837 *EXAMINE VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C
SL3A SL3B SL3C
838 /PLOT BOXPLOT STEMLEAF
839 /COMPARE GROUPS
840 /MESTIMATORS HUBER(1.339) ANDREW(1.34) HAMPEL(1.7,3.4,8.5) TUKEY(4.685)
841 /PERCENTILES(5,10,25,50,75,90,95) HAVERAGE
842 /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES EXTREME
843 /CINTERVAL 95
844 /MISSING LISTWISE
845 /NOTOTAL.
846 *Boxplot of all Questions of H1 in the same Graphic (option: Data are Separate Variables).
847 *Also used to define the limits for variable DUMMY.
848 EXAMINE VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C SL1A SL1B SL1C SL2A SL2B SL2C
SL3A SL3B SL3C
849 /COMPARE VARIABLE
850 /PLOT=BOXPLOT
851 /STATISTICS=NONE
852 /NOTOTAL
853 /MISSING=PAIRWISE.
854
855 **** Detecting OUTLIERS from z−scores: if cum. % of Std. Deviation > 1.96 is about 5%, then we are fine! *
***.
856 * L1A *.
857 DESCRIPTIVES
858 VARIABLES=L1A/SAVE.
859 COMPUTE zL1A=abs(zL1A).
860 RECODE zL1A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
861 VALUE LABELS zL1A
862 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
863 FREQUENCIES
864 VARIABLES=zL1A
865 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
866 * L1B *.
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867 DESCRIPTIVES
868 VARIABLES=L1B/SAVE.
869 COMPUTE zL1B=abs(zL1B).
870 RECODE zL1B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
871 VALUE LABELS zL1B
872 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
873 FREQUENCIES
874 VARIABLES=zL1B
875 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
876 * L1C *.
877 DESCRIPTIVES
878 VARIABLES=L1C/SAVE.
879 COMPUTE zL1C=abs(zL1C).
880 RECODE zL1C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
881 VALUE LABELS zL1C
882 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
883 FREQUENCIES
884 VARIABLES=zL1C
885 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
886 * L2A *.
887 DESCRIPTIVES
888 VARIABLES=L2A/SAVE.
889 COMPUTE zL2A=abs(zL2A).
890 RECODE zL2A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
891 VALUE LABELS zL2A
892 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
893 FREQUENCIES
894 VARIABLES=zL2A
895 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
896 * L2B *.
897 DESCRIPTIVES
898 VARIABLES=L2B/SAVE.
899 COMPUTE zL2B=abs(zL2B).
900 RECODE zL2B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
901 VALUE LABELS zL2B
902 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
903 FREQUENCIES
904 VARIABLES=zL2B
905 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
906 * L2C *.
907 DESCRIPTIVES
908 VARIABLES=L2C/SAVE.
909 COMPUTE zL2C=abs(zL2C).
910 RECODE zL2C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
911 VALUE LABELS zL2C
912 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
913 FREQUENCIES
914 VARIABLES=zL2C
915 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
916 * L3A *.
917 DESCRIPTIVES
918 VARIABLES=L3A/SAVE.
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919 COMPUTE zL3A=abs(zL3A).
920 RECODE zL3A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
921 VALUE LABELS zL3A
922 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
923 FREQUENCIES
924 VARIABLES=zL3A
925 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
926 * L3B *.
927 DESCRIPTIVES
928 VARIABLES=L3B/SAVE.
929 COMPUTE zL3B=abs(zL3B).
930 RECODE zL3B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
931 VALUE LABELS zL3B
932 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
933 FREQUENCIES
934 VARIABLES=zL3B
935 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
936 * L3C *.
937 DESCRIPTIVES
938 VARIABLES=L3C/SAVE.
939 COMPUTE zL3C=abs(zL3C).
940 RECODE zL3C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4).
941 VALUE LABELS zL3C
942 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
943 FREQUENCIES
944 VARIABLES=zL3C
945 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
946 ** The same for Survey lotteries **.
947 * SL1A *.
948 DESCRIPTIVES
949 VARIABLES=SL1A/SAVE.
950 COMPUTE zSL1A=abs(zSL1A).
951 RECODE zSL1A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
952 VALUE LABELS zSL1A
953 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
954 FREQUENCIES
955 VARIABLES=zSL1A
956 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
957 * SL1B *.
958 DESCRIPTIVES
959 VARIABLES=SL1B/SAVE.
960 COMPUTE zSL1B=abs(zSL1B).
961 RECODE zSL1B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
962 VALUE LABELS zSL1B
963 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
964 FREQUENCIES
965 VARIABLES=zSL1B
966 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
967 * SL1C *.
968 DESCRIPTIVES
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969 VARIABLES=SL1C/SAVE.
970 COMPUTE zSL1C=abs(zSL1C).
971 RECODE zSL1C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
972 VALUE LABELS zSL1C
973 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
974 FREQUENCIES
975 VARIABLES=zSL1C
976 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
977 * SL2A *.
978 DESCRIPTIVES
979 VARIABLES=SL2A/SAVE.
980 COMPUTE zSL2A=abs(zSL2A).
981 RECODE zSL2A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
982 VALUE LABELS zSL2A
983 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
984 FREQUENCIES
985 VARIABLES=zSL2A
986 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
987 * SL2B *.
988 DESCRIPTIVES
989 VARIABLES=SL2B/SAVE.
990 COMPUTE zSL2B=abs(zSL2B).
991 RECODE zSL2B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
992 VALUE LABELS zSL2B
993 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
994 FREQUENCIES
995 VARIABLES=zSL2B
996 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
997 * SL2C *.
998 DESCRIPTIVES
999 VARIABLES=SL2C/SAVE.
1000 COMPUTE zSL2C=abs(zSL2C).
1001 RECODE zSL2C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
1002 VALUE LABELS zSL2C
1003 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
1004 FREQUENCIES
1005 VARIABLES=zSL2C
1006 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1007 * SL3A *.
1008 DESCRIPTIVES
1009 VARIABLES=SL3A/SAVE.
1010 COMPUTE zSL3A=abs(zSL3A).
1011 RECODE zSL3A (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
1012 VALUE LABELS zSL3A
1013 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
1014 FREQUENCIES
1015 VARIABLES=zSL3A
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1016 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1017 * SL3B *.
1018 DESCRIPTIVES
1019 VARIABLES=SL3B/SAVE.
1020 COMPUTE zSL3B=abs(zSL3B).
1021 RECODE zSL3B (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
1022 VALUE LABELS zSL3B
1023 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
1024 FREQUENCIES
1025 VARIABLES=zSL3B
1026 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1027 * SL3C *.
1028 DESCRIPTIVES
1029 VARIABLES=SL3C/SAVE.
1030 COMPUTE zSL3C=abs(zSL3C).
1031 RECODE zSL3C (3.29 thru highest = 1)(2.58 thru highest = 2)(1.96 thru highest = 3)(Lowest thru 1.95 = 4)
.
1032 VALUE LABELS zSL3C
1033 4 'Normal range' 3 'Potential Outliers (1.96<z<2.58)' 2 'Probabe Outliers (2.58<z<3.29)' 1 'Extreme
Outliers (z>3.29)'.
1034 FREQUENCIES
1035 VARIABLES=zSL3C
1036 /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
1037
1038 DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C half L2A L2B L2C half L3A L3B L3C half
1039 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV RANGE MIN MAX SEMEAN.
1040
1041 DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=SL1A SL1B SL1C half SL2A SL2B SL2C half SL3A SL3B SL3C half
1042 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV RANGE MIN MAX SEMEAN.
1043
1044 DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=L1A L1B L1C L2A L2B L2C L3A L3B L3C RA L1A RA L1B RA L1C RA L2A
RA L2B
1045 RA L2C RA L3A RA L3B RA L3C
1046 /STATISTICS=MEAN STDDEV RANGE MIN MAX SEMEAN.
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A.3.0.1 Marginal Preferences and Traces on levels
Marginal preferences are a sort of projection of the global preference  on each attribute
i and, more precisely, on each subset I of attributes, so that vectors of space A can
be compared by “fixing” a number of their coordinates ai and allowing the rest of the
attributes w−i that do not belong to subset I to vary. Marginal traces also allow
for such comparisons, but they provide more information regarding the alternatives
containing the w−i [33].
Marginal preferences are defined as: ai  bi ⇔ (i, w−i)(i, w−i),∀w−i ∈ A−I , where ai
are vectors on subspace AI and w−i on A−I.
Marginal traces on levels are defined as: ∀ai, bi ∈ AI , ∀w−i ∈ A−I , ∀k ∈ A:
1. ai + bi ⇔ [(bi, w−i) ≥ k ⇒ (ai, w−i ≥ k]
2. ai − bi ⇔ [k  (ai, w−i)⇒ k(bi, w−i]
3. ai ± bi ⇔

(bi, w−i) ≥ k ⇒ (ai, w−i ≥ k)
and
k  (ai, w−i)⇒ k(bi, w−i)
If we consider the attributes: security, operational time and monetary amount, then
the set of all attributes is {1, 2, 3} ≡ {SEC,OPS,Z} and, e.g. for subset I = {1, 3} we
have:
ai  bi i.e. (s1, z1)  (s2, z2)⇒ (s1, o1, z1)  (s2, o2, z2),∀o1, o2 ∈ A2 = A−I .
ai + bi i.e. (s2, o1, z2)  k ⇒ (s1, o2, z1)  k, ∀o1, o2 ∈ A2 = A−I .
ai − bi i.e. k  (s1, o1, z1)⇒ k  (s2, o2, z2), ∀o1, o2 ∈ A2 = A−I .
For the particular context of information security investment, it is intuitively apparent
that not all “subsets I” of attributes allow for marginal preferences and marginal traces
to be defined on the attribute levels αi and βi. The question which arises then, is
whether the allowed “subsets I” can be empirically elicited through experiments. The
necessary conditions which will allow for the constructive proof of existence of a (unique)
preference relation can be empirically tested [95].
Conjoint Analysis is a statistical methodology that emanated from conjoint measure-
ment theory that allows for the empirical elicitation of stated preferences.
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A.4.0.1 Supplementary Survey
Question 1: “Are you related with the profession or practice of Information
Security in any way?”
Question 2: Question: “Your current or last job role most closely resembles:”
 Senior executive role
(e.g. CEO, CIO, CISO, CSO etc.)
 Managerial role
(e.g. Project Manager, IT Director, Security Manager etc.)
 IT & Security
(e.g. Security Officer, System Admin, Cyber Security Information Analyst etc.)
 Compliance, Risk or Privacy role
(e.g. Governance, Risk and Compliance Consultant, Information Security Consultant,
Auditor etc.)
 Other: please specify
Questions related to Perception of Risk & Skills:
Question 3: “In your opinion, how willing are Information Security Profession-
als to take risks?”
(not willing at all, mostly not willing, neither willing nor not-willing, somewhat
willing, very willing)
Question 4: “Do you think that your mathematical abilities are better than the
average person’s?” (e.g. with respect to probabilities and expected values)
(not better at all, mostly not better, the same, somewhat better, much better)
Question 5: “How willing are you to take risks in general?”
(not willing at all, mostly not willing, neither willing nor not-willing, somewhat
willing, very willing)
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Question 6: “Which one of the following gambles do you instinctively prefer,
by first look?”
You have to roll a dice,
(Gamble A) If a ‘5’ or a ‘6’ comes up, you win (or better use ‘lose’?) $10
(Gamble B) If a ‘6’ comes up, you win (or better use ‘lose’?) $20
Question 7: “Imagine you are responsible for the Information Security budget
and you have to consider potential information security threats. Evaluate and
rank the following statements from the most important to the least important:”
 Estimating expected losses, e.g. Asset Value × Vulnerability × Threat Probability
 Considering losses of the worst-case scenario
 Estimating a specific probability of loss instead of a range of probabilities
 Prioritising security of the system
 Prioritising operational time of tasks
 Investing in security measures for small-probability threats
 Investing in security measures for large-probability threats
 Eliminating existing risk completely
 Containing potential monetary losses in case of a security incident
 Reducing the vulnerabilities of the system
 Obtaining appropriate insurance
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Question 8: “Imagine you are responsible for Information Security budget and
you have to consider potential information security threats. Which of the fol-
lowing items do you consider important?”
 Estimating expected losses, e.g. Asset Value × Vulnerability × Threat Probability
 Considering losses of the worst-case scenario
 Estimating a specific probability of loss instead of a range of probabilities
 Prioritising security of the system
 Prioritising operational time of tasks
 Investing in security measures for small-probability threats
 Investing in security measures for large-probability threats
 Eliminating existing risk completely
 Containing potential monetary losses in case of a security incident
 Reducing the vulnerabilities of the system
 Obtaining appropriate insurance
Questions related to Professional Role:
Question 9: “Are you less or more risk seeking in your [ ]a role than in your
personal life?”
(much less risk seeking in my professional role, somewhat less risk seeking, the
same, somewhat more risk seeking, much more risk seeking in my professional
role)
aParticipants were presented with their role, as stated in Question 2.
Question 10: “Are you less or more risk seeking than your colleagues in your
[ ]a role?”
(less risk seeking than colleagues, somewhat less risk seeking, the same, some-
what more risk seeking, more risk seeking than colleagues)
aParticipants were presented with their role, as stated in Question 2.
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Question 11: “In your opinion, the perceived importance of which of the follow-
ing statements does your [ ]a role affect, making you more careful or worried?”
 Estimating expected losses, e.g. Asset Value × Vulnerability × Threat Probability
 Considering losses of the worst-case scenario
 Estimating a specific probability of loss instead of a range of probabilities
 Prioritising security of the system
 Prioritising operational time of tasks
 Investing in security measures for small-probability threats
 Investing in security measures for large-probability threats
 Eliminating existing risk completely
 Containing potential losses in case of a security incident
 Reducing the vulnerabilities of the system
 Obtaining appropriate insurance
aParticipants were presented with their role, as stated in Question 2.
Question 12: “In your opinion, the perceived importance of which of the
two attributes: Security or Operational Time, is affected by the following
professional roles?”
Attribute that is perceived as more important:
Security Operational Time
Senior executive role (e.g. CEO, CIO,
CISO, CSO etc.)
 
Managerial role (e.g. Project Manager, IT
Director, Security Manager etc.)
 
IT & Security (e.g. Security Officer, Sys-
tem Admin, Cyber Security Information
Analyst etc.)
 
Compliance, Risk or Privacy role (e.g.
Governance, Risk and Compliance Consul-
tant, Information Security Consultant, Au-
ditor etc.)
 
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Question 13: “How willing are you to take risks in your [ ]a role?”
(not willing at all, mostly not willing, neither willing nor not-willing, somewhat
willing, very willing)
aParticipants were presented with their role, as stated in Question 2.
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